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"Political Theology and International Justice"

О журнале

«Социологическое обозрение» — академический рецензируемый журнал теоретических, эмпирических и исторических исследований в социальных науках. Журнал выходит четыре раза в год. В каждом выпуске публикуются оригинальные исследовательские статьи, обзоры и рефераты, переводы современных и классических работ в социологии, политической теории и социальной философии.

Цели

- Поддерживать дискуссии по фундаментальным проблемам социальных наук.
- Способствовать развитию и обогащению теоретического словаря и языка социальных наук через междисциплинарный диалог.
- Формировать корпус образовательных материалов для развития преподавания социальных наук.

Область исследований

Журнал «Социологическое обозрение» приглашает социальных исследователей присылать статьи, в которых рассматриваются фундаментальные проблемы социальных наук с различных концептуальных и методологических перспектив. Нас интересуют статьи, затрагивающие такие проблемы как социальное действие, социальный порядок, время и пространство, мобильности, власть, нарративы, события и т. д.

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- Социология мобильности
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- Культурсоциология
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Журнал ориентирован на академическую и неакадемическую аудитории, заинтересованные в обсуждении фундаментальных проблем современного общества и социальных наук. Кроме того, публикуемые материалы (в частности, обзоры, рефераты и переводы) будут интересны студентам, преподавателям курсов по социальным наукам и другим ученым, участвующим в образовательном процессе.

Подписка

Журнал является электронным и распространяется бесплатно. Все статьи публикуются в открытом доступе на сайте: http://sociologica.hse.ru/. Чтобы получать сообщения о свежих выпусках, подпишитесь на рассылку журнала по адресу: farkhatdinov@gmail.com.

СОЦИОЛОГИЧЕСКОЕ ОБОЗРЕНИЕ

✳

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Тематический выпуск
«Политическая теология и международная справедливость»

About the Journal

The Russian Sociological Review is an academic peer-reviewed journal of theoretical, empirical and historical research in social sciences.

The Russian Sociological Review publishes four issues per year. Each issue includes original research papers, review articles and translations of contemporary and classical works in sociology, political theory and social philosophy.

Aims

- To provide a forum for fundamental issues of social sciences.
- To foster developments in social sciences by enriching theoretical language and vocabulary of social science and encourage a cross-disciplinary dialogue.
- To provide educational materials for the university-based scholars in order to advance teaching in social sciences.

Scope and Topics

The Russian Sociological Review invites scholars from all the social scientific disciplines to submit papers which address the fundamental issues of social sciences from various conceptual and methodological perspectives. Understood broadly the fundamental issues include but not limited to: social action and agency, social order, narrative, space and time, mobilities, power, etc.

The Russian Sociological Review covers the following domains of scholarship:
- Contemporary and classical social theory
- Theories of social order and social action
- Social methodology
- History of sociology
- Russian social theory
- Sociology of space
- Sociology of mobilities
- Social interaction
- Frame analysis
- Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis
- Cultural sociology
- Political sociology, philosophy and theory
- Narrative theory and analysis
- Human geography and urban studies

Our Audience

The Russian Sociological Review aims at both academic and non-academic audiences interested in the fundamental issues of social sciences. Its readership includes both junior and established scholars.

Subscription

The Russian Sociological Review is an open access electronic journal and is available online for free via http://sociologica.hse.ru/en.

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This issue of Russian Sociological Review is the tenth special issue since 2014, when we began publishing four issues a year, one of which is entirely in English and usually focused on a special topic. The electronic format of the journal allows us to monitor the ups and downs of readership over many years. Last year, interest in the 2014 special issue "Borders: Merging, Emerging, Emergent" grew again, and this year the most frequently addressed issue is 2015 "State of War: Human Condition and Social Orders". It was in the middle of the last decade that we managed to raise questions that are still urgent today.

The beginning of the process of widespread shifting in what had until recently seemed to be solid state borders, as well as the ensuing military confrontations and the increased danger of a big war, were not merely important as political events that had a significant impact on all spheres of social life. Much more important was their significance as symptoms of profound processes that are still not entirely clear in nature today. Here is what we wrote: "The central concept state of war was chosen very carefully. It appeared for the first time in the middle of the 17th century and in the history of ideas it was permanently associated with the great political thinkers who introduced the concept of war into the very construction of contractually established peace. War is not the absolute beginning of sociality. War is always there, not before, not after the peace, but rather as the dark side of any peace itself. Paradoxically, as it may seem, the wars between political units (i.e. modern states) as well as any others, e.g., partisan or hybrid wars of today, appear less important than this original war ('Warre', as Thomas Hobbes called it)" (Editorial, 2015: 10). This reasoning is still relevant today, but only as far as we consider the increased tendency to undermine the state of peace as a precondition of social life in general. However, we should also partially revise our earlier assumptions and acknowledge that the social ontology of war, as seen in those years, is today accompanied by simpler and more traditional considerations. War permeates the entire social fabric of the modern world.

However, it is often manifested as the familiar conflict between political entities, both classical and contemporary, which are not necessarily limited to states. Various movements, organizations, and armed groups are capable of waging long and full-scale hostilities against each other and against internationally recognized states. Unfortunately, this creates a more familiar picture of the contemporary world than the one influenced by decades of globalization.

Why do we have to modify our assessments? The disintegration of the social fabric has led to the emergence of hotbeds of tension but has not changed the framework conditions of world society, while maintaining a more or less stable world order. However, we are now experiencing a possibly reverse movement. States all over the world are increasingly determined to wage wars among themselves and with other belligerent forces to assert old borders or draw new ones. However, the strengthening of states and the emergence of new state-like political entities does not only involve the reinforcement of military and administrative apparatuses. It also entails the restoration of political communities. While concepts such as world society, global society, and society without borders still hold relevance, they belong to a previous era. The trend has shifted. Among other things, there has been a strengthening of communities based on political boundaries rather than cultural tradition or values in their purest form. One concept that has been suitable and well-known since the 19th century in this regard is the 'Schicksalsgemeinschaft' or 'community of fate'. But fate is primarily an external circumstance, regardless of how one interprets the concept. Solidarity emerges in moments of intense confrontation because politics contributes decisively to the formation of unity.

This perspective, based on the friend/enemy dichotomy, was substantiated by Carl Schmitt. It was initially formulated in the renowned essay *Der Begriff des Politischen* (1927) and has since been widely reprinted and commented upon, including by the author himself. It can be seen as an expression of perilous German revanchism, as Schmitt argues that people gain political status in a state that refuses to remain neutral and determines its own allies and adversaries. This is a political deontology, not a moral one. The people must unite and prepare for war in order to exist as a cohesive entity. Leo Strauss, a profound interpreter and critic of Schmitt, accurately cites *The Concept of the Political*: "But the possibility of war does not merely constitute the political as such; war is not merely 'the most extreme political measure'; war is the dire emergency not merely within an 'autonomous' region—the region of the political—but for man simply, because war has and retains a 'relationship to the real possibility of physical killing' […]; this orientation, which is constitutive for the political, shows that the political is fundamental and not a 'relatively independent domain' alongside others" (Strauss, 2007: 104). Schmitt's work is often preferred to be read as prescriptive, but it also has an analytical and descriptive content. "Schmitt desires only to know what is" (Strauss, 2007: 108). In the late 20s — early 30s of the 20th century, he emphasizes the connection between military confrontation and the primordial character of politics. This is important: in certain epochs we may want peace and prefer non-political areas of culture, be they economics, science, or sports. But there comes a time when political confrontation makes them subordinate; their importance, contrary to

our desires, may be vanishingly small to the political community of a people. Perhaps that time is near again. However, scholars and philosophers still need and will need to question the political, legal, and discursive framework in which the confrontation occurs.

It is noticeable that Schmitt's interpretations of his own position changed after World War II, particularly in the 1963 edition of *The Concept of the Political* (Schmitt, 1963), that has been less well-received internationally than earlier versions of the text. Schmitt insisted that his writing was intended for experts in the history of international law and those familiar with the traditional European definition of state. This is a significant point, as it highlights how researchers' fundamental intuitions can shift, even if they claim to remain loyal to traditional concepts. The historical epoch influences our constructions, even the most abstract ones. For several decades, our situation has differed greatly from those of both great wars and also from the expectations of war in the first half of the 20th century. While we may not currently face such an existential confrontation of enemies as was the case in the first half of the last century, it is possible that we are now closer to the 1930s than to the 1960s. The legal framework of growing conflicts is a current topic, and the potential for forming political communities within state borders and other political entities must be discussed in a new discursive field. A century ago, some countries had high hopes for the League of Nations, while others did not recognize its legitimacy. Today, the legitimacy of the UN is rarely questioned, but its effectiveness is increasingly scrutinized. For conflicts to not only erupt but also end in treaties, a legitimate treaty framework must exist. This framework should be ethically and legally recognized to provide a context for the agreement. The current violations of treaties suggest that such a recognized context does not exist, and humanity may be at the beginning of a new journey.

We have tried to take a few steps in this field by combining, according to a well-established tradition, the problems of law and justice with political theology. This issue is based on the proceedings of a conference that our journal held on May 19-20, 2023, in cooperation with the Center for Fundamental Sociology of the National Research University Higher School of Economics. Researchers engaged in theoretical and historical sociology, international relations and international law, political philosophy, theology, and the history of ideas and intellectual history took part in the discussion.

Political theology today is a rapidly growing field of social science. It has long gone beyond the original project outlined by Carl Schmitt a century ago and continued in his later works. Modern scholars have largely diverged from Schmitt, both in their interpretation of specific issues and in their formulation of general problems. This does not prevent us from seeing political theology as a highly productive and instructive way of thinking. What is remarkable for sociologists, philosophers, and legal theorists is that it allows us to connect the work of political theology with questions of constitutional and international law, that is, with the study of the foundations of domestic social and political order along with the conditions of possibility of that order in foreign policy.

We are aware that this is as yet unfamiliar specifically to sociology. Classical sociology appears in the golden age of international law, when, after the Franco-Prussian War, peace

was established in Europe for almost half a century, and the desire for cooperation among civilized peoples is reinforced by the creation of numerous international institutions. The First World War shatters not all illusions. Although the great sociologists become militant nationalists: Max Weber advocates the strengthening of Germany's position as a world power, Georg Simmel points to the need for a "spiritual solution" during the war, and Emile Durkheim exposes the aggressive role of German imperialism. The idea that the order established after the defeat of Germany and its allies in the war is not only forcibly guaranteed, but also just, is not only alien to the defeated — it is not even discussed by the victors.

However, if the state order of the defeated country, within which its social life takes place, is simply an order imposed from outside, it cannot be based on a law higher than the laws of this country itself. And if the international order is not recognized as such by all countries, the victors cannot convincingly justify the justice of this order, the justice of the very law they declare as "international", i.e., binding on all polities. But the justice or injustice of the supreme legal order is no longer a sociological or even a legal question. It is a question that transcends the purely immanent and historically concrete realities of military or foreign policy practice. Here we all find ourselves in a field of tension between the ultimate meanings of the religious-metaphysical type and the political-legal narratives familiar to modernity. Their adequate interpretation is precisely what is possible in the field of political theology.

Today it does not take much effort to notice the widespread use of theological rhetoric and symbolism in public communication, in the speeches of representatives of the hostile parties. The classical understanding of the enemy as someone who just as an enemy has his legitimate claims is not to be accepted or even considered at all. An enemy would be declared not as a legitimate party to a foreign policy conflict (with their own interests, albeit pursued by unacceptable means), but as an absolute evil in the theological or even religious sense. As a result of certain discursive manipulations, the conflict ceases to be usual for relations between modern states, it turns out to be the last phase of the struggle between good and evil, God and the Devil.

For social scientists around the world, this puts on the agenda the task of renewing political-theological studies in the field of international legal description and analysis, not so much of wars themselves, but of the future world order that always comes after the cessation of hostilities.

The current crisis of the system of international relations has acutely raised the question of cognitive resources for conceptualizing both the causes of the outlined disintegration of the existing world order and the prospects for its reassembly on new, more equitable principles. In the conditions of ideological and value disorientation of many subjects, interpreters and theorists of foreign policy, classical approaches and developments of the previous generations of political thinkers, who formed the very language of interpretation of international events, gain new significance. In this sense, the heuristic potential inherent in the works of the classics of political theology, recently erroneously considered exhausted, is now again proving to be an invaluable intellectual experience in a situation of global semantic uncertainty.

There are several key aspects in our issue around which the articles naturally cluster. However, they all echo each other, and we decided not to make thematic sections in it.

Evidently, for a number of authors in this issue, the most important political and theological resources are the post-war writings of Carl Schmitt and, above all, his important notion of katechon. The issue opens with Dmitry Popov's article "Katechon: on the political and theological foundations of international justice". The article's main hypothesis is that in international relations, the katechon functions as a balancing force for a particular spatial order. This order is expressed through the containment or transgression of forces that aim to demarcate 'red lines', which ultimately shifts the horizon for catastrophic events.

The topic of katechon is continued in the article by Yevgeny Uchaev "The Concept of Katechon in the Thought of Carl Schmitt: Towards a Different Universalism?". This article argues that the katechon might offer a non-liberal and non-revolutionary universalist political project, with Carl Schmitt as an unlikely ally. Contrary to dominant interpretations, Schmitt's notion of the katechon does not legitimize either sovereign state power or international plurality. Rather, it embodies an underappreciated universalist strand in Schmitt's thought that is in tension with the confrontational and pluralist logic of his concept of the political or the idea of the Grossraum (large space).

Irina Borshch compares in her article Carl Schmitt and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. Both were prominent lawyers in Weimar Germany, but their paths diverged dramatically in 1933. They shared the belief that the modern state should act as a deterrent to war. Additionally, they both emphasized the importance of the church in maintaining stability within the new international order of the Westphalian era. This approach to international justice was based on the concept of religious pluralism, which allowed for a variety of sovereign states.

A critical approach to Schmitt's ideas is developed by Marina Marren in her paper "The Power of Political Theology: Analysis of Carl Schmitt's Sovereign Dictatorship and Friend-Enemy Distinction through Friedrich J. W. Schelling and Sigmund Freud". To explain why it would be inappropriate to take Schmitt's insights into political theology as prescriptive, the author turns to Friedrich W. J. Schelling's 1809 Freiheitsschrift and argues that Schmitt's theologized sovereign dictator is a force of evil. The author then discusses Sigmund Freud's 1929 Das Unbehangen in der Kultur to shed light on the psychological underpinnings of the friend-enemy distinction as it manifests in real life.

A completely different approach to the problem of international justice is presented in the article by Dmitry Balashov "Thomas Nagel's Theory of Justice". Competing conceptions have emerged, which can be presented as three broad lines of argumentation: 'moral cosmopolitanism', 'political cosmopolitanism', and 'statism'. Thomas Nagel's Theory of Justice is one of the most influential 'statist' theories among liberal theories of global justice. Nagel's Hobbesian conception of global justice is based on the key points of Hobbes' theory, but he significantly modified the original ideas. The author argues that the modifications allowed him to invoke the principles of egalitarian justice at the state level and assert that international relations are not devoid of morality.

Another section consists of articles by Timofey Bordachev and Vladimir Petrunin. Both of them are dedicated to Russia and Russian Orthodoxy. Timofei Bordachev in the article "Rus' — The New Israel: The Medium and The Message of the Medieval Russian Political Philosophy" explores the question of the influence of the religious and political concept of "Rus' — New Israel" on the public consciousness of Russia and its foreign policy culture. Throughout several centuries of Russian history, the concept of identifying the Russian land with ancient Israel played a significant role in comprehending and conceptualizing major political events in Russian chronicles and religious literature. This suggests that during the early stages of the development of the Russian state, this religious-political construct was the most important way of self-identification in the surrounding world.

In his extensive review, Vladimir Petrunin examines the social doctrines of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as the social-political provisions of the documents adopted by the Council of Crete in 2016, in relation to international justice. According to social doctrines, achieving international justice is impossible due to the sinful depravity of human nature. This sinfulness results in various forms of global discrimination, not only against individuals or social groups, but also against peoples and states. In social doctrines, war is considered an unacceptable means of solving global issues. Orthodox churches advocate for fair international relations based on Christian values and criticize the current world order, which they believe is based on the ideology of liberal globalism and secularism.

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Katechon: On the Political and Theological Foundations of International Justice

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The paper examines the problems of international justice in its relation to one of the most significant concepts of Christian theology — the *katechon*. The main hypothesis of the article is that the *katechon* in international relations manifests itself as a balancing effect of a specific spatial order, expressed in the containment/transgression of forces aimed at the demarcation of "red lines", and contributes to the displacement of the horizon for catastrophic events. In order to substantiate this hypothesis, a link has been drawn between the concept of "red lines" and the historically established international legal borders separating spheres of influence in world affairs and invariably expressing the idea of a threshold that separates order from chaos, whose transgression is perceived as a collapse of the established equilibrium. The "red lines" are related to the idea of international justice in three ways: as fixed legal boundaries (the *nomos* of the Earth); as a balance of forces and capabilities determined by the parties; and as rules for transgressing boundaries, which lead to the notion of just war. The analysis of the reasons for a just war leads to a *katechonic* threshold that can be crossed in the perspective of the loss of ideas of a "just enemy", a just cause of war, a just war on both sides and the reduction of a law of war to an act of aggression, to a reactive response to crimes against humanity and the identification of the aggressor as a criminal. This model of just war entails the demonization of the enemy and translates the conflict into the Armageddon paradigm, which makes it possible to establish an essential link between the issues of war, international justice and *katechon*. The *katechon*, studied in the article on the basis of theological interpretations as an Empire (in particular, a Christian empire), righteousness, the power of divine grace, as well as the need to preach the Gospel around the world, appears in the political-theological paradigm as a factor restraining the forces of destruction. The restraint of the pure will to destroy allows us to see that the *katechon* fulfils not only an agonistic but also a liturgical function, the purpose of which is to maintain a continuous link between the content of culture, which is centered on the idea of humanity, and the actions of the actors in international relations. It is the preservation of humanity, based on the highest cultural values, that is the final "red line", thanks to the inviolability of which international justice is preserved and the coming of the Judgment Day is restrained.

Keywords: political theology, *katechon*, international justice, containment, transgression

Katechon: on the History and Semantics of the Concept

Katechon (from the Greek. ὁ κατέχων — "a restrainer") is a theological and political concept that has roots in Christian eschatology. Having no unambiguous content, the *katechon* is understood as some actor with a mission to prevent the final triumph of evil in history and the coming of the Antichrist. The origin of the concept goes back to the words of the Apostle Paul in the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, where he speaks of the postponement of the Day of Judgement: "He who now restrains it will do so until he

is out of the way" (2 Thess. 2:7). There are a number of interpretations of whom or what should be considered a *katechon*. First, the Empire — the Imperium that is understood not so much as a way of organizing a political union, but primarily as a World Empire — the only one of its kind, a true empire with a mission and the moral power to resist world evil, the Antichrist). Thus, John Chrysostom believed the Roman Empire to be that restrainer who prevented rampant evil through the power of its imperial organization. Different views on the special role of a particular nation or supranational union (e.g., the United Nations) can be traced to this version. Second, sanctity (lat. Sanctitas) — the sanctity of the righteous and the Divine grace are seen as a restrainer that will be taken away from people because of their total resentment and lack of love. Third, there is the interpretation of St. Ephraim the Syrian and St. John of Damascus, which associates the *katechon* with the proclamation of Gospel throughout the world (*Evangelium praedicans per orbem terrarum*) that inevitably precedes the Judgement Day[1].

There are a number of interpretations available for this explanation. In the famous polemic between Carl Schmitt and Eric Peterson, the former broadly interpreted the Empire as a bulwark of order, organization, and a spiritual fortress on the way to chaos, while the latter believed that "what acts as katechon is not a political power [potere], but only the Jews' refusal to convert" (Agamben, 2011: 16). Following Agamben, "for Peterson… the historical events he witnessed — from the World Wars to totalitarianism, from the technological revolution to the atomic bomb — are theologically insignificant. All but one: the extermination of the Jews. If the eschatological advent of the Kingdom will become concrete and real only after the Jews have converted, then the destruction of the Jews cannot be unrelated to the destiny of the Church" (Agamben, 2011: 16). Thus, in contrast to Schmitt who thought of *katechon* in terms of political unions and their leaders, Peterson views it negatively, as an event of conversion that did not happen, thereby delaying the coming of the Last Day.

It seems that the political-theological interpretation of international justice should be related to the idea of the *katechon*, taking into account the meaning given to political theology by Carl Schmitt, who argued that all "significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development… but also because of their systematic structure…" (Schmitt, 2005: 36). In Schmitt's logic, a katechonic perspective can be seen in the twists and turns of international re-

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1. Thus the famous Russian *narodnik*, and later even more famous monarchist and conservative thinker, Lev Tihomirov, summarizes his views on the *katechon* in this way: "... the ground is already sufficiently prepared for the appearance of the Antichrist. But for a certain period of time something "restraining" prevents his appearance... Some considered the Roman state to be this restrainer, and among them was even St. John Chrysostom... The thought of St. John Chrysostom is that a firm state system, based on the ideals of law and order, prevents the revolution that the Antichrist will produce. Some other interpreters believed that the restrainer was divine grace. Still others thought that "God's predetermination" should be considered as a restrainer, that is, the coming of the Antichrist cannot take place before all that God has planned for the salvation of mankind is fulfilled... In particular, the means by which the Lord restrains the Antichrist can be diverse: among them may be worldly means or the action of divine grace" (Tihomirov, 2012: 627).

lations. And if in Christian theology the katechonic barrier restrains the Antichrist, in political theology it does the same to "his" *predicates*.

It is significant that *katechon* connotes the double meaning of restraint and transgression — the passage that opens a new horizon and a new, long-awaited, righteous world order, the Millennial Kingdom. In this context, the *katechon* is at once a barrier and a boundary, both a border and a "gateway". It redeems the world from ruin, but it also redeems the perishing world for eternity. The katechonic horizon is predetermined by the theological interpretation of the *katechon* as a simultaneous twofold desire to prevent the coming of the Last Day and, in the meantime, to allow its advent. Jacob Taubes, in his polemic with Carl Schmitt, "discovers an eschatological dimension that acts as a direct revolutionary counterpoint to Schmitt's counterrevolutionary political theology, which seeks to prevent revolution even as it seeks to stimulate a certain form of legal anarchy — a state of emergency... the sovereign, put in theological terms, plays the *katechon* role… the role of some 'restraining force' that prevents the coming of Antichrist, an event that precedes the Apocalypse and the coming of Messiah. Taubes, however, sees this differently. Secular political power is regarded as clearly negligible and futile from an eschatological perspective. It is well known that for St. Paul the coming of the Messiah is accompanied by the fall of the Roman Empire. Pauline messianism is seen by Taubes as a kind of revolutionary state of emergency when the regime of power collapses" (Jarkeev, 2022: 11). If, from the position of restraint, the shift in the perspective of the Judgment Day is viewed as unconditionally positive, then from the perspective of the possibility of the imminent onset of the chiliastic era, the Judgment Day is perceived in the same positive modality. The result of the complex superimposition of "horror without end" and "horrible end" is precisely the displacement of the katechonic horizon as a result of active resistance to the subversive forces of chaos, which postpones the prospect of doomsday into an uncertain future.

If *katechon* restrains the forces of destruction, it is primarily because it preserves the optics of the universal struggle between Good and Evil as the main event taking place in the world. The *katechon* leads back to the source of reality. The Apostle Paul, in his Epistle to the Galatians, said: "Be not deceived: God is not mocked" (Galat. 6:7) Reality is not negated. K*atechon* restrains the negation of reality. Its main function is not agonal, not even containment or transgression, but liturgy. The "restrainer" does not allow the disintegration of the ontological link between the will to humanness, based on love and mercy, and the reality of human life. K*atechon* opposes pure will, the quintessence of arbitrariness. Everything that cultivates a human, that shapes human culture, has a katechonic dimension. Health, upbringing, education, observance of moral and legal norms, political participation in the name of the common good, spiritual and creative pursuits — all these are elements of culture integrated into established forms that "cultivate" the mind and will of the individual and resist the excessive, the exaggerated, the uncontrollable, the ugly — all of which have disastrous consequences. If *katechon* restrains, it is primarily because it is the sum of human cultivation. It is culture that gives humanity its form. The *katechon* that restrains the coming of the Last Day associated with actions of subversive forces, re-

lies on the human in man, connects with him. This is the lasting significance of *katechon* as the political and theological foundation of international justice that is brought about by humanness. The essence of world order, which has *katechon*ic significance, is the human ability to distinguish a false inhuman reality from a reality that supports humanness. If this "red line" is crossed, nothing will restrain the coming of doomsday.

Drawing the "Red Lines"

The basic semantic interpretations of *katechon* lead us to the question of how it can be visibly manifested in the interaction between individuals, peoples, states and civilizations, directly affecting international justice. It is obvious that the concept of "red lines", behind which the language of the ultimatum is clearly visible, i.e. of the ultimate (*ultimus* in Latin) — the "final" demands, firmly established in the space of political *polemos* — can fulfill this function.

Note that the "red lines", perceived primarily as a metaphor, have a long-standing background. In the writings of Carl Schmitt, one of the key concepts is that of the *"nomos",* a law embodied in a visible concrete spatial order dating back to the "land-appropriation": "Nomos comes from *nemein* — a [Greek] word that means both 'to divide' and 'to pasture'. Thus, nomos is the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people becomes spatially visible — the initial measure and division of pastureland…" (Schmitt, 2006: 70). Similarly, Hannah Arendt notes that the prototypes of law in the ancient world were "*horoi,* the boundaries between one estate and another, divine", defended by "Zeus Herkeios, the protector of border lines" (Arendt, 1998: 30). The very concept of law is rooted in the specific spatial order of land-division after the land is initially appropriated. Boundary stones — the "petrified" law — "restrain" the balance and warn against its transgression. James Scott seems to base his concept of a "grain state" (Scott, 2018) on Schmitt's considerations, demonstrating how the appropriation of alluvial land in Mesopotamia becomes a springboard for the emergence of proto-states that fix the established spatial order. The lines on the ground mark the boundaries that separate order from hostile chaos.

"Red lines" have been entangling the Earth for a long time. For the first time, global distributive lines divided the world in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean according to the Spanish-Portuguese Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. In 1526, the Treaty of Saragossa created the Raya, a line that crossed the Pacific Ocean and divided the spheres of influence between Spain and Portugal. Then, initiated by the Spanish-French Treaty of 1559, the *amity lines* appeared. Amity lines separated the space in which the accepted fair interstate legal order operated from "no man's land", where international law did not apply. And finally, the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 marked the line separating the Western Hemisphere from the Eastern Hemisphere. This line was primarily political, not geographic. In the Monroe Doctrine, the Western Hemisphere was considered the security space of the United States. The line dividing the Western and Eastern Hemispheres is the line of the elect, given the fact that the New World presented itself as true Europe, as opposed to historical Europe. In this respect, this barrier had the value of a protective trench and *cordon*

sanitaire. Over time, the Monroe Doctrine shifted from isolationism to interventionism, and the Western Hemisphere line was transformed from a cordon into a virtual mobile frontier.

There is another important political meaning behind the "red lines". These lines are complementary to the spatial demarcation of "friend" and "enemy", which, according to Schmitt's logic, is actually a political act. Schmitt emphasizes that the "distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation… The political enemy… is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible" (Schmitt, 2007: 26). The friend/enemy distinction constitutes the realm of the political. Being the highest degree of association/dissociation, this distinction is a form of differentiation. The "red lines" may or may not be associated with it. Although the genealogy of the concept of "red line" doesn't directly refer to enmity or friendship, denoting the line beyond which someone's behavior becomes unacceptable, we can witness the coincidence between red lines and the distinction between friend and enemy in case of territorial borders (especially when it comes to military invasion or some other kind of intervention in internal affairs). In this sense, the distinction between friend and enemy is related to the theme of red lines. However, not every boundary is a red line. Many lines and boundaries are transparent and crossing or violating them does not entail dramatic consequences.

So the red lines separate the "insider" from the "alien" who should be treated with suspicion. At the same time, in her analysis of the problems of the "alien" (who, of course, is more an enemy than a friend), Svetlana Ban'kovskaya notes: "An alien is interesting as someone who performs a special kind of function in a group… The key criterion for determining an alien… is the 'unity of proximity and distance' in relation to a group. At first, this criterion is interpreted as purely spatial, but … it turns out that a temporal criterion is also assumed here. An alien is someone who was not there 'at the beginning', who comes later… In a graphic representation, this is perhaps similar to a vector whose starting point is a group and whose direction is indeterminate" (Ban'kovskaya, 2023: 71-75). In this situation, red lines cease to be barriers. If the "alien" is identified as a friend rather than an enemy, then there is a possibility of changing attitudes toward him, which opens up the prospect of red lines becoming transparent. Understanding an "alien" means being able to neutralize the idea of the unacceptability of contact with him, creating conditions under which the red lines allow their transgression.

The Peace of Westphalia, the Congress of Vienna, the Treaty of Versailles, and the Yalta Conference are historical events that determined the configuration of the "red lines" that were often drawn over the previous ones. In terms of red lines, the world is a palimpsest. Over time, the sphere of "red lines" has become less visible to the eye. The lines have been drawn through water, air, and space. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is meant to deter a nuclear war. And this is one of the most "red" lines — the line of the "red button", to use a common dysphemism. Right in front of our very eyes, Elon Musk has launched a public plebiscite on the restrictions that should be placed

on artificial intelligence systems. The commercial launch of ChatGPT has prompted a call for "digital red lines" in virtual space. All these lines define both the visible spatial order of safe coexistence between states as well as other possibilities for the existence of humanity. The "red lines" problem is ultimately related to a situation of danger, of existential risks, which in the political and theological dimension has a katechonic horizon of reflection.

As a result, the connection between the red lines and international justice is threefold. First, the world, understood as an *orbis* (i.e., a circle), has had natural or specially created artificial boundaries since the time of the ancient history of proto-states and states in the proper sense of the word. These could be seas, oceans, mountain ranges, or things like the Midgard Serpent, the Pillars of Hercules, or the Great Wall: "The purpose of such boundaries was to separate a pacified order from a quarrelsome disorder, a cosmos from a chaos, a house from a non-house, an enclosure from the wilderness. Boundaries constituted a division in terms of international law…" (Schmitt, 2006: 52). The presence of certain boundaries — of "red lines" drawn on the ground and in the mind — meant "mutual recognition, above all of the fact that neighboring soil beyond the border was sovereign territory" (Schmitt, 2006: 52).

Thus, the red lines delineate the boundaries of the oecumene, the populated universe, in which a certain recognized, specific spatial order operates, which is judged to be just, i.e., which establishes the concept of justice in relation to land ownership, and which contains demands for retribution for the violation of established boundaries. It follows, second, that red lines should be seen as an expression of the principle of balance, the balance of forces, capabilities, rights, and obligations in relation to the other party. Justice and balance are complementary if we consider the genesis of the concepts. In this way, justice can be thought of as equity, the right state of things (*aequitas*); as a measure that defines "to each his own"; as equivalence (from lat. *aequalis* — being of the same value and *valentis* — valid), which allows Ulpian to consider law (lat. *jus*) as "the art of goodness and equivalence" (*ius est ars boni et aequi*). Obviously, both justice and equilibrium (*aequilibrium*, from the combination of *aequus* — equal — and *libra*, meaning weigh-scales that define the balance between the parties) go back to the metaphor of measures and weights, the exact calculation of what is due to the parties when something is divided. The red lines are a spatial equilibrium of the owners of the earth on either side of them, although the observance of the equilibrium in itself is considered the spatial embodiment of justice. The most important thing for understanding the connection between red lines and international justice is, of course, the issue of imbalance, which requires resolution by conventionally established means that allow both to return to equilibrium and restore violated justice.

The Justice of War

Of course, red lines, even if they take the form of "impenetrable" constructions, are not eternal. Neighbors may have territorial disputes, which, as justice demands, should have

their own rules. The "land-appropriation" must be fair, so, thirdly, the red lines can only be changed as a result of a "just war". Ultimately, in a world permeated by borders, "all significant questions of an order based on international law ultimately coalesce in a concept of just war" (Schmitt, 2006: 120). A just war, in turn, requires both the determination of the attitude toward the enemy and the observance of a certain order of commencing, continuing, and ending hostilities. Hence the need to recognize the enemy's status as a "just enemy" (justus hostis). It is the "ability to recognize a *justus hostis* [just enemy] is the beginning of all international law" (Schmitt, 2006: 51-52). Then "*Justum bellum* is war between *justi hostes*; 'just' in the sense of 'just war' means the same as 'impeccable' or 'perfect' in the sense of 'formal justice'… The non-discriminatory concept of war based on parity — the *bellum utrimque justum* [just war on both sides] — was developed with even greater clarity out of the concept of a just enemy recognized by both sides" (Schmitt, 2006: 153). In the concrete historical period of the *jus publicum europaeum* established after the Peace of Westphalia, which defined the red lines of borders, confessions and peoples in seventeenth-century Europe, "all wars on European soil between the militarily organized armies of states recognized by European international law were pursued according to the European laws of war" (Schmitt 2006, 143). In a just war, legitimate and equal enemies (*justi et aequales hostes*), represented by sovereign states with a just cause for declaring war (*justa causa belli*), fight each other beyond the context of mutual demonization and discrimination: "The justice of war no longer is based on conformity with the content of theological, moral, or juridical norms, but on the institutional and structural quality of political forms. States pursued war against each other on one and the same level, and each side viewed the other not as traitors and criminals, but as *justi hostes*" (Schmitt, 2006: 142-143). Martin Van Creveld, who calls such a "classical" war "trinitarian", notes that "it only emerged after the Peace of Westphalia" (1991: 57). This war is based "on the idea of the state and on the distinction between government, army, and people" (Van Creveld, 1991: 57). Over time it "led to war being redefined as the province of the former two to the exclusion of the latter" (Van Creveld, 1991: 193). However, over time, where "armed force is directed by social entities that are not states, against social organizations that are not armies, and people who are not soldiers in our sense of the term, trinitarian concepts break down" (Van Creveld, 1991:72). War, as a culturally determined form of human activity, is undergoing a transformation. This transformation reveals for us an extremely important connection between international justice and war in its catastrophic consequences — the katechonic dimension. Having left aside the extremely curious aspect of the involvement of partisans, rebels and non-combatants, which leads to the transformation of the war into a non-trinitarian, irregular or low-intensity conflict (Martin Van Creveld); into a mutiny-war (Evgeniy Messner); into a civil war (Giorgio Agamben) and even into a global civil war (Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt), we will touch upon the aspect of demonizing the enemy, depriving him of the *justus hostis* status.

This transformation of war into the identification of the aggressor as a criminal (or outlaw) similar to a rebel and a pirate, is in itself based on the idea that "the injustice of aggression and the aggressor lies not in any substantive or material establishment of guilt

in war, in the sense of determining the cause of war, but rather in the *crime de l 'attaque*, in aggression as such" (Schmitt, 2006: 122). This means that the "present theory of just war aims to discriminate against the opponent who wages unjust war" (Schmitt, 2006: 122). In such a paradigm, crimes against humanity are inevitably attributed to the aggressor; he becomes *hostis generis humani* — the enemy of the human race — which enables the repulsion of the aggressor to be modeled in the metric of Armageddon, clearly referring to the problem of *katechon*. Crimes against humanity now include widespread killing, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against civilians before or during war, as well as systematic persecution on political, racial or religious grounds. Crimes against humanity are now considered in isolation from warfare. The list of inhumane acts has been expanded to include unjustified mass detention, torture, rape, and apartheid. Such crimes will be taken into account regardless of whether or not there is provision for them in the domestic law of the country where the crime was committed. The context for crimes against humanity is the crossing of the threshold of widespread criminal practices (Schabas, 2005: 209–216). The exposure (as well as the fabrication) of crimes against humanity committed by an enemy criminal entitles the opposing side to the status of waging a just war. Crusade mode is activated under the labarum of international justice (Erdmann, 1978).

The prerequisite for the return of the moral evaluation of the enemy's essence was related to the Enlightenment philosophy of absolute humanism of the XVIII century, when the concept of *Unmensch* (inhuman or monster) appeared for the first time. Paradoxically, this ethically charged concept contributes to the destruction of the post-Westphalian model of just war and creates the conditions for an Armageddon-type war with unpredictable consequences. Schmitt is ironic about pacifism, which seeks to free humanity from the unhuman representatives of the human race: "If pacifist hostility toward war were so strong as to drive pacifists into a war against non-pacifists, in a war against war… The war is then considered to constitute the absolute last war of humanity. Such a war is necessarily unusually intense and inhuman because, by transcending the limits of the political framework, it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed. In other words, he is an enemy who no longer must be compelled to retreat into his borders only" (2007: 36).

Thus, the abandonment of the conventional *jus publicum europaeum* concept of a just war in favor of the idea of the last and greatest just war raises the specter of Armageddon, when those who are "righteous" will fight the hordes of Gog and Magog in the name of humanity's final triumph. All this is directly related to the problems of the *katechon*. Speculative humanism allows us to see the possibility of a *katechon* retreat, the coming of doomsday caused by the violation of red lines in the act of *crime de l'attaque* without taking into account *justa causa belli* — this cornerstone of a just war of the *jus publicum europaeum's* classical period.

Moving on from the problem of the correlation between "red lines", international justice and the possible catastrophic consequences of their violation, the most important

of the *katechon's* "restraining" attributes — containment, must be mentioned, i.e. a factor that prevents the destruction of the existing balance. In any case, the game of katechon, as a kind of gamble with fateful decisions in the course of reassembling the international relations by their influential actors has the prospect of both implementing catastrophic scenarios for humanity and of preventing them. This is another version of balancing the coordinates of containment/transgression in the context of changing the basic parameters of human civilization as it evolves.

Containment and Transgression: a Technical Tool-Kit for International Relations

Katechon is historically associated with the idea of threat containment. Containment in the political and philosophical tradition is considered as an attribute of the state in the same way as the threat of chaos, correlative to theological inferno. A "thin red line", balancing deterrence and innovation, permeates the katechonic perspective upon "reassembling the social". It seems that neither petrifaction in some frozen form nor continuous slipping across the border is feasible. The values of moderate conservatism, for example, are related to this. On this occasion Alexander Filippov noted: "On the one hand, katechon restrains the given and asserts the value of what is… That which is… should be preserved because it has a dignity beyond mere facticity... But... there can also be a 'restrainer' that wants a radical renewal, but without a disaster" (Filippov, 2012: 249). A very interesting version of the delicate balance between containment and transgression is offered by Hans Freyer. For him, whenever "interests collide with counter-interests, pressure begins, and if resistance does not yield, a struggle ensues...Equilibrium positions are a momentary configuration. The blow is only slowed down by a counterblow. The social struggle may calm down, but it will not stop. If it ceases as an open action, it will continue as a regrouping of forces..." (Freyer, 2008: 21-22).

Containment serves the core for the balance of power theory. Historically, this theory manifested itself in *jus publicum europaeum*, in the seven anti-French (and anti-Napoleonic) coalitions (1792-1815), in the anti-Hitler coalition of the Allies against the Axis countries. Geopolitics has absorbed the ideas of fragile equilibrium, balance and containment. German geopolitics began with the prioritization of land-appropriation (*Lebensraum*) within the context of achieving parity with a potential adversary. Halford Mackinder was looking for the keys to unlock the resource potential and unique transcontinental logistics of the Heartland. Nicholas Spykeman justified the importance of Rimland for the same reason. Weighing the pros and cons of thalassocracies and tellurocracies, Alfred Mahan and Carl Schmitt pointed to the peculiarities of maritime law in the context of the priorities of maritime powers. Pretty soon, geopolitical rivalry began to be talked about as playing on the "grand chessboard". On the eve of the First World War, Alexey Edrihin (Vandam) wrote about geostrategists: "The surface of the earth, dotted with oceans, continents and islands, is for them a kind of chessboard, and the peoples, carefully studied in their basic characteristics and in the

mental qualities of their rulers, are living pieces and pawns which they move in such a way that their opponent, who sees in each pawn facing him an independent enemy, is finally lost in perplexity as to how and when he made the fatal move that led to the loss of the game" (Vandam, 2002: 43-44). Challenge and response (Arnold Toynbee), "War is simply the continuation of *political intercourse* with the addition of other means" (Carl von Clausewitz), and "politics is the continuation of war by other means" (Erich Ludendorff) — containment and transgression are at the center of the geopolitical worldview. The reliance on containment launched the Cold War. George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram" of February 22, 1946, set the paradigm for the Soviets' containment. Kennan wrote about the organic expansionism of the Soviet leadership and proposed as a response the peaceful "containment" of the USSR by demonstrating a willingness to use force. Kennan's telegram was followed by Winston Churchill's Fulton Speech on March 5, 1946, which marked the beginning of the Cold War. The coalition of Allies had collapsed. The "Truman Doctrine", announced in an address to Congress on March 12, 1947, consolidated a new paradigm.

The complex relationship between containment and transgression within the katechonic perspective of confronting destructive tendencies and constructing a new order based on overcoming the failures of the previous stage can be understood as an overlapping between the border and the cordon. It results in the shifting of the latter and the construction of a new border configuration in relation to the newly emerging cordon. In this context, the unity of deterrence and transgression in a katechonic perspective is covered by the concept of horizon. The *katechon* appears as an elusive horizon, but only as a consequence of a new prospective power balance, the outcome of the struggle between the counterparties, which restrains the unfolding of a catastrophic scenario thanks to the efforts made and the emergence of mutual constraining factors that neutralize each side's unconditional advantage. A katechonic elusive horizon can mean in a local sense peace, a ceasefire or the freezing of conflict, while in a global sense it can mean the temporary overcoming of an existential threat to human existence.

The impending threat forces you to jump on the running board of a departing train — this is a necessary condition for the katechonic horizon to slip away. Passing the threshold, making the transition, crossing the line is a necessary condition for avoiding a "terrible end".

Conclusion

Carl Schmitt, in the Spanish version of his article "The Unity of the World" (Schmitt, 1951), links the katechon to the Christian vision of history, in which the Christian empire suppresses the power of evil and the Antichrist, thus delaying the arrival of the final disaster. In this respect, Carl Schmitt is a follower of Juan Donoso Cortez, who believed that the main content of human history is Jesus Christ and the truth of Christian doctrine, which triumphs over the errors of the mind. In the katechonic context of history, according to Donoso Cortez, the "forces of aggression" meet the "forces of resistance" inflicted

by divine mercy, whose triumph presupposes the Christ's victory on Earth. The Christian vision of human history is the axial point for the philosophical and historical doctrine of Donoso Cortez. He understands the history of humanity as the history of the Mystical Body of Christ: "This divine teacher... is the universal Ruler who serves as the center of everything… Seen at once as God and as man, he proves to be the center in which the creative essence and created substances unite" (Cortez, 2006: 70).

The great medieval emperors saw the historical essence of their imperial dignity in the fact that, as "*katechons*", they fought the Antichrist and his allies thereby restraining the coming of Judgment Day. Schmitt, however, sees a katechonic perspective not so much in the bravery of kings and empires as in the specific joint of unique historical events that can only be understood from the standpoint of a Christian view of history. A deviation from the religious and theological understanding of the central events of Christian history from the standpoint of a rationalist philosophy or a unified technocratic vision puts the time out of joint and violates the true basis for the unity of the world. Schmitt emphasizes that it was the connection between the divine and the human that made possible both the idea of History and the historical existence of humanity.

In the context of this understanding, our study has revealed a link between the foundations of international justice and the *katechon*, understood in political and theological terms as a balancing force of containment/transgression that allows for restraining the catastrophic consequences of international communications. The "red lines" served as an intermediary between the *katechon* and international justice. They were interpreted in the context of ideas about a certain spatial order or the "*nomos* of the Earth" as a properly established and recognized configuration of borders; the fixed equilibrium, a balance of forces and capabilities; recognized rules of border contestations arranging the conflict on terms understandable to its parties. Within this interpretation, the *katechon*, which regulates the agonistic aspect of international relations, has a more significant liturgical function, providing a link between the culturally determined concept of humanity and international justice.

The ideas proposed in the article can be developed, as it seems, in a number of different directions. Of particular interest is the study of the "*katechon* dispute", i.e. the analysis of the interpretations that assess models of international justice which were proposed by influential international relations actors both historically and in present-day realities. In addition, it is possible to problematize the "*katechon* game" as a gamble with fateful decisions that superpowers are trying to play by granting themselves a particularly significant role within the world system.

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Катехон: к вопросу о политико-теологических основаниях международной справедливости

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В статье исследуется проблематика международной справедливости в ее отношении к одному из значимых понятий христианской теологии — катехону. Основной гипотезой

статьи является то, что катехон в международных отношениях проявляет себя как эффект баланса конкретного пространственного порядка, выражающийся в сдерживании/ трансгрессии сил, нацеленных на демаркацию «красных линий», что способствует смещению горизонта наступления катастрофических событий. Для обоснования гипотезы установлена связь между понятием «красные линии» и исторически зафиксированными в международном праве границами, разделяющими сферы влияния акторов международной политики, инвариантно выражающими идею порога, отделяющего порядок от хаоса, трансгрессия через который воспринимается как крах сложившегося справедливого равновесия. «Красные линии» трояким образом связаны с идеей международной справедливости: как зафиксированные законные границы (номос земли); как определенный сторонами баланс сил и возможностей; как правила трансгрессии границ, что ведет к концептуализации справедливой войны. Анализ оснований справедливой войны приводит к катехоническому порогу, преодоление которого возможно в перспективе утраты представлений о «законном враге», справедливом поводе для начала войны, законной с обеих сторон войне и сведению справедливости в войне к акту агрессии, реактивному ответу на преступления против человечности и отождествлению агрессора с уголовным преступником. Эта модель справедливой войны влечет демонизацию противников и переводит конфликт в парадигму Армагеддона, что позволяет по существу увязать между собой проблематику войны, международной справедливости и катехона. Катехон, рассматриваемый в статье на основании богословских интерпретаций в качестве Империи (в частности, христианской империи), праведности, силы благодати Святого Духа, а также необходимости проповеди Евангелия по всему миру, в политико-теологической парадигме предстает как фактор, сдерживающий силы разрушения. Сдерживание чистой воли к разрушению позволяет усмотреть выполнение катехоном не только агональной, но и литургической функции, основным содержанием которой является поддержание непрерывной связи между содержанием культуры, сосредотачивающим в себе представление о человечности, и действиями акторов международных отношений. Именно сохранение человечности, фундированной высшими культурными ценностями, является финальной «красной линией», благодаря неприкосновенности которой сохраняется международная справедливость и отсрочивается наступление «последних времен».

Ключевые слова: политическая теология, катехон, международная справедливость, сдерживание, трансгрессия

The Concept of *Katechon* in the Thought of Carl Schmitt: Towards a Different Universalism?*

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The concept of *katechon*, in the way it is generally invoked today, only exacerbates already existing political and ideological divisions, pitting 'conservatism' against 'progressivism', or 'multipolarity' against 'globalism' and 'hegemony'. With Carl Schmitt as an unlikely ally, this article argues that the katechon might instead offer an alternative — non-liberal and non-revolutionary — universalist political project, thus showing the way out of these oppositions. Contrary to dominant interpretations, Schmittian notion of the katechon is not a legitimation of either sovereign state power or international plurality. Instead, it embodies an underappreciated universalist strand in Schmitt's thought, which stands in tension with the confrontational and pluralist logic of his concept of the political or the idea of the *Grossraum* order. For Schmitt, the katechon implies an essentially non-sovereign form of power, which both maintains and renews an existing social order to ensure the continuation of history understood as the realm of 'infinite singularity'. In modern times, this primarily involves guarding against the threat of technocratic globalization that portends either a collapse of humanity into nature-like regularities or its technological suicide. However, instead of opting for international plurality as a solution, in an often-neglected Spanish version of an essay "The Unity of the World" Schmitt directly links the katechontic theology of history to a specific kind of 'true' political universalism, opposed both to the 'false' universalism of techno-economic liberalism, and to antagonistic pluralism. Although he does not explicitly elaborate the details of this 'true' universalism, his work hints at the diarchy of spiritual and temporal powers as a crucial element of katechontic world unity.

Keywords: katechon, Carl Schmitt, theology of history, universalism, power, order, spiritual powers

A strange, but fashionable concept

The last couple of decades have witnessed a surge of interest in the concept of *katechon*, a mysterious Pauline "restrainer" or "withholder" from the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians[1]. According to *Google Books* statistics, the frequency of the term's usage in the English-language publications increased more than sevenfold from 2004 to 2019. To

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1. "Let no one deceive you in any way; for that day will not come unless the rebellion comes first and the lawless one is revealed, the one destined for destruction. He opposes and exalts himself above every so-called god or object of worship, so that he takes his seat in the temple of God, declaring himself to be God. Do you not remember that I told you these things when I was still with you? And you know *what is now restraining* him, so that he may be revealed when his time comes. For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work, but only until *the one who now restrains* it is removed." (2 Thess. 2:3-7, New Revised Standard Version; italics added by me. — *Ye.U.*).

provide an example, the katechon features prominently in the work of Giorgio Agamben, one of the leading contemporary philosophers, for whom the katechontic de-activation of messianic hope is one of the keys to the genealogy of modernity (2011).

Meanwhile, if in the West this surge of interest has been confined mostly to philosophical and academic circles, in Russia the concept has become popular among a wider conservative public, as evidenced by the existence of two intellectual association bearing the name "Katechon", one calling itself "an intellectual club"[2], and another "a think tank"[3]. Connected with the latter is a student fraternity of "Academists", with sections in several universities around the country, which also holds the idea of the katechon as one of the key elements of its ideology[4]. It has even been argued that the concept, in its secularized form, has influenced official Russian foreign policy thinking (Engström, 2014). While the latter thesis seems rather far-fetched, Kirill, Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, has indeed recently referred to Russia as "the restrainer" holding against "the forces of the antichrist"[5].

A characteristic feature of contemporary discussions about the katechon is that they largely boil down to a choice between its positive and negative evaluations, with the meaning of the concept regarded as basically established and fixed. The idea of the katechon is usually interpreted as legitimizing strong conservative government domestically, and multipolarity internationally, which, especially for Russian commentators, also logically implies an opposition to Western hegemony. As a result, the concept feeds into already existing binary oppositions (e.g., "liberalism/progressivism vs. conservatism", "globalism vs. sovereignty"), seemingly giving to them some philosophical depth. In fact, however, the katechon is simply subsumed by those oppositions, only making the divisions more intractable by adding a layer of theological rhetoric, and failing to provide any novel analytical or persuasive wagers.

This paper argues that the present condition of the debate on the katechon has not been inevitable, but is a result of its having gone in the wrong direction. One of the key causes of this unfortunate outcome has been a misinterpretation of Carl Schmitt. Indeed, Schmitt's writings of the 1940-50s were, perhaps, the chief factor of the revival of interest in the katechon, at least in the West: "After the Reformation, though, the notion of the katechon tended to be forgotten. Schmitt played a central role in resurrecting it as a central category in the Catholic understanding of history" (Lievens, 2016: 415). The work of Agamben and his followers unfolds in an explicit polemic with Schmitt: seeing Schmitt as an apologist of a reactionary katechon, they aim at de-throning "the restrainer" and re-activating the messianic[6]. The German theorist has been relatively less important for the renaissance of Russian katechontism,

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2. *Intellektual'nyi klub "Katekhon"* [An Intellectual Club "Katechon"]. URL: http://katehon.ru/ (accessed 30 September 2023).

3. About us. *Katehon.* URL: https://katehon.com/en/about-us (accessed 30 September 2023).

4. Nashi simvoly [Our symbols]. *Academists.* URL: https://academists.ru/logo (accessed 30 September 2023).

5. Sviateishii Patriarkh Kirill: Ot budushchego nashego Otechestva i nashei Tserkvi zavisit, v polnom smysle slova, budushchee mira [His Holiness Patriarch Kirill: The Future of the Entire World Depends on the The Fate of Our Homeland]. *Official Website of the Moscow Patriarchate,* 20 November 2022. URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5978803.html (accessed 30 September 2023).

6. Agamben's own classical statement is, of course, *The Time That Remains* (2005). For a representative work developing this position see, e.g., Prozorov (2012).

which has its own deep roots in the pre-1917 Orthodox tradition[7]. Still, contemporary Russian thinkers generally regard Schmitt's interpretation of the katechon as being in line with their political Orthodoxy, and sometimes cite his works as well (Dugin, 2021).

Naturally, scholarship on Schmitt has also paid increasing attention to the katechon. A significant number of studies analyze specifically his treatment of the concept[8], and a few of them will be discussed in more detail further. The katechon has been characterized as a "central" concept for Schmitt, either on the whole (Schmitt, 2015a: 422), or for his post-war writings (Nichols, 2018: e101). It has also been described as Schmitt's "most enigmatic concept" (Hell, 2009: 283). In terms of the interpretation, some of those recent works continue to treat Schmittian katechon as directly connected with "defense of the state" and "stability" (Falk, 2022: 1, 14). In several cases, scholars whose primary focus lies elsewhere (e.g., on analyzing the katechon as "imperial theology" or as an attempt to solve the crisis of legitimacy) still rely on sovereign readings of the katechon (Hell, 2009; Nichols, 2018), which distorts their otherwise illuminating findings[9].

Importantly, however, a few studies have begun to "part ways with approaches that interpret the katechon as being the centerpiece of a conservative or authoritarian outlook" (Lievens, 2016: 415). Using these studies as a starting point, and supplementing them with my own analysis of Schmitt's relevant texts, I will argue that for Schmitt *the katechon is a (political) force tasked with ensuring the continuation of history, which requires both maintaining and renewing an existing order. Moreover, the katechontic mission implies a specific — non-revolutionary and non-utopian — vision of world unity; in other words, it is a universalist political project*. As such, the idea of the katechon stands in tension with other, more confrontational and antagonistic aspects of Schmitt's thought, such as friend-enemy logic of the political, the plurality of "large spaces" (*Grossraum*), or the opposition between land and sea. It is perhaps due to this tension that the concept of the katechon remained underdeveloped in Schmitt's writings. Taking the katechon over from Schmitt thus holds the promise of opening up new paths of thinking about international political universalism in its relation to history. At a time when the very continuation of history might be threatened, this is no minor promise.

The paper is organized into six sections, including this introduction. The next section briefly overviews all Schmitt's writings mentioning the katechon. The third section explains

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7. On those roots see, for example, Shnirelman (2019).

8. The following list includes some of the most recent works, and it is not exhaustive: Hell (2009); Lievens (2016); Nicoletti, (2017); Nichols (2018); Falk (2022); Collison (2023).

9. It has to be mentioned at the outset that I was not able to consult first-hand several book-length studies of the Schmittian katechon, namely, Felix Grossheutschi's *Carl Schmitt und die Lehre vom Katechon* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996), Günter Meuter's *Der Katechon: Zu Carl Schmitts fundamentalistischer Kritik der Zeit* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), and Théodore Paleologue's *Sous l'oeil du grand inquisiteur: Carl Schmitt et l'héritage de la théologie politique* (Paris: Cerf, 2004). However, if the secondary sources are correct, Grossheutschi argues that the notion of the katechon "functions very differently" in each of the nine Schmitt's texts he analyzes, thus not forming any coherent conception (Lievens, 2016: 416); Meuter "theorized the katechon as an institution that averts chaos and has the capacity to re-establish a concrete social order" (cited in Meierhenrich, Simons, 2016: 48); and Paleologue combined these two views, arguing that "properly speaking, there is no doctrine of the katechon in Schmitt" (cited in Lievens, 2016: 415-416), but if one looks for the most important conceptual connection, it is the one with the law: "the katechon is . . . the guarantee of a legal order" (Ibid: 421). All these views are addressed throughout the paper, in one way or another.

why Schmittian interpretation of the concept does not legitimize all authorities, nor all sovereign authorities, nor all authorities that maintain order. In the fourth section, a katechontic conception of history is outlined, with an emphasis on the problems of the end of history and the identity of the katechon. The fifth section traces the link between this conception of history and a specific vision of political universalism, opposed both to nihilistic universalism of technocratic civilization and to antagonistic pluralism. The conclusion summarizes the implications of the present study, on the one hand, for our understanding of Schmitt's thought and, on the other hand, for further thinking about the katechon.

Schmitt on the katechon: an overview of texts

First, a brief overview of relevant works is in order. Apart from private correspondence and some notes in the *Nachlass,* still unedited, the *katechon* appears in ten Schmitt's texts (the table below contains 11 entries as the *Glossarium* is listed twice for chronological reasons).

Table 1. Schmitt's published works containing mentions of the katechon[10]

Work		Date
"Beschleuniger wider Willen oder: Problematik der westlichen Hemisphäre"	–	April 1942
Land and Sea: A World-Historical Meditation	–	1942
"*Historiographia in nuce*: Alexis de Tocqueville" in *Ex Captivitate Salus*	–	Summer of 1946
10 fragments in *Glossarium*	–	From December 1947 to October 1949
The Nomos of the Earth	–	1950
"Three Possibilities for a Christian Conception of History"	–	1950
"La Unidad del Mundo"	–	1951
3 fragments in *Glossarium*	–	February 1953, April 1955, August 1957
"The Other Hegel-Line"	–	1957
Author's note to "The Situation of European Jurisprudence" in *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924 — 1954*	–	1958
Political Theology II	–	1970

Data source: compiled by the author on the basis of Nicoletti (2017).

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10. All the dates are dates of publication, except for the *Glossarium* notes and "*Historiographia in nuce*", for which Schmitt provides explicit dates of writing.

The table shows that Schmitt's engagement with the topic had a clear peak from the end of 1947 to 1951[11], and perhaps a second — smaller one — in 1957-58. Both before 1947 and after 1958 we encounter only passing references to the subject.

A focus on the writings of 1947-51 is further justified by the substantive content of the works in question. Both texts of 1942 are exploratory in regard to the katechon, the concept is used there allegorically or by analogy: Emperor Franz Joseph is portrayed as performing the katechontic function for Austria-Hungary (1995: 436); Joseph Pilsudski, for Poland (Ibid); Byzantium, for Italy against Islam (2015b: 17-18). Similar usages are also found in later works: Thomas Masaryk as the katechon for Europe and for western liberal democracy (2015a: 85); England, "for certain areas of the Mediterranean and the passage to India" (2006: 238). Schmitt's purpose here is to clarify for the readers the meaning of a new and potentially obscure concept — "to indicate the political and historical sense of the role of the delayer" (1995: 436) — rather than to define it directly. Therefore, these instances are better interpreted as analogies (that is, Franz Joseph was for Austria-Hungary what the katechon is for the world), and *not as examples of the katechon per se*[12]. Such a reading is further corroborated if we consider the case of Masaryk in particular: how could the person sustaining liberal democracy (which Schmitt consistently opposed throughout his life) be *an example* of the katechon?

Furthermore, the only abstract meaning of the katechon — as a general designation of delaying, as opposed to accelerating, forces — that can be extracted from the 1942 writings, is later explicitly disavowed by Schmitt himself: "We must not use it to add, along with the concept of restrainer and deferrer, a couple of exemplars to Dilthey's typological collection of historicism" (2009: 169). As we shall see, what will be at stake in Schmitt's later works on the katechon is not the slowing *vs.* acceleration of history, but the very possibility of its continuation. For this reason, treatments of the katechon that focus on this "accelerator-delayer" dichotomy (e.g., Bradley, 2019: 141-162), though potentially fruitful in themselves, cannot be seen as accurate analyses of the concept's functioning in Schmitt's thought.[13]

A 1946 essay on de Tocqueville belongs to another category of writings that in itself is also of little help in figuring out the meaning of the katechon for Schmitt: lamentations that particular thinkers were not familiar with the concept: "Europe was lost without the idea of a *katechon*. Tocqueville knew no *katechon*" (2017: 29). Other remarks of this kind can be found in the *Glossarium* and refer to such figures as Juan Donoso Cortés, Thomas Hobbes and Francis Bacon (2015a: 52, 207). As for Schmitt's post-1951 works,

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11. See a similar conclusion in Nicoletti (2017: 378)

12. Treating those instances as *examples* remains a widespread approach, even in the otherwise innovative works (e.g., Lievens, 2016: 416; Nicoletti, 2017: 369-372). This has likely added a lot of unnecessary confusion to the debate. Sergei Prozorov has been one of the few scholars so far to point out the allegorical nature of those designations (2012: 485).

13. For the same reason, the debate on the positive vs. negative evaluation of the katechon by Schmitt in "Beschleuniger wider Willen oder" is of little importance for our purposes. For arguments in favor of negative evaluation (with which I concur), see Hell (2009: 303-305). For a more ambivalent assessment, see Nicoletti (2017: 369-370).

there we find either very brief (sometimes just a sentence-long) remarks on the subject, or references to what other authors, namely Hans Freyer, Eusebius of Caesarea and Erik Peterson, meant by the katechon, without any elaboration or detailed commentary (2008, 2022).

Four works thus end up being central for understanding Schmitt's concept of the katechon: 1) *The Nomos of the Earth* (in particular, chapter 3 of its first part, titled "International Law in the Christian Middle Ages"); 2) relevant passages of the *Glossarium*; 3) a short 1950 essay "Three Possibilities for a Christian Conception of History", written as a review of Karl Löwith's *Meaning in History*, and 4) a lecture "The Unity of the World" [*La unidad del mundo*] that Schmitt delivered in several Spanish universities in the summer of 1951[14]. Interestingly, the German-language version of this lecture, published in January 1952 in *Merkur* under the title "Die Einheit der Welt", differs from the original Spanish text, lacking precisely the last section that initially discussed the katechon. It is perhaps due to this change in the German text that many of the scholars who analyzed Schmitt's concept of the katechon did not pay attention to "The Unity"[15]. As will be shown later, the Spanish version of the lecture is crucial in uncovering a previously unnoticed link between the katechon and a specific kind of universalism that Schmitt seemed to endorse.

Meanwhile, this brief overview of the relevant texts has already yielded some provisional results. It has shown that katechon is far from ubiquitous in Schmitt's writings: it is absent from all the major works before 1940s, as well as from *Theory of the Partisan,* nor does it occupy a particularly prominent place in *Political Theology II*, as we have seen. This observation seems to put in question assessments of the katechon as somehow central to the whole of Schmitt's thought, or even to its post-1945 phase. More puzzling is the fact that one such assessment belongs to Schmitt himself. In a 1974 letter to Hans Blumenberg, he wrote about the katechon: "I am searching for a human ear which will listen to and understand this question—for me the key question of (my) political theology" (cited in Nicoletti, 2017: 377). Furthermore, in a letter to Pierre Linn, reproduced in the *Glossarium*, Schmitt writes that his interest in the subject dated back to 1932 (2015a: 61), while his correspondence shows that the katechon continued to occupy his thoughts well into the early 1980s (Nicoletti, 2017: 377). Given all that, why are there so few publications reflecting the 50-year-long interest and research?

Concerning the letter to Blumenberg, let us, however, note that Schmitt refers specifically to his *political theology,* not to the entirety of his *oeuvre,* and uses the word "question". As will be discussed in the conclusion, the katechon may indeed be seen as the crucial — and unresolved — question of Schmitt's political theology.

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14. The first, third, and fourth of those works are further contracted throughout the paper as *Nomos*, "Three Possibilities", and "The Unity", respectively.

15. "La unidad del mundo" is not even included in the list of Schmitt's writings in a recent *Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt* (Meierhenrich, Simons (eds.), 2016: xxxi-xliii). It is easier, in fact, to mention those who *did* pay meaningful attention to the Spanish original of the essay, as the list would probably include just Martti Koskenniemi (2004). Nicoletti (2017) also takes note of it, but fails to notice its universalist implications.

Katechon, power, and order: clarifying misconceptions

One of the most widespread misconceptions about Schmitt's understanding of the *katechon* is its reduction to justification and legitimation of any power, or of any supreme (sovereign) power, or of the modern state's power. For instance, Jacob Taubes interprets the Schmittian katechon as a way of thinking "apocalyptically, but from above, from the powers that be" (2013: 13) and believes it to embody the purpose of saving the state "at whatever cost" (Ibid: 54). According to Giorgio Agamben, Schmitt "finds in 2 Thessalonians 2 the only possible foundation for a Christian doctrine of State power" (2005: 109). Although the influence of these thinkers may partly explain the popularity of a straightforward power-legitimizing interpretation of Schmitt's concept of the katechon, its persistence is in the end striking[16] — given that a careful reading of Schmitt's texts easily and unequivocally refutes it.

Firstly, and most importantly, the features attributed to the katechon in the *Nomos* differ remarkably from those of the sovereign state, or, indeed, of any supreme power: "It was the elevation of a crown, not a vertical intensification — not a Kingdom over Kings, not a Crown of Crowns, not a prolongation of the monarch's power, not even, as was the case later, a bit of dynastic power — but a commission that stemmed from a completely different sphere than did the dignity of the monarchy" (2006: 62). Katechon "did not signify a position of absorbing or consuming power *vis-à-vis* all other offices", but was connected with "concrete tasks and missions" (Ibid).

Secondly, in some cases Schmitt explicitly argued that certain manifestations of power had nothing to do with the katechon, be it individual figures, such as Winston Churchill, Georges Clemenceau, or John Forster Dalles (2015a: 47, 94), or forms of rule: "All such renovations, reproductions, and revivals disregarded the katechon. Consequently, instead of leading to a Christian empire, they led only to Caesarism. But, Caesarism is a typically non-Christian form of power, even if it concludes concordats" (2006: 63).

Thirdly, as it would logically follow, Schmitt himself never equated the katechon to power as such, nor to sovereign power, nor to the state as such[17]. In general, while the state for him was a concrete-historical phenomenon belonging to Modernity, Schmitt always hesitated to identify the katechon in the Modern age, in contrast to his confident description of the Holy Roman Empire as the katechon of the Middle Ages.

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16. Apart from Taubes and Agamben, a non-exhaustive list of authors sharing this interpretation would include Roberto Esposito (2015: 76-82), Fedor Nekhaenko (2022), Julia Hell (2009), Sergei Prozorov (2012), Joshua Nichols (2018), Hjalmar Falk (2022), the last four having already been mentioned in the introduction.

17. In one Glossarium note Schmitt wrote a short phrase: "The neutral state as katechon" (2015a: 313), which could potentially mean at least two things. If he meant international neutrality, then he later rejected this possibility himself: "Switzerland is not really a katechon" (Ibid: 364). The context of the whole note from April 16, 1955 implies that Schmitt might in fact mean that the state "neutralizes" the primary distinction between friend and enemy through "secondary differentiations" between state and society, economy and politics (Ibid: 313). If he used the word "katechon" there seriously, not allegorically, it would imply a 180-degree reversal of his attitude to neutralization and depoliticization. Although it is not impossible that he could entertain such a thought for a while, there is no evidence of such a reversal eventually taking place.

Therefore, Schmttian concept of the katechon is definitely not a legitimation of absolute power and rule. We could even say the katechon was for Schmitt an essentially non-sovereign form of power, given the emphasis on "concrete tasks" and the lack of "absorption" of "other offices". This has recently led Luke Collison to draw parallels between the katechon and commissary dictatorship, seeing both as reflecting Schmitt's continuous concern with intermediate authority (2023). Such an interpretation logically entails a shift from power to order as the core idea behind the katechon, a move advocated by Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons in their introductory chapter to *The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt*: "the katechon is a figure that seeks to maintain a concrete order" (2016: 46). This would offer us a seemingly coherent interpretation of the katechon as intermediate authority tasked with maintaining existing order[18]. However, I argue that this "order-maintaining" reading of the katechon, despite no doubt being closer to Schmitt's logic than a simplistic "autocratic" interpretation, still misses important aspects of the German thinker's argument.

To begin with, let us note one difference between the commissary dictator and the katechon: the former presupposes the existence of a higher, i.e., supreme, worldly authority that authorizes a dictator to act, while the latter has no other worldly authority above them. The commission of a Medieval Christian emperor "stemmed from a completely different sphere" (2006: 62), from an other-worldly realm. It is again indicative that Schmitt himself never treats commissary dictators as examples of the katechon. For some reason, while speculating that Jesuits or the Catholic Church could be potential candidates for the role (2015a: 52, 192), he never mentions, let's say, Albrecht von Wallenstein in the similar context.

Furthermore, Schmitt's phrasings make an impression that, for him, katechon is tasked not simply with maintaining an existing order, but also with reforming and renewing it. In "Three Possibilities", he warns against reducing the concept to "a generalized designation of simply conservative or reactionary tendencies" (2009: 169). This distinction is repeated in a short piece from 1957, written as a tribute to Hans Freyer on his 70th anniversary: "Everything that has been deemed "conservative" since the 19th century (and which calls itself so) is surpassed and outmaneuvered by this notion of a katechon found in Freyer's world-history" (2022: 4). We can find similar reasoning in the *Nomos*: the Medieval Christian Empire is described there as a "great historical force" [*großartigen Geschichtsmächtigkeit*] (1974: 29), while its becoming "a merely conservative upholder and preserver" [*nur noch konservativer Erhalter und Bewahrer*] meant the

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18. Conforming to such an interpretation is also the view of Viacheslav Kondurov, who, highlighting the differences between Schmitt's approach to sovereignty in *Dictatorship* and *Political Theology*, argues that in *Political Theology* "the concept of the sovereign fulfils the role of katechon (κατέχων) because the sovereign (1) seeks to contain the 'political' and preserve order; (2) exists in the space of historical time, not even metaphorically being the 'zero point' of history; (3) does not exercise a 'messianic' salvific function, since the latter involves a qualitative change in state, whereas the sovereign seeks to preserve the status quo" (2021a: 240). As described there, the sovereign of *Political Theology* appears to be closer to the commissary dictator, than to the sovereign dictator, of *Dictatorship*. On the specifics of Kondurov's approach to Schmitt's political theology see also note 28 below.

weakening of the katechon (Ibid: 33)[19]. Indeed, Charlemagne or the Ottonian Emperors did not just maintain imperial order, they first (re)created it. "For Konrad Weiss, the merely restraining forces are not sufficient. He claims that historical circumstances are more often to be seized rather than to be restrained", writes Schmitt (2009: 170), and he seems to support the view he is citing.

Finally (and, perhaps, most surprisingly), two passages from *Glossarium* radically severe the link between the katechon and both order and power[20]. A note dated June 16, 1948 reads: "Anarchic chaos is better than nihilistic centralization and ordering by statutes. The *katechon* is recognizable by the fact that it does not aspire to this unity of the world, but lays the imperial crown" (Schmitt 2015a: 124). And on September 25, 1949 Schmitt writes down: "The *katechon*, it is deprivation, it is hunger, need and powerlessness. It is those who do not rule, they are people. Everything else is mass and object of planification" (Ibid: 206). Therefore, if order is achieved via "nihilistic centralization" and "planification", then maintaining such an order would not be katechontic, on the contrary, in this situation the katechon might manifest itself in those who manage to stay outside the order, to avoid becoming the object of planning. But what is the purpose of such a katechontic break with order and power? Schmitt's answer would be simple: to keep history going.

Katechon and history

That it is a certain idea of history that constitutes the conceptual core of the *katechon* is stated explicitly more than once in several Schmitt's works. A connection to history is already visible in the "Beschleuniger wider Willen oder" (1995: 436). Later, in the *Nomos* katechon is called a "historical concept" (2006: 60), in "Three Possibilities", a form of "historical consciousness" (2009: 169), and in "The Unity", "a Christian conception of history" (1951: 353). This clear emphasis has recently been noted by several commentators (Lievens, 2016; Nicoletti, 2017).

Schmitt's general definition of the katechontic conception of history is a fairly traditional one, following Apostle Paul: katechon is "a force, which defers the end and suppresses the evil one" (2009: 169, see also 1951: 353; 2006: 60). In other words, it ensures the continuation of history. However, this general definition does not yet shed light on three crucial (and interrelated) questions: 1) How could history end? 2) Who (or what) is "the evil one"? 3) Who (or what) is the katechon? What are the key features of this mysterious force?

We would not find a single, unified answer to these questions in Schmitt's writings, but rather two distinct (though connected, as I will argue) conceptual schemes, related to the Middle Ages, and Modernity, respectively. In the first scheme, Christian empire of the Middle Ages was the katechon, acting as "the historical power to *restrain* the appear-

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19. The translation of these passages in the existing English edition of the *Nomos* is rather confusing (Schmitt 2006: 60, 64).

20. Lievens (2016: 415) also points out this break.

ance of the Antichrist and the end of the present eon" (2006: 59-60). While in the *Nomos* and most other works Schmitt seems to advance a merely historical thesis that the Holy Roman Empire *understood itself to be the katechon* and was seen as such by its contemporaries (Ibid; 2009: 169; 1951: 353-354; 1995: 436), in the *Glossarium* he also claims that *it in fact was the katechon* (2015a: 47). According to Walter Warnach, in the early 1980s Schmitt was concerned with "anchoring the medieval Empire and its world mission in the Scriptures as convincingly as possible" [*das mittelalterliche Reich und seinen Weltauftrag möglichst in der Schrift zu veranken*] (cited in Schmitt, 2015a: 422).

The relevance of this historical analysis for the modern times may not be immediately clear. Here it is worth paying attention to the so-called "great historical parallel", which Schmitt repeatedly refers to. He points out that it has been characteristic of the self-understanding of the 19th and 20th century to compare its historical situation with that of early Christianity (2006: 63; 2009: 168-169). Beyond mere observation, Schmitt affirms that it is indeed the right way for the people of the last two centuries to see their place in history (1951: 353). If so, they, like the early Christians, face the challenge of "overcoming the … eschatological paralysis" (2009: 169). That is how the problem of the katechon emerges for the modern age.

However, in this second scheme, which relates to Modernity, little (if any) attention is paid to the Antichrist and a literal Christian meaning of "the end of the world", as Schmitt's attention shifts to more human-induced scenarios of the closure of history. His chief concern now is the threat of a final and complete triumph of techno-economic civilization. It is this threat that we may legitimately call Schmitt's primary image of "the end of history" in relation to the modern times.

Schmitt's opposition to and criticism of a society organized around the imperatives of technical rationality and economic efficiency is clearly expressed already in his 1920s works, for example, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* (1996: 13-15, 34-36). From the start, this opposition was also connected with an understanding of history "as an open, creative process, in which the spirit obtains new strength to respond to the challenges of the present" (Nicoletti, 2017: 367-368). This theme is taken up again in the later writings on the katechon. A potential arrival at the condition of "pure technicity" is described there as a "shipwreck" (Schmitt, 1951: 354), as it would transform human life into a bunch of regularities, governed by the immanent laws of economic and technological development. This would mean the end of history because "historical reality", for Schmitt, is characterized by "the infinite singularity" of events (2009: 169), that is, by the emergence of real novelty in the course of history: "the essential and specific content [of history] is the event that happens just ones and does not repeat itself"[21] (1951: 354). If society became "a mere piece of nature circling around itself" (Ibid: 170), it would no longer belong to history in the proper sense of the term.

There is one more reason to treat techno-economic society as heralding the end of history: it has supplied humanity with the means to literally destroy the world. Although

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21. "Su contenido esencial y específico es el acontecer que sólo una vez sucede y no se repite".

nuclear *problématique* never became central for Schmitt, in contrast to such thinkers as Karl Jaspers (1961) or Hans Morgenthau[22], it still surfaced briefly in his writings of the early 1950s. *The Nomos* warned about the danger of "atomic and hydrogen bombs" falling beyond "new amity lines" unless "a new normative order of the earth" was found (2006: 49). Techno-economic civilization was to blame here because it provided to the powerful the means of extermination, but could not possibly provide knowledge about when, if ever, and against whom, if anybody, they could be used justly (1951: 355; 2009: 167). As a consequence, "the technical unity of the world also makes possible a technical death of humanity"[23] (1951: 352).

To sum up, a techno-economic unification of the world, its total functionalization would be the end of history for Schmitt — both in itself and as a possible harbinger of the mankind's nuclear suicide. Therefore, social forces and tendencies that advance such a scenario could be logically regarded as "the evil", which needs to be restrained.

Restrained by whom or what? To this question we will not find a conclusive answer, if any answer at all. As I have pointed out earlier, Schmitt finds it extremely difficult to identify any katechontic force (or figure) in the Modern age. In a *Glossarium* note dated December 19, 1947 he famously writes that "one must be able to identify the *katechon* for every epoch of the last 1948 years. The place was never unoccupied, otherwise we would no longer exist" (2015a: 47). Few sentences further we also read: "I am sure that as soon as the concept is sufficiently clarified we can even agree on the many names concretely and up to the present day" (Ibid). However, the task of clarification must have proved to be more challenging than Schmitt expected, for he eventually does not provide any concrete "name" apart from the Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages, and even that restricted mainly to "Frankish, Saxonian, and Salic times" (2006: 64). By 1953, Schmitt seems to have changed his mind, as he composes a blank verse containing the following lines: "Don't delude yourself, the last Christian / was Hegel, the last Katechon" (2015a: 293). Perhaps, the steady expansion of technology and economic organization of society since the early 19th century meant there simply were no countervailing forces left.

Nevertheless, we are still here, which makes it necessary to clarify the relationship between the katechon and the end of times. Do the lines cited above imply that Schmitt abandoned the view that the katechon was indispensable for preventing the end? It is unlikely, as the katechon's indispensability is an essential feature of the concept, without which it ceases to be meaningful. If Schmitt had changed his view on that issue, he would have had no reason to continue working on the subject almost till the very death. (And he did continue, as we know). Should we then conclude that a 1953 verse simply reflected a temporary "loss of faith", after which he returned to the belief in the uninterrupted presence of the katechon? We can neither exclude nor claim that, as there are no unequivocal indications in his writings.

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22. On Morgenthau's struggling with the nuclear challenge, which led to him endorsing a world state, see Craig (2003).

23. "La unidad técnica del mundo hace también posible la muerte técnica de la humanidad"

Still, I would like to point out yet another available option: katechon can be regarded as both indispensable and, at the same time, not necessarily present at every moment. Historical reality is a dynamic one, where all the processes, including the ones leading to its end, unfold in time, and take time[24]. In this conceptualization, a temporary absence of the katechon would unleash destructive trends, but if the restrainer is restored not too late, these trends could be reversed. In my view, such a dynamic and processual understanding of the katechon's indispensability is preferable[25] to "the uninterrupted existence" interpretation for two main reasons. First, it provides a more coherent account of a relationship between *the idea of the katechon* and the katechon as *a real historical force*. Second, it allows to better comprehend the katechon's *institutional specificity*.

Schmitt explicitly writes that the idea of the katechon provided "a sense of an historical epoch" to the Middle Ages (2006: 60), and was gradually forgotten or rejected during a transition to Modernity (Ibid: 63-66). Therefore, the "uninterrupted presence" interpretation implies that katechontic forces can exist without understanding themselves as such, that is, without having the idea of the katechon. However, it is not clear how an actor could restrain "the evil one" and defer the end in the absence of at least a minimum understanding of this task.

As for the specificity, it follows logically from Schmitt's writings that not all forms of rule can be the katechon. Caesarism, for instance, is essentially incompatible with the katechontic mission (2006: 63). The doctrine of "uninterrupted presence" would require identifying a succession of sufficiently similar institutionalized authorities for the last two millennia, which would leave the Roman Church as the only plausible candidate. Schmitt, however, has always been reluctant to consider the Church itself as the katechon, even in the Medieval context opting for the Empire, and not the Papacy.

In contrast, the proposed processual interpretation suggests that katechontic forces probably ceased to be active in the late Middle Ages along with the abandonment of the idea of the katechon. Furthermore, their revival would likely require a restoration of a specific form of rule (of course, adapted to the changed circumstances).

Katechon and 'the unity of the world'

The last thesis I'm going to defend is that the specific form of rule, characteristic of the *katechon*, is a universalist one. In other words, I argue that the katechon implies a particular conception of a political unity of the world.

It is obviously a controversial thesis. While some of the previous arguments regarding the non-sovereign nature of the katechon and its relation to history have already been made by other scholars (see, e.g., Nicoletti, 2017; Lievens, 2016), universalist interpretations of Schmitt have been remarkably rare. One such interpretation is presented in a recent essay by John Milbank, who identifies three "idioms" in Schmitt's thought: "a

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24. One may recall here Agamben's analysis of the messianic time as "the time that time takes to come to an end" (2005: 67).

25. Both in general and in the particular context of Schmitt's thought.

Catholic universalism", a Wespthalian defense of the nation-state, and a more "civilizational" approach (2023). He further argues that, although Schmitt "early associated Catholicism with the internationalism of justice, linked not just to the idea of natural law, but also with the representation of the person of Christ", he later "continually suppressed" the first idiom. Milbank does not consider the idea of the katechon to be representative of this universalist idiom, treating it as belonging rather to the third — civilizational/imperial idiom. Nor does he pay attention to the Spanish text of "The Unity". In the end, Milbank does not seem to provide an adequate account of the functioning of universalism in Schmitt's writings[26].

Martti Koskenniemi comes closest to the thesis of the present paper: Schmitt "does not attack the Anglo-American, liberal world order because of its universalism, but because of its *false* and *nihilistic* universalism" (2004: 501). Koskenniemi sees the "distinction between a "false" and a "genuine" universalism" (Ibid: 495) operating already in the *Nomos*, but yet in an unarticulated form. He further argues that this distinction is fleshed out in more detail in "The Unity" — precisely in connection with Christian view of history and the katechon (Ibid: 501-502). However, Koskenniemi concludes that Schmitt's "genuine" universalism "is from beginning to end based on an unquestioned faith" (Ibid: 502), which seemingly precludes the possibility of reasoned engagement with it. In any case, Koskenniemi does not attempt to describe what this universalism might mean in practice.

So, could it all be a phantasm, an illusion? Maybe there is, in reality, no "genuine" or "suppressed" universalism in Schmitt? This is a dominant view of his international thought, according to which the German thinker was a staunch defender of international political pluralism[27]. Schmitt's perhaps most famous work seems to straightforwardly support this view: "A world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist. The political world is a pluriverse, not a universe. <…> The political entity cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity and the entire world" (2007: 53). Similarly, the notion of "a large space" (*Grossraum*) also implies a pluralistic world order, since there are supposed to be multiple large spaces (Hooker, 2009: 126-155). All this follows from the fundamental definition of the political as a distinction between friend and enemy: "The political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity" (Schmitt, 2007: 53). In a condition of world unity, if ever achieved, "what remains is neither politics nor state, but culture, civilization, economics, morality, law, art, entertainment, etc." (Ibid). Schmitt is, however, highly skeptical about the ability of people, even in such a condition, to "escape the logic of the political" (Ibid: 79).

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26. Milbank also describes the second part of his essay as an attempt "to articulate a development of Schmitt's neglected first idiom", however it remains unclear what he takes specifically from Schmitt to come to the following thesis: "from the village to the planet, we need to recreate the complex network of gift-exchanging communities and corporations, which naturally and traditionally pursue intrinsic good purpose and virtue, out of which a true and relatively more peaceful order can be distilled" (2023).

27. For a representative sample, see, e.g., Kervégan (1999), Petito (2007), Kökerer (2021).

Some scholars have also tried to explicitly connect Schmitt's defense of international pluralism with his concept of the katechon. For Nicoletti, the katechon "seems to embody the figure of opposition to monist universalism—which can be interpreted theologically as the mark of the reign of the Antichrist, who alone can reduce the earth to a single kingdom—and can thus be seen as the defender of pluralism" (2017: 380). In a similar fashion, Viacheslav Kondurov has recently argued that Schmitt's "legacy offers an atypical non-universalist and anti-messianic view on international law as a heterogeneous global legal order" and that "the pluralistic structure" of this order "can be seen as a katechon that holds back the end of history"[28] (2021b: 69).

Such arguments, however, neglect the distinction between "true" and "false" universalism, which, as I will show in a moment, is indeed present in the Spanish text of "The Unity". It is also important to note that Schmitt himself never established a connection between the katechon and any form of pluralist world organization, either *jus publicum europaeum* or *Grossraum* order. In a couple of cases, cited earlier, he opposes the katechon to "nihilistic centralization", but *not to any form of world unity*. Furthermore, the Holy Roman Empire, which he most confidently identifies as the katechon, was a universalist force. So were the Jesuits, an explicitly transnational movement with universalist ambition in an epoch of sovereign states.

Finally, it is in "The Unity" that Schmitt comes closest to outlining his vision of a katechontic universalism. Early in the lecture, two possible scenarios of world unity are described: "The abstract unity may lead to the triumph of evil as well as to the triumph of good"[29] (1951: 344). He also highlights at the outset that it is precisely *political unity* — "the unitary organization of human power" (Ibid: 343) — that is in question, not any other (e.g., biological or merely economic) form of unity. "Evil" unity is then analyzed, in an already familiar fashion, as the result of techno-economic centralization, as the unity brought about by the new means of transportation, communication, and destruction, which make the planet smaller (Ibid: 344-345). Evil as such, it has become all the more dangerous by the middle of the 20th century, as the tremendous increase in human's technological power has not been accompanied by commensurate moral progress (Ibid: 350-351).

Schmitt's next move is to connect visions of world unity with conceptions of history: "The problem of world unity is the problem of man's self-understanding in history"[30]

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28. Kondurov's argument is, in fact, a bit more complex (both here and in relation to the sovereign, see note 18 above), as he works within a "methodological" approach to Schmitt's political theology (Kondurov, 2021a: 239-240). Therefore, the most accurate rendition of his argument would be not that the pluralistic structure of heterogenous legal order *is* the katechon, but that its function in the political-legal realm *is structurally analogous* to the function of the katechon in a theological realm. A detailed discussion of the merits and drawbacks of such an approach is obviously beyond the purview of this article. Nevertheless, I would like to note that its application to the katechon in particular contradicts Schmitt's understanding of the concept. The katechon was for Schmitt the bridge between eschatology and history (2009: 169), which connected the eternal and the temporal: it is thus incompatible with the autonomy of the two realms, which is a necessary condition for drawing structural analogies between them.

29. "La unidad abstracta en cuanto tal lo mismo puede redundar en auge del bien que en auge del mal."

30. "…el problema de la unidad del mundo es un problema de autointerpretación histórica del hombre."

(Ibid: 355). In particular, techno-economic vision of world unity emanates from the Enlightenment — rationalist and progressivist — philosophy of history, of which both Soviet Marxism and Western liberal progressivism are offsprings (Ibid: 348-351). To this philosophy of history Schmitt then opposes some "possibilities for a Christian conception of History", the katechon being one of the them. He further argues that these possibilities are "the only ones that make History and, together with it, *the right conception of the unity of the world*, possible"[31] (Ibid: 354). On the contrary, "any world unity that does not follow this Christian image [of history] would herald either the transition to *a new plurality, full of catastrophes*, or the coming of the end of times"[32] [italics here and in the previous quote are mine. — *Ye.U.*] (Ibid: 355).

It seems to follow directly from Schmitt's analysis that there exists a possibility for the true unity of the world, opposed both to "false" techno-economic unity and to catastrophic plurality. Furthermore, this "true unity" is somehow connected with the katechontic conception of history. The only problem is that Schmitt does not provide any details. What would be key features of "the true world unity"? How would it emerge? Nor does he ever return to this topic in his later works. On the contrary, the German version of the same lecture, published in January 1952, nor longer mentions either the katechon or "the true unity". However, the very fact that the two themes simultaneously disappear from the text confirms the initial connection between them.

As to why Schmitt decided to change the text of "The Unity" in the German edition (and not to develop the theme of katechontic unity later), we can only guess. One explanation could be a misfit between the universalist implications of the katechon and the confrontational and pluralist logic of his theory of the political: a contradiction that demanded a resolution, and was resolved in favor of the political. Such a resolution might have also been aided by Schmitt's inability to identify contemporary katechontic forces, either actual or potential. In the intensifying flux of modernity, a pluralist picture could at least provide some source of orientation.

In lieu of a conclusion: *loquimini theologi?*

Two sets of implications can be derived from the analysis undertaken in the paper: 1) implications for our understanding of the thought of Carl Schmitt; and 2) implications for our understanding of concept of *katechon*.

First, the paper provides support to the view that there is a universalist strand in Schmitt's political thought. This strand turns out to be most closely connected with his development of the concept of the katechon: katechontic conception of history leads to a vision of a "true unity of the world". In the end, however, katechontic universalism remains significantly underdeveloped, and, on the whole, occupies only a secondary place in the overall Schmitt's *oeuvre*.

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31. "… son las únicas que hacen posible la Historia y con ella, la recta concepción de la unidad del mundo."
32. "Toda unidad del mundo que no siga esta imagen cristiana podría anunciar o bien la transición a una nueva pluralidad, premiada de catástrofes, o bien la señal de que ha llegado el fin de los tiempos."

Second, a popular thesis about the centrality of the katechon for the whole of Schmitt's thought is not supported by the evidence. The concept of the katechon does not play any major role in Schmitt's theory of the political, nor in his idea of the *Grossraum*, nor in the opposition of land and sea… Moreover, the idea of the katechon enters into conflict with those concepts, allowing us to see *an important tension at work in Schmitt's thought*. While published works may create an impression that this tension was mostly resolved, and not in favor of the katechon, Schmitt's continued preoccupation with the concept, as evidenced by his private notes and correspondence, points to a more complex intellectual picture.

As for the second set of implications, the concept of the katechon emerges from this study less obscure, but still in the need of further clarification.

First, the relevance of the katechon today is probably even higher than in Schmitt's time. The nuclear danger is alive and well, while techno-economic centralization of the world has intensified drastically in the digital age, and it continues to supply humanity with global threats to its existence, from climate change to a possible malign AI[33].

Second, and connected with this less than inspiring picture, the absence of the katechon may well be an accurate diagnosis of the present condition. If this is correct, and if we agree with Schmitt on the undesirability of both pure technicity and collective suicide (1951: 354), then katechon needs to be revived.

Third, this revival will most likely need to base itself on an alternative — non-liberal and non-utopian — vision of political universalism. To begin with, in the age of techno-economic globality, particularistic projects are dangerous because international antagonism might escalate to world-destroying levels. (And stable coexistence implies finding at least a minimum common ground, a modicum of universality). Moreover, as Schmitt reminds us, mere particularism is easily subsumed into the very techno-economic universality it seeks to challenge (Ibid: 355).

The task of katechontic revival would thus require identifying an ideational legitimation of the non-utopian universality, as well as its institutional form. Schmitt is silent on the details of both, but it does not mean that his works cannot provide some hints. On an ideational level, he points to the significance of *history* itself: for Schmitt, history is "the irruption of the eternal into the course of time, <…> the hope and honor or our existence"[34] (Ibid). Contrary to Lievens, it is hardly a "profane" and "minimal" image of history, whose "sole function is a negative one, namely, to keep final ends away and to throw us back onto ourselves here and now" (2016: 418-419) [35]. The imperative of preventing the end of history could probably seem meaningless, and thus leading to "nihilism" (Ibid: 419), a century ago, but today it is full of meaning.

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33. For an up-to-date overview of so-called "existential risks", see Ord (2020).

34. "… un encuadramiento de lo eterno en el transcurso de los tiempos, <…> la esperanza y el honor de nuestra existencia." See also Schmitt (2009: 170).

35. Nicoletti is more attentive to Schmitt's text in this regard, as he describes the katechon as "reaffirming a transcendence which is incarnated within—not extraneous to—history" (2017: 379-380).

This idea of history as the meeting point of eternity and time resonates well with the famous question Schmitt poses at the end of *Political Theology II*: "Who answers *in concreto*, on behalf of the concrete, autonomously acting human being, the question of what is spiritual, what is worldly and what is the case with the *res mixtae*, which, in the interval between the first and the second arrival of the Lord, constitute, as a matter of fact, the entire earthly existence of this spiritual-worldly, spiritual-temporal, double-creature called a *human being*?" (2008: 115). It seems that the problem of the katechon, which acts in history but receives his commission from a higher realm, was for Schmitt just another way to pose this same question.

Therefore, on an institutional level, could it be that the medieval katechon was made possible by the existence of "the distinction between *potestas* [power] and *auctoritas* [authority] as two distinct lines of order of the same encompassing unity" (Schmitt 2006: 61)? Could such a "double representation" be a necessary condition for the katechon's revival? It seems quite plausible: if the ultimate question is "what is spiritual, what is worldly?", then no concrete order is better suited for navigating those issues than the one which is represented simultaneously by two authoritative hierarchies–one spiritual, another worldly[36]. So, shall we say: *loquimini theologi in munere vestro*?

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36. For a more detailed analysis of what spiritual authority might look like in a post-liberal world, and why its restoration might be conducive to achieving peaceful international coexistence, see Uchaev and Nikolaev (2023).

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Понятие *катехона* у Карла Шмитта: в поисках иного универсализма?*

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Идея катехона, как она обычно понимается сегодня, лишь углубляет уже существующие идеологические и политические расколы, резко противопоставляя консерватизм прогрессивизму, а многополярность — глобализму и гегемонии. С опорой на работы Карла Шмитта в статье утверждается, что концепция катехона в действительности содержит в себе корни альтернативного — нелиберального и нереволюционного — универсалистского политического проекта и, тем самым, способна преодолеть указанные бинарные оппозиции. Вопреки доминирующей интерпретации, катехон у Шмитта не означает легитимации суверенной государственной власти или международного плюрализма. Напротив, эта концепция выражает недооцененное универсалистское направление в мысли немецкого теоретика, которое вступает в конфликт с конфронтационной и плюралистской логикой его понятия политического или концепции порядка больших пространств. Для Шмитта катехон подразумевает сущностно не-суверенную форму власти, которая одновременно поддерживает и обновляет существующий социальный порядок, чтобы обеспечить продолжение истории, понимаемой как область уникальных и единичных событий. В современности, эта задача в первую очередь заключается в противостоянии технократической глобализации, которая угрожает либо растворением человечества в квази-естественных поведенческих закономерностях, либо его технологическим самоубийством. В качестве решения этой проблемы Шмитт, однако, предлагает не международно-политический плюрализм, а особое — и напрямую связанное с катехонической теологией истории — «правильное» понимание универсализма, которое в редко рассматриваемой испанской версии статьи «Единство мира» противопоставляется как ложному техноэкономическому либеральному единству, так и антагонистической множественности. Хотя сам Шмитт не разрабатывает в деталях этот проект, его работы указывают на диархию духовных и мирских властей как ключевой элемент катехонического единства мира. [37]

Ключевые слова: катехон, Карл Шмитт, теология истории, универсализм, власть, порядок, духовная власть

War and Church from the Peace of Westphalia to the Treaty of Versailles: by Carl Schmitt and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy

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Historically, religious institutions have often played some role in determining the criteria for international justice during the war and in the post-war periods. The article aims to reflect theoretically on this phenomenon, drawing on the political theology of C. Schmitt (1888-1985) and the historical sociology of E. Rosenstock-Huessy (1888-1973). Both were prominent lawyers in Weimar Germany, but their paths diverged dramatically in 1933. They shared a view of the modern state as a restrainer of war. They also focused on the church and its role in stabilizing the new international order of the Westphalian era. The Westphalian approach to international justice rested on the idea of religious pluralism in terms of a plurality of sovereign states. It was important for Schmitt that the Roman Catholic Church (to which he belonged) recognized sovereign states and their right to declare war and make peace, even if it retained autonomy of doctrinal judgment and independent government. Unlike Schmitt, Rosenstock-Huessy believed that the main role in resolving religious conflicts was played not so much by the arrangements of sovereign states, but by the new organization of society that emerged as a result of the Reformation. This organization consisted of new social forms: the monarch-legislator, the civil servant, the civil authority, and the civil population. Rosenstock saw the separation of the military from the civil service as a kind of continental system of checks and balances that promoted international justice by limiting violence. After a historical and theoretical overview, the paper will analyze why the cultural role of ecclesiastical institutions is still important. Finally, it will be shown that the perspectives of political theology and historical sociology described above form a multi-confessional dialogue. The dialogical reflection on church and politics can be a contribution to the debate on international justice.

Keywords: political theology, Schmitt, Rosenstock-Huessy, law and religion, international relations, ecclesiastical institutions, international justice.

Introduction

In recent decades numerous scholars have pointed to the resurgence of religion as a relevant factor in international politics. This trend has forced many scholars to rethink the relationship between the religious and the secular, both in ideological and institutional terms (Haskell, 2018; Janis, Evans, 2004). It is assumed that religions will continue to be a powerful driver of behavior both in the foreign policy of some states and in the actions of religiously motivated NGOs (Buzan, Lawson, 2015: 295, 317). They also play an important role in the articulation of cultural diversity in the international context (Reus-Smit, 2020). It is an undeniable fact that religious institutions are returning to the

public sphere, but there is still uncertainty about their status in international relations. Religious institutions are seen as both the state's «soft power» and as nongovernmental organizations that interpret values within civil society. Religious organizations can offer mediation in military conflicts, and this activity presupposes relative neutrality. On the other hand, religious leaders have an impact on public debates and the formation of public opinion. They interpret and promote the criteria for justice, both social and international. In addition, religious organizations, both global and national, are expected to mobilize public opinion, to make statements, and to take positions in current socio-political conflicts. This tendency — the mobilization around certain political projects while declaring neutrality — dates back to the Cold War era (Leustean, 2014). Its current stage of development involves the open and public multilateralism of religious leaders, who meet in conferences and councils to discuss concepts pertaining to domestic and foreign policy. It is taken for granted that the moral condemnation of the strategies of war and mediation is naturally inherent in all religious institutions and constitutes their main contribution to public life. Such expectations and demands (which are generally the same for all) contribute to the already rapidly progressing processes of homogenization of the global religious space, the destruction of local cultural and historical areas, the transformation of religious life along state borders and interstate alliances. All this leads to reflecting on the future of state-church relations in the context of international justice.

The article aims to reflect theoretically on this phenomenon, drawing on the political theology of C. Schmitt (1888-1985) and the historical sociology of E. Rosenstock-Huessy (1888-1973). Both were prominent jurists in Weimar Germany, whose paths diverged dramatically in 1933, when they took opposite positions (supporting Nazi policies and criticizing them in exile). Both may be united by the fact that, as jurists, they wrote on ecclesiastical matters and thus stood out from the general secular trend of the social sciences of their time. With regard to the development of international law, they shared the view of the State as a restraint on war and appreciated the role of the Church in stabilizing the new international order of the Westphalian era.

Carl Schmitt has become a standard reference in writings on modern political theory. Despite his collaboration with the Nazis, many contemporary scholars believe that his theory can be deconstructed by extracting its purely scientific, political, and legal content. Out of this deconstruction emerges the discussion of the interpretation of Schmitt's own positions, including the relevance of his own religious views and ecclesiastical experience. There is an immense bibliography on Carl Schmitt's political theology, but there are not many works on how he understood the role of the ecclesiastical institutions in international politics in the context of his own relationship to the Church (Dahlheimer, 1998; Fox, 2017; Mehring, 2016).

Rosenstock-Hussey, a legal scholar, historian and sociologist, is less well known today than Schmitt. Born in Berlin to a non-observant Jewish family, the son of a banker, he converted to Christianity and joined the Evangelical Lutheran Church at the age of 17. He studied law and received his doctorate from the University of Heidelberg in 1909 at the age of 21, after which he taught at various universities. He was an officer in the German

army during World War I, on the Western Front near Verdun, and it was this experience that led him to re-examine the foundations of liberal Western culture[1]. He then pursued an academic career in Germany as a scholar of medieval law, which was interrupted by the rise of Nazism[2]. In 1933 Rosenstock-Huessy and his family left for the United States, where he began a new academic career. Famous in German academic circles, he was invited to Harvard, but his approach seemed too «theological» for Harvard's social science department. In 1935 he began teaching social philosophy at Dartmouth College, where he remained for the rest of his academic career until 1957. Rosenstock-Huessy's German historical writings were not translated into English and when he came to the United States he was no longer a professional legal historian. He remained an interdisciplinary social thinker[3], who interpreted European history as the unfolding of tensions within Christianity (Roy, 2016). While his ideas were framed in the context of a universal history, he preferred to present himself as a sociologist (Rosenstock-Huessy 1956, 1958).

Schmitt and Rosenstock-Huessy had a brief period of collaboration in 1930-1931. They worked together on the revision of Rosenstock's book[4]. Rosenstock-Huessy, who moved to the U. S. in 1933, «was bitterly disappointed by Schmitt's support of the Nazis and he believed Schmitt was a survivor who had sold his soul; «The Talleyrand of Hitlerism» as he called him one occasion» (Cristaudo, 2012: 170). Meanwhile, the fact that two such different thinkers, one a Catholic who did not belong to the Catholic intellectual circles of his time, and the other a Lutheran of Jewish origin, found themselves in Germany in 1930, if not friends, then certainly like-minded scholars in matters of legal theory and history, seems crucial to a better understanding of them both. Schmitt and Rosenstock-Huessy emerged from the aftermath of the First World War lamenting the loss of Germany's full political sovereignty after the Treaty of Versailles and the reduction of German life to an exclusively economic problem. Their political thought had theological roots, but they avoided bringing morality and politics too close together. Both formulated the differences between political, legal, moral and economic thought in a way that combined

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1. He began this work in the 1910s, together with his friend Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) (Rosenstock-Huessy, 2011).

2. Mohler's classic study of the Conservative Revolution in Germany (1918–1932) sees Rosenstock-Huessy as a «special case» (Mohler, Weissmann, 2005 [1950]). On this occasion, Roy remarks: «Indeed, what figure is less typical of the Conservative Revolution, largely dominated by neopagan or antihumanist tendencies and historicist assumptions, than Rosenstock-Huessy? One may wonder why this pioneer of Jewish-Christian dialogue even figures in the Conservative Revolution's canon, beyond sharing its main publisher (Eugen Diederichs)» (Roy, 2022: 63-64).

3. Cfr. «A brief list of some of his correspondents is indicative of the quality of minds with which he directly engaged: Carl Schmitt (whom he never forgave for his Nazism), Lewis Mumford, Reinhold Niebuhr, Alfred North Whitehead, Paul Tillich, Jacob and Susan Taubes, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Carl Friedrich, Karl Löwith (whom he particularly disliked), W. H. Auden (who wrote the Preface to his *I Am an Impure Thinker*), Helmuth von Moltke (whom he taught) and Helmuth's widow, Freya (who would become his companion after the death of Margrit Huessy), Sabine Leibholz (the twin sister of Dietrich Bonhoeffer), Carl Zuckmayer and Hermann Rauschning» (Cristaudo, Fiering, Leutzsch, 2015: 1).

4. From this collaboration remain the entries in Rosenstock-Huessy's diary, the layout of his book on revolutions with Schmitt's corrections («Die europäischen Revolutionen und der Charakter der Nationen»), and the reference to it on the first pages of «The Nomos of the Earth» (Schmitt, 2003: 59n).

literary expressiveness with extraordinary historical erudition. Although a comparison of the contributions of these two legal scholars would seem obvious, given the many points of overlap, it has not yet been made, largely because they were estranged from each other after 1933 and both experienced periods of oblivion at different times in the second half of the twentieth century[5].

In this article, I compare the political theology of C. Schmitt and the historical sociology of E. Rosenstock-Huessy not as integral projects, but only in the part concerning the Church or Christian ecclesiastical institutions in the process of the evolution of public law between two key events for international justice: from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the Treaty of Versailles in 1918. This comparison between two great thinkers and historians of law will be made in the light of the problems facing the international community today.

The Universalism of the Church and the «Elasticity» in Politics

Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the unity and universality of the Western Church has been challenged by the plurality of sovereign states. Before that, the Church had been shaken by conflicts and schisms, but with the advent of sovereign politics, the issue took on a whole new resonance. In their military and peace treaties, Christian nations became independent of ecclesiastical authorities, although the latter continued to play an important role in the Westphalian international order. At the same time as the plurality of states, confessional pluralism also took shape. It is well known that the Treaty of 1648 was based on the recognition of three confessions: Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism, whose coexistence shaped the political culture of classical Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries (Shaunu, 1966). The Catholic Church, in the form of reformed Tridentine Catholicism, was an important institution that united half of Europe (preserving common standards of culture and justice) but had a universal view of its mission that was inseparable from the politics of the time.

In the essay «Roman Catholicism and Political Form» (1923), Carl Schmitt supports the Catholic Church's claim to universality and describes it as a political institution *par excellence* (Schmitt, 1996). This essay made him famous as a Catholic apologist. It seems important, however, to emphasize that, although Schmitt was associated with conservative Catholic thought, he criticized the romanticism of the «ultramontanists» and sympathized with the earlier classical era in the relations between Church and State. Classical European Catholicism did not enter into «agonistic» (competitive) relations with

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5. There are two recent exceptions to this rule (Leutzsch, 2011), (Möckel A., entry 01.10.2023). In general, by the time Schmitt was overtaken by academic interest and recognition, Rosenstock-Huessy was remembered only within a narrow circle of his students and family. Even here there were notable exceptions. Although there were no full-fledged comparisons, there were mentions of Rosenstock-Huessy among those who were influenced by Schmitt. Helmuth Schelsky (1912-1984), a sociologist, wrote a review of Rosenstock's book «Sociology» (in which he emphasized the author's very subjective views) (Schelsky, 1959). Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006) used the example of Rosenstock-Huessy's description of political language and revolution as an example in his own work (Koselleck, 1997: 221, n. 97; Koselleck, 1984: 717, 788).

the State (represented by a plurality of states). In the 17th and 18th centuries the Catholic Church recognized sovereign states and their right to declare war and make peace, but it retained the sovereignty of doctrinal judgment and its own independent apparatus of government at two levels — regional (dioceses on the national territories) and universal (in Rome with the corresponding Papal State).

The recognition of a plurality of sovereign states as the international order creates, according to Schmitt, the «elasticity» of the Church when «in European monarchies, it preaches the alliance of throne and altar, and in the peasant democracies of the Swiss cantons or in North America it stands wholly on the side of a firm democracy» (Schmitt, 1996: 4). That is why critics accuse the Catholic Church that its «politics is nothing more than a limitless opportunism» (Schmitt, 1996: 4). Then Schmitt goes on and speaks about «High Church dignitaries blessing the guns of all warring nations; or neo-Catholic literati, partly monarchist, partly communist» (1996: 5). There are two aspects to this «elasticity», as Schmitt sees it. On the one hand, it is a manifestation of the tactics of political coalitions. On the other hand, it is the universalism of the Roman Empire that continues to live in the Church:

«The Roman Catholic Church as an historical complex and administrative apparatus has perpetuated the universalism of the Roman Empire. French nationalists like Charles Maurras, German racial theorists like H[ouston] Stewart Chamberlain, German professors of liberal provenance like Max Weber, a Pan-Slavic poet and seer like Dostoyevsky— all base their interpretations on this continuity of the Catholic Church and the Roman Empire» (Schmitt, 1996: 5).

The fact of continuity in the development of legal tradition leads Schmitt to consider the Roman Catholic Church as the bearer of a special political and juridical mentality that has marked the legal progress of European nations. Describing the papal dogma in terms of the opposition between charisma and office, he sees in the sole authority of the Church an elimination of the contradictions of parliamentarism through the ecclesiastical *complexio oppositorum*. The Pope has a representative role or function as the Vicar of Christ. The papacy is institutional and personal, but «independent of charisma» (Schmitt, 1996:14). As a political institution the Church retains some power in the international sphere, but this power is limited compared to the Middle Ages, and this is the natural development of the principle of universality, according to Schmitt. The limitations of the present intensify eschatological expectations. And it is in this perspective that Schmitt claims that the Catholic Church is a *complexio oppositorum,* which can be described as the antagonism of justice and glory (Schmitt, 1996: 33). This is a reference to the scene of the Last Judgement by the conservative French writer Ernest Hello (1828-1885), in his version of the story by Léon Bloy (1846-1917). The Church is the representative of God's justice, but only temporarily, until the Day of Judgment. It is, therefore, much more a representation of Divine Glory.

The difficult cases of the Church's involvement in military conflicts (including the then recent First World War) have already been highlighted in «Roman Catholicism and Political Form». But such issues, along with the whole concept of the political, have not

yet been properly articulated. In 1923, Schmitt opposes economic or technical rationality to political power based on authority and ethos, but it is only in his later work «The Concept of the Political» (1932) that he makes a significant step forward in defining the political in terms of distinction between friend and enemy (Schmitt, 1976). The political entails the possibility of struggle, conflict and war. Religious institutions can become political because «political can derive its energy from the most varied human endeavors» including «the religious» (Schmitt, 1976: 35). The concept of the political in this work embodies the critique of liberalism. This concept is different from the one contained in «Roman Catholicism». It does not include the eschatology of the Last Judgment. Instead, it presents a different image of judgment in relation to original sin (Fox, 2017). But even here, the quality of «elasticity» is clear when it comes to the Church. The latter is rejected by liberal politics as an institution that restricts individual freedom (along with the State), but it can also become a part of liberal politics (along with commerce) (Schmitt, 1976:70). In any case, liberalism's attempts to avoid the «friend-enemy» distinction by limiting the power of the State and the Church are doomed to failure. Here Schmitt believes that collectivity is impossible without antagonism (Mouffe, 2015). Scholars disagree about whether Schmitt retains the same Catholic view in his works of the 1930s as in those of the 1910s and 1920s (the fact that his political theory may have evolved does not raise objections). Meier argues that Schmitt embraced a Catholic theology throughout his works (Meier, 1998), while McCormick suggests that he abandoned the Catholic position after his excommunication from the Catholic Church (for having a second marriage) (McCormick, 1998; Fox, 2015).

The Place of the Church in the Europe of Sovereign States

The «friend-enemy» distinction is given a new reading in Schmitt's post-war studies, in which the theme of collective antagonism fades into the background[6]. «The Nomos of the Earth» (1950) sees European international law in the 16th-19th centuries as a solution to the problem of war, one that avoids unnecessary bloodshed. The concept of sovereignty was of great importance in this international context. According to Carl Schmitt, since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, European states have been regarded as equally sovereign «persons» (Schmitt, 2006: 144). This allowed for a non-discriminatory definition of war as well as the distinction between the terms of «enemy» and «criminal»: «Through a consideration of this new spatial order of the earth, it becomes obvious that the sovereign, European, territorial state (the word "state" is always understood in its concrete historical sense as characteristic of an epoch from about 1492 to 1890) constituted the only ordering institution at this time. The former bracketing of war overseen by the church in interna-

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6. This article omits discussing at depth the 1938 book «The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol». "Leviathan", which could be seen as a dialogue between Schmitt and modern political philosophers and deserves a detailed treatment that goes beyond the chosen topic (Schmitt, 1996a). In short, Schmitt's contemplation of the church beneath the sovereign's hand on the title page of «Leviathan» prompted him to reflect on the Church's position under absolutism, as well as on the divide between law and morality, faith and confession (*fides* and *confessio*).

tional law had been destroyed by religious wars and creedal civil wars. Its institutional power of creating order obtained only as a *potestas indirecta*, while the union of political spatial order and the organizational form of the state were based on the astounding fact that for 200 years a new bracketing of European wars had been successful, because it again had become possible to realize the concept of a *justus hostis*, and to distinguish the enemy from a traitor and a criminal in international law. The recognized sovereign state also could remain a *justus hostis* in wars with other sovereign states, and war could be terminated with a peace treaty, even one containing an amnesty clause» (Schmitt, 2006: 148).

The Church was present on the land of the European continent even before modern states began to draw their borders. Respect for such an inherited order of things ensured the stability of the modern system, despite the sovereign right to war and the unstable borders:

«But, in reality, strong traditional ties — religious, social, and economic — endure longer. Thus, the nomos of this epoch had a completely different and more solid structure. The concrete, practical, political forms, arrangements, and preconceptions that developed for the cohabitation of continental European power complexes in this interstate epoch clearly demonstrated that the essential and very effective bond, without which there would have been no international law, lay not in the highly problematic, voluntary ties among the presumably unrestrained wills of equally sovereign persons, but in the binding power of a Eurocentric spatial order encompassing all these sovereigns» (Schmitt, 2006: 48). Thus, for the state, the recognition of ecclesiastical ties which already «burden» the land that becomes its territory is a factor of stability of the *nomos*. For the Church, the recognition of the State — represented empirically by a multitude of states — is a consequence of experience of religious wars. It was the states that put an end to what Schmitt calls the «European Civil War» during the Reformation. States «ended the European civil war of churches and religious parties, and thereby neutralized creedal conflicts within the state through a centralized political unity» (Schmitt, 2006: 128), when sectarian intolerance demanded war to the last living «heretic».

Schmitt believed that war is not the content, but the *precondition* of politics, because it is a condition of seriousness or, in other words, the framework of a serious decision (Slováček, 2014: 160-161). War is inevitable, but it should not be absolutized or turned into a religious duty: «The significance of the state consisted in the overcoming of religious civil wars, which became possible only in the 16th century, and the state achieved this task only by a neutralization» (Schmitt, 2006: 61).

Within the modern order of international law the Roman Catholic Church has maintained its own state on the Italian peninsula as the backbone of its historic central bureaucratic apparatus and diplomacy. However, it claims neutrality that is different from that of states such as Switzerland or Belgium, because it is not territorial neutrality, but neutrality «to the affairs of states». Moreover, the Church distanced itself from the problems of the occupation and «as a result of the religious tolerance of enlightened absolutism, after

the 18th century church relations also largely remained undisturbed by a change in sovereignty» (Schmitt, 2006: 201). By maintaining its ties under all configurations, the modern Church demonstrates the relativity of sovereignty applied to territory, to the land.

It is noteworthy that the theme of the Church's specific relationship to the land runs through Schmitt's works throughout the years. It appears as early as 1923, when he ponders how the Church can sustain itself in the modern era of capitalism and argues that it needs selective alliances: «Catholicism will continue to accommodate itself to every social and political order, even one dominated by capitalist entrepreneurs or trade unions and proletarian councils. But accommodation will be possible only if and when economically based power becomes political, that is, if and when capitalists or workers who have come to power assume political representation with all its responsibilities» (Schmitt, 1996: 24), but even better with «the states in which the landed nobility or peasantry is the ruling class» (Schmitt, 1996: 25).

The arbitrariness of the decisions of the new multilateral order, in Schmitt's view, contradicts the Church's intimate relationship with the earth/land. A fierce critic of the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations, Schmitt had little to say about the contemporary ecclesiastical diplomacy aimed at preserving the Church's presence in the new post-World War I international order (the Versailles system). This historical context, in which «Roman Catholicism and Political Form» was written, will be described in more detail below. Pope Benedict XV (1854-1922), who was elected by the conclave in the first months of the First World War, openly condemned it. He immediately proclaimed the neutrality of the Holy See and attempted to mediate peace from this perspective in 1916 and 1917 (Pollard, 1999: 80), but the warring parties rejected his initiatives. The Pope wanted to be a mediator, he wanted the Papal Nuncio to be present at the Versailles Conference (as he had been at the Westphalian meeting), but since the «Roman question» was still unresolved, Italy categorically rejected this demand. Pope Benedict XV considered the consequences of the Great War to be disastrous for the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, the Roman Church recognized the territorial decisions of the Versailles Conference and, with the efforts of the new nuncios, began to build a new union of Catholic nations. In addition, representatives of the Catholic Church actively participated in various international humanitarian initiatives under the new Versailles-Washington order (Amorosa, 2022).

All of Rome's turbulent activity after 1917 finds no response or positive evaluation in Schmitt's 1923 apology for the Church («Roman Catholicism and Political Form»). His inspiration for Catholicism was based neither on the Church's presence in international humanitarian organizations, nor on the development of Catholic associations (an alternative to «atheistic socialism», proposed by Pope Leo XIII). In fact, Schmitt's thought is far removed from the ideas of other Catholic intellectuals of the time who would later provide the ideological basis of *Christian democracy* (such as Romano Guardini (1885-1968), Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), and Luigi Sturzo (1871-1959)). There may be reasons to believe that he deliberately stayed away from these circles. One may assume that, first, he was aware of the risks of «ideologizing» the Church's position and, second, he be-

lieved that papal mediation in international conflicts was a phenomenon of the past, a remedy from the era of dualism between the Pope and the Emperor. It was relevant before the emergence of the territorial state. A return to medieval categories in such a complex modern issue would either be a vicious circle, taking politics back to the eve of the explosion of religious wars, or merely a romantic historical performance. Although Schmitt said that «The Catholic Church is the sole surviving contemporary example of the medieval capacity to create representative figures: the pope, the emperor, the monk, the knight, the merchant» (Schmitt, 1996: 19), he had no romantic nostalgia for the Middle Ages[7]. In his conservative Catholicism, the 18th and 19th centuries were seen as an irreversible stage. His hope for a *katechon*, a restraining force, was linked to the secular state (Rasch, 2004: 43).

Rosenstock-Huessy on the Reformation and the New Civil Order

Unlike Schmitt, Rosenstock-Huessy believed that the main role in overcoming the European wars of religion was played not so much by the arrangements of sovereign states as by the new organization of society that emerged from the Reformation.

The German-American legal scholar was not alone in reflecting on the historical contribution of the Reformation to political and legal progress in the first half of the twentieth century (the period of increasing secularization). Among his predecessors were Rudolph Sohm (1841-1917), Max Weber (1864-1920) and Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923). The famous legal historian Sohm (with whom Eugen Rosenstock worked at the Faculty of Law of the University of Leipzig in 1912-1914) was known for his studies of early Christianity, Roman and German law. His idea that in church history the charismatic principle of organization was replaced by a juridical order (Sohm, 1892, 1923) had a great influence on a number of his contemporaries, including Max Weber. The latter, after studying the Protestant communities of North America, formulated his thesis on the role of the Reformation in economic progress (expressed in socio-political forms) in the articles of 1904-1906 (Weber, 2014). Ernst Troeltsch, theologian and historian, also emphasized the importance of Protestantism for the emergence and development of the modern world (Troeltsch, 1912; Troeltsch, 1925) in close reference to Weber's theses (Dmitriev, 2022). Thus, Rosenstock-Hussey offers his reading of the Reformation history in the light of these earlier discussions, but through the prism of the new experience of the world war[8]. He is therefore primarily interested in how the political culture of Protestantism was historically able to withstand the inexhaustible bloodshed of the «war of all against all» (and not in how it solved the problems of social liberalization, which were the direct concern of both Weber and Troeltsch).

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7. On this occasion, Gray reproaches Schmitt for paying attention to the attempts of neo-medievalism to raise the question of moral authority in international law independently of politics in the 1920s (something the Pope could express) (Gray, 2007).

8. He was an innovator in this approach. It was only after the Second World War, with its experience of total social mobilization, that historical science began to formulate the question of «war and society» (Anderson, 1998: 5).

Rosenstock-Huessy's historical-sociological approach to the impact of the Reformation could be summarized by the term *Revolution*. He saw the Protestant Reformation as the second great revolution in Europe after the Papal one in the 11th century. The scholar considered the entire second millennium as an era of revolutionary aspirations. This period began with the Roman Revolution of the Catholic Church under the rule of the Papacy against the power of monarchs and feudal lords. Later, the «chain of revolutions» continued with the Reformation in Germany, the Puritan Revolution in England, the American Revolution, the French Revolution and finally, the Russian Revolution. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia coincided with the World War and was the last possible revolution. He saw religion as the most important key to understanding social evolution and reform, while he found theology too abstract. That is why his ideas were placed in the context of a universal history and his most important book in the interbellum period was «Out of Revolution: Autobiography of Western Man»[9] (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1938). After the Second World War, he outlined his system of social thought in the book «In the Cross of Reality», in which he called himself a sociologist, although at the center of his sociology was the Christian cross[10] (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1956, 1958).

The term «revolution» as applied to sixteenth-century European history means that the Reformation was not just a theological dispute accompanied by institutional revisions. It changed the world, creating new relationships between political and ecclesiastical authorities, between Christian states and ultimately between individuals and society. The social transformation was carried out by both religious and secular figures within the same movement[11]. A constant polemical reminder follows from this approach: «modernity» began with the Reformation (and not with the Renaissance). Periodization «proves the universal scope of the German Reformation. Our division of the Christian era into the darkness of the Middle Ages and the light of modern times is a Protestant creation. Luther's followers were bold enough to begin a new era» (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1938: 362-363).

Rosenstock-Huessy noted that the German Reformation led by Martin Luther and the German princes gave rise to a universe of new political and cultural forms. The eclipse of Roman ecclesiastical law made the introduction of civil law a matter of concern for sovereign princes. This led to the birth of a new public law and a new ethics of public service. The idea of equal civil law for all subjects throughout the territory of the state

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9. The American edition quoted here is the revised translation of a German edition (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1931).

10. The title refers to the famous book «The Star of Redemption» (1921) by his friend Franz Rosenzweig.

11. Cfr. «Formally, it is easy to show what the Reformation has in common with the later revolutions. As in the others, the first period is one of upheaval. The second is a time of carelessness and arrogance, which leads to deep humiliation and abasement. Furthermore, the problem of a double start, a two-fold beginning, is very clear in the German Reformation, because Luther's religious movement and the political moves of the German princes are distinct and separate. The monk, Luther, dominated the public scene from the sensational moment when he nailed up his theses against indulgences and papal securities in 1517, up to the equally sensational event of his marriage in 1525. In that same year the princes themselves became reformers during the war against the inflamed and fanatical villagers, and remained so until the peace of religion in 1555» (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1938: 364).

was an innovation at the time. Finally, while the duty of a Protestant ruler was to maintain order for all citizens, the Reformation abolished the traditional view of man as a warrior first and a peaceful citizen second. Rosenstock-Huessy saw the separation of the military from the civil service to be a kind of continental *system of checks and balances* that promoted international justice by curbing violence: «The High Magistrate, when he created a civil law and a civil service, separated his generals from his civil servants and made them generals pure and simple, without any claim to be made governors, either then or later. How strange and surprising this division of labour was and is, is shown by the lives of George Washington, the Duke of Wellington… So natural is it for a nation to entrust political leadership to a successful general. But the Reformation abolished this confusion. From Luther's time down to 1880, ordinarily no German general was invested with civil power! Hindenburg was a great exception to the rule. German militarism consisted in the strict exclusion of generals from politics. This cardinal contribution of Germany to democracy and civilization was not adopted by the democratic countries» (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1938:373).

For Rosenstock-Huessy the Lutheran form of government was as important for legal progress as English parliamentarism or French democracy. The Reformation concentrated its efforts on the democratization of the Church, thus opposing the evil of unjust and bad government. Here Rosenstock-Huessy indirectly disagrees with Troeltsch and Weber, who contrasted the democracy of Calvinist communities with the patriarchal Lutheran monarchies (Dmitriev, 2022). Harold Berman (1918-2007), an American lawyer, who had been a student of Rosenstock-Huessy in the late 1930s, developed his idea by combining both Lutheran and Calvinist perspectives: «The Lutheran… and the Calvinist doctrine… led inevitably to what from Protestant perspectives was the spiritualization of the secular. In Protestant countries large parts of the spiritual law of the Roman Catholic Church were appropriated and transformed by the secular power and administered not by the clergy but by the laity» (Berman, 2003:369-370). The political world, created by «the spiritualization of the secular», existed for more than 400 years until it came into crisis in the face of increasing secularization.

Rosenstock-Huessy on Militarization as an Expression of Spiritual Crisis

According to Rosenstock-Huessy, the system of checks and balances developed in the German states between the 16th and 18th centuries included both the separation of civil and military administration and the balance between state and church authorities. The church in this argument is the Reformed Evangelical Church of the Protestant states, which became an important institution of civic life and *civilization*. Comparing Luther as a political thinker to Machiavelli and Boden, Rosenstock argued that the German preacher «really saved the world from fascism» (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1938: 406) by offering a balance (and only in this balanced form a recognition of sovereignty) between the monarchy and the Protestant Church. He notes that the political thought of Boden and Machiavelli exclude the Church from political discourse. Boden's ideas of sovereign-

ty were developed with no recognition of the role of the Church in any balance with the monarchy, while Machiavelli wrote about the struggle of tyrants for power when the moral authority of the Pope was in decline.

The difference between Rosenstock-Huessy and the later systematization of Martin Luther's political doctrine in the form of the 'Two Kingdoms theory' («Zwei-Reiche-Lehre»)[12], is that he places the individual (not the institution) at the center. Those who reconcile the duty of a loyal citizen and subject of a Christian state with the ecclesial duty implied by the «priesthood of all believers» achieve a balance that is expressed in the spirituality of everyday life (Ferrario, Vogel, 2020). This was the reason why independent universities with theological departments became important institutions of religious autonomy in Lutheran monarchies.

The *red line* between military and civil logic, as well as the balance between church and state, almost disappeared in the 19th century, when the importance of independent ecclesiastical institutions steadily declined as the significance of the national police increased. Militarization thus occurs where war is the only alternative to a failed civil order. Even more dangerous, however, was the period of artificial demilitarization of Germany that followed the Treaty of Versailles (1919). Rosenstock-Huessy makes a bold statement by suggesting a correlation between demilitarization and hypermilitarization. He claims that Germany, having lost its regular national army, ended up creating the military corps of the Anti-Comintern Crusade, which was dangerous because of its pseudo-religious ideology. He saw the alternative to the ineffective Treaty of Versailles in a consistent system of international justice, but he felt in the 1930s and 1940s that a generation of *impartial* international officials had not yet been raised and trained for such a system. In the years that followed, as he reflected on the *planetary* society, he came to the conclusion that in the third millennium the economy would unite the world, just as the Church had done in the West at the beginning of the second millennium. However, it is necessary to distinguish between, on the one hand, the economic homogeneous space, and, on the other hand, the world as a place of communication, with the possibility of speech and decentered dialogue. In this human dimension, the world must be organized not as a *universum* but as a *pluriversum,* whose peaceful unity depends on different cultures (Leuztsch, 2011)[13].

In today's world, Rosenstock-Huessy's message may be understood as a call for intercultural diversity. World wars have raised the question of world unity to preserve peace. Recognizing that in the post-war era humanity would be united by the global economy, Rosenstock believed that economic considerations would not protect against personal national preferences, «block consciousness» and social utopianism that hide behind ide-

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12. This systematization is created as a reaction to the relations between state and church in the Third Reich and becomes the subject of internal ecclesiastical controversies from the 1950s onwards, especially in Germany (Beeke, 2021).

13. Andreas Leuztsch compares Rosenstock-Huessy to both Fukuyama and Huntington and shows that his idea of dialogue is inspired by history (which never ends, contrary to what Fukuyama claims). At the same time, Rosenstock-Huessy does not see the *pluriversum* as a threat to Western civilization (as Huntington does) (Leuztsch, 2011).

alism the real problems of the planetary society. Today it is clear that cultural and historical differences are still seen as a conflict and threat in politics even after seventy years of the work of the United Nations. All of the criticisms that have been leveled at the League of Nations can also be applied to the current state of international organizations. And yet the *pluriversum* requires the work of international institutions. And in this work the churches, as living witnesses of history and defenders of culture, can compensate for the abstract nature of the economic projects pursued by international bureaucracy.

Conclusion

The perspectives of Carl Schmitt's political theology and Rosenstock-Huessy's historical sociology can complement each other in a multi-confessional dialogue. Both scholars independently concluded that in the Westphalian era, ecclesiastical institutions, even if they were not allowed to make decisions about war and peace, played an important role in limiting the use of war. This was possible because of their neutrality towards sovereign states. Respecting their individual patriotism, the churches did not have to choose between equally sovereign states. The ecclesiastical solidarity between Catholic and Protestant countries did not make them unbreakable military blocs. The European era of mechanisms designed to limit military conflict ended with the First World War. In the aftermath of total world wars, the problem of a supranational authority to support a peaceful solution became urgent, and new hopes for this kind of authority were placed in international organizations. In the new chaos of the postwar situation, churches also began to seek their place as actors on the international stage. Carl Schmitt was quite skeptical about the church mediating and getting involved in international conflicts. Meanwhile, he believed that the Church retained the very form of the political, without which it was impossible to raise the question of international justice at all. This view resonates with some contemporary assumptions that international justice requires a political rather than an economic dimension (Fusco, Zivanaris, 2021).

Rosenstock-Hussey also believed that modern states and international organizations seek solutions mainly in the field of economic cooperation, but this is not enough for peace and stability. It is essential to preserve the possibilities of communication in the languages of different cultures (*pluriversum*). Like Schmitt, Rosenstock-Huessy was critical of liberal idealism in international relations. However, although he saw revolutions as a disease, he was sympathetic to their results in expanding new liberties. Therefore he insisted that revolution as a paradigm for positive social change in Western civilization emerged in close connection with the theological idea of ecclesiastical reform. Here he differs from Schmitt, who was appalled by the violent anarchy of the revolutionary movement and sided with the consolidated state as a means of restraining lawlessness (*katechon*). In his historical sociology, Rosenstock-Huessy argued that revolutions were always accompanied by wars. Although he did not consider violence necessary, he saw revolutions and wars as an irreversible chain of events, as the apocalyptic «birth pangs». Ultimately, he saw them as conditions that had to be passed through for rebirth, greater harmony and mutual understanding among peoples. The end result is still the construction of a planetary society, already anticipated in symbolic forms by the Church.

A comparative study of these two approaches reveals that even today, when humanity is once again trying to prevent a world war, dialogue on the political influence of the Church can contribute to the debate on international justice.

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Война и церковь от Вестфальского до Версальского мира у Карла Шмитта и Ойгена Розенштока-Хюсси

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Во время войны и в послевоенные периоды религиозные институты часто играли определенную роль в установлении мирных отношений и критериев международной справедливости. Статья теоретически осмысливает этот феномен, опираясь на политическую теологию К. Шмитта (1888-1985) и историческую социологию О. Розенштока-Хюсси (1888-1973). Два выдающихся юриста Веймарской Германии, чьи пути резко разошлись в 1933 г., разделяли взгляд на государство модерна как на средство ограничения войны. Они также отводили особую роль Церкви в стабилизации нового международного порядка вестфальской эпохи. Вестфальский подход к международной справедливости был основан на идее религиозного плюрализма в форме плюрализма суверенных государств. Для Шмитта было важно, что Римско-католическая церковь (к которой он принадлежал) признавала суверенные государства и их права объявлять войну и заключать мир, в то время как культурный универсализм Римской империи продолжал жить в церкви и обеспечивал старые территориальные связи, благодаря которым европейский «номос» имел более прочную структуру. В отличие от Шмитта, Розеншток-Хюсси считал, что главную роль в преодолении конфликтов религиозных войн сыграли не столько договоренности суверенных государств, сколько новая организация общества, возникшая в результате Реформации. Розеншток рассматривал отделение военных от гражданских служащих в государственном управлении как своего рода континентальную систему сдержек и противовесов, которая способствовала международной справедливости путем сдерживания насилия. После исторического и теоретического обзора мы проанализируем, почему культурная роль церковных институтов по-прежнему актуальна и важна. В заключение мы покажем, что описанные выше перспективы политической теологии и исторической социологии формируют межконфессиональный диалог, который может стать вкладом в дискуссию о международной справедливости.

Ключевые слова: политическая теология, Шмитт, Розеншток-Хюсси, право и религия, международные отношения, церковные институты, международная справедливость.

The Power of Political Theology: an Analysis of Carl Schmitt's Sovereign Dictatorship and Friend-Enemy Distinction through Friedrich J. W. Schelling and Sigmund Freud*

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In this paper, I draw together Carl Schmitt's take on sovereign power and its dictatorial exceptionalism with his political theology and his insistence on the friend-enemy distinction in order to take steps towards a critique of his work. To explain why we would be remiss to take Schmitt's insights into political theology prescriptively, I turn to Friedrich W. J. Schelling's 1809 *Freiheitsschrift*. I then take-up Sigmund Freud's 1929 *Das Unbehangen in der Kultur* in order to shed light on the psychological underpinnings of the friend-enemy distinction as it actually plays itself out in everyday life. I explain Schmitt's analogy between divine power and sovereign power in Section II. In Section III, I argue that the role of the sovereign dictator in the state of emergency is especially problematic given Schmitt's insistence on the friend-enemy distinction. In Section IV, I turn to Schelling's view of God, and of the manifestation of divine principles in the human world, and argue that Schmitt's theologized sovereign dictator is a force of evil. In section V, I engage with Freud's understanding of the role of religion and his view of the effects of repression of the powerful drives (*eros* and *thanatos*) in civilized society. I then argue that the practical unravelling of Schmitt's political theology and his concept of the political, when put to the test of psychoanalytic inquiry, is that they end up demonizing those who are deemed "enemies".

Keywords: Dictatorship, civilization, *eros*, evil, god, sovereign power, state of exception, *thanatos*

I. Introduction

The central concern of this paper is the problematic alignment that Carl Schmitt's theorizing suggests between political theology, sovereign dictatorship, and the friend-enemy distinction. I argue that this alignment eventuates in politically and socially disastrous prescriptive elements of Schmitt's thought. In effect, instead of securing international justice through the balance of powers (as Schmitt recommends in *Der Nomos der Erde* 1950), Schmitt's political theory denies us a chance of a just and fair world. Schmitt develops his ideas, not in the least part, in an attempt to counter what he sees as the anti-theological thrust of 19th and 20th century sociology, politics, and jurisprudence. To draw out the unsavory consequences of the practical effects of Schmitt's theories, I will concentrate my analysis on Schmitt's *Political Theology* (1922) and *Dictatorship* (1921), but I will also draw on the *Concept of the Political* (1932). I argue that, while Schmitt correctly identifies the force that theology has when it comes to shaping the decisions and actions

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of the sovereign (be this leadership represented by a single individual or by a social class), we would be ill-advised to take Schmitt's findings prescriptively.

My analysis shows that Schmitt's political theology, when brought together with his articulation of the state of exception and the role of sovereign power therein, theologizes the sovereign in a problematic way. That is, the sovereign and the power thereof for constitutive or foundational action are thought by Schmitt by analogy with the omnipotent power of God. However, such power cannot be exercised by humans without violence of hubris. This is also the case in extraordinary circumstances when the sovereign acts as a dictator. Schmitt himself denies to the Church, as an institution, the power of a "stupendous monopoly" (Schmitt, 1923, 1996: 25). Instead, for Schmitt, the "essence of the Roman-Catholic *complexio oppositorum* lies in a specific, formal superiority over the matter of human life such as no other imperium has ever known" (Schmitt, 1923, 1996: 8). The Church is such a confluence and complex of opposites that it admits a standing higher than that of everyday material existence. The latter abides by the logic of non-contradiction where opposites collide, but do not co-exist. Thus, the Church has a form that can be representative of the many elements — including opposing ones — of secular life. Schmitt admits that "the Church requires a political form. Without it there is nothing to correspond to its intrinsically representative conduct" (Schmitt, 1923, 1996: 25.). The spirit and form of Roman Catholicism, then, especially provided that the Church undergoes a political reform, is not that of a monopoly or of an absolute authority, but it is the spirit of a representative power. Despite this account of the Church, Schmitt nonetheless ascribes God-like power to the sovereign dictator.

Furthermore, if we take Schmitt's friend-enemy distinction as the condition necessary for political life — the life that readily includes the God-like power of the sovereign — then the result (despite Schmitt's own claims to the contrary) is that the enemy can never be an equal, but must always be in a disadvantaged position. In Schmitt's theory, for genuine political life to continue, the enemy must always exist, be treated dispassionately, and possessed of such a stature and power as to be capable of taking the opponent's life. However, historically and in practice, when the enemy is singled out by the sovereign dictatorial power in the state of exception, this enemy is no match for the latter and eschatologically, the power structure is such as always to secure the ultimate victory of the sovereign powers that be.

I draw together Schmitt's take on sovereign power and its exceptionalism with his political theology and his insistence on the friend-enemy distinction in order to open his work up to critique. To explain why we would be remiss to take Schmitt's insights into political theology prescriptively, I turn to Friedrich W. J. Schelling's 1809 *Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Human Freedom (Freiheitsschrift)* where he offers sustained analyses of God, the divine principles of the dark ground and the revealing light, and of the way in which these manifest in the human world. I establish the meaning of the principles' effects in the human world for the possibility of good and evil and our claims concerning the matter. I argue that, although Schmitt correctly identifies the coincidence between the power of sovereign dictatorship and the God-like stance of the dictator, as-

sessed through the lens of Schelling's theology, Schmitt's sovereign is bound to do evil, and not, as Schmitt would have it, see to the good and preservation of the state. I then turn to Sigmund Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents* in order to shine light on the psychological underpinnings of the friend-enemy distinction as it actually plays itself out in life, including in Schmitt's lifetime.

Through Freud's interpretation of religious belief as well as the psychological effects of *eros* and *thanatos* — the forces that are at play in the formation and potential disintegration of society — I contextualize the proclivity toward establishing the poles of "good" and "evil," especially as these poles determine political life.[1] This dichotomy itself is often used — as Freud clearly indicates — to demonize those who are deemed or declared to be political opponents or, in Schmitt's terms, "enemies" (including enemies of the state). This demonization becomes especially problematic in times of crisis or, as Schmitt would have it, in extraordinary situations when the sovereign decision and action post-factum legitimize things done against those deemed dangerous to the existence of the state. The psychoanalytic investigation suggests that under duress, the public readily admits of seeing a group of people as "enemies" because this label affords the needful target upon which violent, destructive energies of the death-drive — energies that otherwise must remain repressed in civil life — can be expended. Thus, drawing on Freud avails me of another aspect of critique against Schmitt's recommendations regarding the coincidence between the constitutive power of the sovereign dictator in the state of emergency and the friend-enemy distinction as a requirement for political life.

I explain Schmitt's analogy between divine power and sovereign power in Section II. In section III, I argue that the role of the sovereign dictator in the state of emergency is especially problematic given Schmitt's insistence on the friend-enemy distinction. In Section IV, I turn to Schelling's view of God and argue that Schmitt's sovereign dictator, if analyzed through Schelling, is a "force of evil" in the world. In section V, I engage with Freud's understanding of the role of religion and his view of the effects of repression of the powerful drives (*eros* and *thanatos*) in civilized society. I then argue that, put to the test of psychoanalytic investigation, the practical denouement of Schmitt's political theology and his concept of the political is that they end up demonizing those deemed "enemies." Although in 1963, the concept of an "enemy" is repositioned not to apply to internal conflicts, in 1922, Schmitt unambiguously states that under extraordinary circumstances there would be those who "without ceasing to be citizens, would be treated as 'enemies' or 'rebels' without rights" (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 121).[2] The use of this label ends

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1. Schmitt's own discussion of good and evil in view of the Roman Catholic faith can be found in the appendix to Schmitt, 1923, 1996: 46-59.

2. On Schmitt's later view of the friend-enemy distinction, see Schmitt, 1963, 2007: 85-89. Reinhard Mehring further shows how both Schmitt's friend-enemy and his concept of war invite criticism because as "conceptual definitions can hardly be separated from the context of his overall body of work; its aims were limited to the construction of a theory with a practical purpose and to being a tool in a political battle" (Mehring, 2014: 186). See further Mika Ojakangas who draws a direct connection between the Jews under National Socialism and Schmitt's "enemies" (Ojakangas, 2003: 411-424). See further Mehring's summary of

up spearheading atrocious acts against a group of people who become the target of the psychic discharge of the repressed, aggressive drive, i.e., *thanatos.*

II. Theological Roots of Sovereign Power

In this section, I argue that Schmitt identifies the political arrangement of a given historical era with what he sees as a metaphysical foundation at the basis of this practical arrangement. I further claim that, for Schmitt (and at least in the context of his historical milieu), the most appropriate basis for political order is the divine power of the One and Only God, which in practice is expressed as the will and action of the sovereign leader.

In *Political Theology*, Carl Schmitt identifies the general tendency of 19th and 20th century sociology, jurisprudence, and politics to disavow the theological underpinning of power and government.[3] He offers analyses and critiques of materialist and positivist positions as well as of liberalism and constitutional democracy[4]. Schmitt observes that there is a break in positivism, normative thought, and materialism with such rationalist thinkers of the 18th century, like Rousseau, who engages in the "politicization of theological concepts" (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 46)[5]. Already in the 17th century, the ideas of Descartes and Hobbes pave the way for a rationalistic and mechanistic view of the political society. However, as Schmitt himself holds, "[a]ll decisive concepts of the modern state theory are secularized theological concepts. Not only because of their historical development, but also because they are transferred unto the theory of state from theology. Thus, for example, "the almighty God," Schmitt claims, "becomes the omnipotent lawgiver. But also in their systematic structure, their knowledge is necessary for the sociological consideration of these concepts" (Schmitt, 1922a: 43). Rationalized and secularized political and state theory, if traced back to its roots, originates in theology and a metaphysical representation of the world that corresponds to a given theological outlook. Schmitt is also careful not to attribute to Descartes, a Renaissance thinker, a fully mechanistic outlook.

Specifically, comparing Descartes and Hobbes, Schmitt claims that Descartes' model of state construction and of the architect as the sovereign "corresponds to the Renaissance artwork and it is not yet the techno-mechanicalized imagination of the rationalistic-revolutionary state theory for which the state is a clockwork, machine, automat, or apparatus … as Hobbes says" (Schmitt, 1936/37: 622).The power and control that Des-

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Schmitt's critics, including Karl Löwith's objection to the friend-enemy distinction and also Löwith's "decisive critique of Schmitt's 'occasionalistic decisionism'" (Mehring, 2014: 307).

3. On Schmitt's interest in and commitment to the questions of revelation and theology — throughout his career — see H. Meier, 1998.

4. Find Schmitt's critiques of liberalism, in P. Hirst, 2016: 128–37; C. Larmore, 1997: 175–88; M. Lilla, 1997: 38-44; A. Carty, 2002: 53–68; David Dyzenhaus, 1998. See Schmitt's critique of constitutional democracy in C. 1928, 2008. See further R. Cristi, 1993: 281–300.

5. Throughout this paper, I refer to different editions of Schmitt's works. I aim to offer optimal translations of Schmitt's works. I offer my own translations of Schmitt's text and I consult and cite existing English language translations. Where the English differs from extant translations, the translation is by the author. Likewise, where the English of Freud's and Schelling's texts differs from the extant translations, it is by the author.

cartes' state-architect exercises in the political arena, on Schmitt's interpretation, can be understood by analogy with the work and efficacy of an all-powerful God. Schmitt upholds political theology as it supports his view of sovereignty and justifies the admittance of the sovereign's right to exercise the power of exception[6]. Schmitt's comments on Descartes indicate that he sees in Descartes' privileging of reason an opening unto an understanding of the world — its theological foundation and political arrangement — that Schmitt himself finds crucially important. Namely, what Schmitt thinks emerges in the light of reason is that there is a correspondence or an analogy between God and the statesman. Both constitute the world in the best way possible — God as a singular, omnipotent creator and the statesman as an architect or a master craftsman (a *demiurge* to borrow an idea from Plato's *Timaeus*). Both God's and the state-architect's power is sovereign power — the power to constitute or bring forth foundational and self-grounding arrangements that are, for all intents and purposes, representative of the best constituted order that there can be. Schmitt writes that

> [a] continuous thread runs through the metaphysical, political, and sociological conceptions that postulate the sovereign as a personal unit and primeval creator. The … *Discours de la méthode* … is a document of the new rationalist spirit. … 'One sole architect' must construct a house and a town; the best constitutions are those that are the work of a sole wise legislator [*die besten Verfassungen sind das Werk eines einzigen klugen legislateur*], … and finally, a sole God governs the world [*ein einziger Gott regiert die Welt*]" (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 47; Schmitt, 1922a : 51).

Implicit in this take on Descartes is Schmitt's preference of a single and unified source of power over the deliberative process of the many. Especially where it comes to the many members of the parliament, Schmitt puts no trust in its capacity for expedient deliberation and the kind of political action that would reflect the interests of the people that the parliament members are supposed to represent. According to Schmitt, parliamentarism deviated from "its intellectual foundation and … the whole system of freedom of speech, assembly, and the press, of public meetings, parliamentary immunities and privileges … [lost] its rationale" (Schmitt, 1923, 2000: 49). Thus, the power of political constitutive action and determining decision must lie within a unity that is a sovereign — monarch-like — unity. Effective and properly representative political action does not come out of the boudoirs of parliamentary politicking, or at least, it can't be adequately expressed by "[s]mall and exclusive committees of parties or of party coalitions [that] make their decisions behind closed doors" (Schmitt, 1923, 2000: 50). Although for Schmitt the issue of formation and expression of the will in democracy is a problematic one, nonetheless, "democracy can exist without what one today calls parliamentarism and parliamentarism without democracy; and dictatorship is just as little the definitive antithesis

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6. Despite Schmitt's preference of Hobbes' political theory, Schmitt actually misses the fact that, followed to its logical conclusion, it offers precisely the sort of political arrangement that Schmitt himself eschews. For details and analysis, see H. Meier, 1995: 34, 119. However, see Mehring who shows that Schmitt arrived at a realization that Hobbesian political philosophy led to and supported liberalism (2014: 350).

of democracy as democracy is of dictatorship" (Schmitt, 1923, 2000). Schmitt draws a difference between parliamentarism, which he disavows, and democracy, which he sees as possibly suitable for dictatorial power.

The metaphysical underpinning of the political concept of sovereign power has deep theological roots for Schmitt. It is, emphatically, not a pantheistic divinity, but a "sole God" who best governs the world he created and, by analogy with this monotheistic power, it is a "sole wise legislator" who proffers "the best constitutions." Although Schmitt's assessment of Descartes is not off base, it is not entirely holistic. The lines that Schmitt takes from the *Discourse* are indeed set in a political context, but the final end of Descartes' examples is to persuade the reader of the importance of being the architect of one's own house, which is Descartes' metaphor for the make-up of opinions, beliefs, habits, ideas, etc., that go into and influence the workings of one's mind. The examples of legislature and architecture dovetail in Descartes' conviction "as regards all the opinions that [he] … had hitherto accepted as credible" (Descartes, 1637, 2007: 22). These had to be rejected or accepted but only after examination and upon having been "adjusted … to the standard of reason" (Descartes, 1637, 2007: 22). Thus, it is one's reason that ends up exercising sovereign power *over oneself* on Descartes' schema, and not the other way around as Schmitt would have it, i.e., that a sovereign's power finds a metaphysical basis in God for the legitimation of its political efficacy in society.

However, Schmitt is clear that we cannot take one thinker's idea of divinity and use it as a basis for socio-political reality. In other words, Descartes did not single-handedly come up with the image of divinity that then became the underlying ground on which the actual sovereign power of his time was built. Or as Schmitt put it, "[i]t is … not a sociology of the concept of sovereignty [*nicht Soziologie des Souveränitätsbegriffes*] when, for example, the monarchy of the seventeenth century is characterized as the real that is 'mirrored' in the Cartesian concept of God" (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 45, 1922a: 50). Instead, Schmitt wants to say that if metaphysical concepts coincide with and underlie the *already* legally constituted elements of a given political time-period and its spirit or "consciousness," then we are dealing with sociology. For him, sociological investigation entails pointing out how political reality becomes a reflection of the self-understanding of a given era. Moreover, sociology is also concerned with establishing how it is the case that "the juristic construction of the historical-political reality [*die juristische Gestaltung der historisch-politischen Wirklichkeit*] can find a concept whose structure is in accord with the structure of metaphysical concepts [*einen Begriff finden konnte, dessen Struktur mit der Struktur metaphysischer Begriffe übereinstimmte*]" (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 45-46, 1922a: 50). Thus, on Schmitt's own terms, his theorizing about and his view of the practical application of the sovereign power in the state of exception, must be traceable to the political spirit of the epoch. Furthermore, the reality of the socio-political consciousness (at least as Schmitt perceives this reality) must have a metaphysical ground. His own articulation of this schema is that "[t]he metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the world has the same structure as what the world immediately understands to be appropriate as a form of its political organization. The determination of such an identity

is the sociology of the concept of sovereignty" (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 46)[7]. Thus, Schmitt's concept of sovereignty is a tightly wound kernel or a spring that unfolds into, what in his view, represents the two-pronged articulation of reality, i.e., its metaphysical foundation and its political organization. Schmitt establishes a hard identity between these latter two conceptual arrangements.

III. Political Reality and the Concept of Sovereignty

In this section, I explain the difference that Schmitt establishes between constitutive and constituent power and identify five elements that make up Schmitt's understanding of political power. Relying on my discussion in Section II, I point to the problematic nature of the alignment between sovereign dictatorial power exercised in the state of emergency and its metaphysical foundation, i.e., the omnipotence of divine power. This alignment is especially pernicious with an eye on Schmitt's insistence on the friend-enemy distinction and considering his analyses of the way in which the "enemy" is determined in politically precarious, exceptional circumstances of danger to the state.

The power of the sovereign most shows itself in extraordinary circumstances. As Schmitt defines it, "[s]*ouverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet*" (Schmitt, 1922a : 13) or the sovereign decides on the state of exception (or the state of emergency). This is an indication of the way in which Schmitt thinks about sovereign power, which for him, is defined by its right to suspend the normal operation of politics, law, etc., if the extraordinary circumstances call for such a suspension. Thus, power is not to prolong or sustain public discourse or uphold individual rights. "Constitutive power" (*pouvoir constituant*) as Schmitt refers to it in *Dictatorship*, where he is addressing the question of emergency powers of the president under Article No. 48 of the Weimar constitution, is the sovereign's power to override constitutional rule on the grounds that exceptional circumstances call for such a decision and action[8]. "Sovereign dictatorship appeals to the *pouvoir constituant*, which cannot be eliminated by any opposing constitution" (Schmitt, 1921: 121). The meaning of constitutive power is that "without being itself constitutionally established, [it] nevertheless is associated with any existing constitution in such a way that it appears to be foundational to it — even if it is never itself subsumed by the constitution, so that it can never be negated either (insofar as the existing constitution negates it)." Constitutive power is the basis of that which is constituted. Constitutive power is foundational, originary, or grounding for any possible constitution and as such it is not subject, strictly speaking, to any already existing constitution. On the contrary, the ex-

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7. Das metaphysische Bild, das sich ein bestimmtes Zeitalter von der Welt macht, hat dieselbe Struktur wie das, was ihr als Form ihrer politischen Organisation ohne weiteres einleuchtet. Die Feststellung einer solchen Identität ist die Soziologie des Souveränitätsbegriffes" (Schmitt, 1922a : 50-51). This passage can also be rendered as follows: "[t]he metaphysical picture of the world that a given era makes for itself has the same structure as that which presents itself as a readily apparent political order. The determination of such an identity is the sociology of the concept of sovereignty."

8. On Weimar constitution and sovereignty, see P. C. Caldwell, 1997.

ercise of constitutive power by a sovereign who assumes a dictatorial role ends up in a suspension of an existing constitution for the sake of the decision and action requisite in emergency or otherwise unprecedented circumstances. As John P. McCormick observes, for Schmitt, "[t]he material specificities of a crisis—an immediate or initial end—generate the specific 'means' to be employed by the dictator, which cannot be determined a priori" (McCormick, 1997: 165).

There are then five main elements of Schmitt's understanding of political power: 1) the role of the sovereign; 2) the conjunction between sovereign act and dictatorship; 3) the state of exception that calls for the sovereign's 4) exercise of constitutive power. The other critically important moment that is central to Schmitt's thinking about the political is 5) the opposition between friends and enemies or "them" and "us," which he develops in the *Concept of the Political*. For Schmitt, without this distinction and the imminent threat of facing a deadly enemy, our life loses its political nature, and remains, at best, interesting, but utterly devoid of political significance (1932: 35-36). Schmitt holds that this life-threatening conflict where one's life can be taken by an enemy or where one has to take the enemy's life — must be at the basis of the possibility of politics. The analysis which Schmitt offers of the human predicament and our perennial propensity to wage wars and find or face enemies is sound (Marren, 2020: 157). However, this alignment between the ever-looming threat of finding oneself faced with a mortal foe and the need of such a threat for the very existence and continuation of our political lives and commitments takes on a rather precarious if not sinister connotation when we put this element together, as Schmitt himself does, with the other four elements that go into his understanding of the political.

Again, in the *Dictatorship*, where the sovereign is meant as the sovereign dictator, Schmitt further draws together the elements of the state of exception and constitutive power. Effectively, he claims that under sovereign dictatorship, what normally would be unconstitutional, readily holds as valid and necessary, including that "without ceasing to be citizens [some], would be treated as 'enemies' or 'rebels' without rights" (Schmitt, 1921, 2014: 119). We have here an emergency of an internal enemy — of an enemy of the state — and despite it being unconstitutional, Schmitt holds that it is "precisely such exceptions that are intrinsic to the nature of dictatorship" (Schmitt, 1921, 2014: 119). As to the constitutive power, the reason why Schmitt finds it (and other exceptions that the situation may call for) necessary is that "[d]ictatorship does not *suspend* an existing constitution through a law based on the constitution — a constitutional law; rather it seeks to *create* [my emphasis] conditions in which a constitution — a constitution that it regards as the true one — is made possible" (Schmitt, 1921, 2014: 119). What justifies the exception (including the exceptional treatment of citizens as enemies) is the state of exception or the unprecedented situation of harm to the state (the existence of which the sovereign ultimately determines) (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 35). Another thing that justifies the exception is the post-factum legalization and legitimation of the exceptional action by the constitutive power of the sovereign dictator or what Schmitt also refers to as a "true" constitution or "a constitution…that is still to come" (Schmitt, 1921, 2014:

119). Richard A. Cohen puts this process of after the fact legitimation in stark terms when he writes about fascism that "the fascist Dictator creates a need for fascism, the conditions of his own necessity and the theatre for his own alleged greatness" (Cohen, 2018).[9] Despite the obvious illegitimacy of such a move (history is rife with examples of such illegitimacy) and despite the rather problematic power of the sovereign dictatorship in Schmitt's theory, in *Dictatorship*, it is not yet seen by Schmitt as something that is altogether preferable to the normal order of things. McCormick observes that in *Dictatorship*, Schmitt claims that "the political technology of emergency authority is consigned only to the temporary exceptional moment, and in this scheme the normal and rulebound regular order is presented as substantively correct by Schmitt and worthy of restoration." However, according to McCormick, in "*Political Theology*, the exceptional situation is that which calls for the emergence of a potentially all-powerful sovereign who not only must rescue a constitutional order from a particular political crisis but also must charismatically deliver it from its own constitutional procedures— procedures that Schmitt pejoratively deems technical and mechanical" (McCormick, 1997: 163). There is, then, in the movement from *Dictatorship* to *Political Theology* not only a distrust and a critique of liberalism, but also a preference of the immediacy, incontrovertible character, and decisiveness that sovereign dictatorial constitutive power presupposes. This preference is solidified by 1932 when *Legality and Legitimacy* comes out. About the latter, McCormick writes that it

> cannot be understood as a neutral, purely analytical diagnosis of the Weimar Republic that lacks a substantive agenda of its own. This would put the work in a bizarrely awkward position, given its author's criticisms of value-neutrality as one of the main problems plaguing the Republic. … [T]he substantive-value agenda of the work does not conform with a temporary suspension of the liberal-legal parliamentary components of the constitution so that the democratic-plebiscitary presidential components might reinstitute them once the crisis had passed. On the contrary, *Legality and Legitimacy* is a blueprint for the permanent supersession of the former by the latter, a work whose intention may not be "Nazi" in 1932, but certainly is fascist[10].

There is, then, a quickening in Schmitt's thought about the place of the dictatorial power of the sovereign. This place is initially temporary and is meant to counterbalance the parliamentary liberal dissipation of the proper political deliberative process. However, fairly quickly, Schmitt settles on the power of the sovereign dictatorship as the preferred and best means of governing the state.

In terms of the difference between *Dictatorship* and *Political Theology* on the question of sovereign power, while in the former, sovereign dictatorship is not yet the form of political power that is preferred over and above all others, in the latter, it acquires a sense

9. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10010007

10. John P. McCormick, "An Introduction to Carl Schmitt's *Legality and Legitimacy*" in *Legality and Legitimacy*. Jeffrey Seitzer, trans. (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1932, 2004), xlii.

of permanence and decisiveness which render it as the best. On Schmitt's arrangement, there really is no power higher than the power of the sovereign in their role as a dictator. Since it is the sovereign dictator who ultimately decides to call for the state of exception and to name or determine the situation that calls for it, not even the circumstances or the situation can be seen as a higher end and authority. In this capacity to reveal (the nature of the situation) and create (the future constitution), the sovereign power is analogical to the power of God.

The move from *Dictatorship* (1921), where the role of the dictator is temporary, to *Political Theology* (1922), where it becomes permanent, happens in a very short period of time. Schmitt's definition of the "sociology of the concept of sovereignty" entails determining reality both in terms of its metaphysical and political form. For Schmitt (albeit not necessarily for all of those sharing with him a historical epoch), the form of political order that is adequate to reality is sovereign dictatorship (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 46). The question whether Schmitt accurately espied and articulated the underlying structure and spirit of his times can be decided. To arrive at an answer, we need to determine whether National Socialism and the politics leading up to and superseding the Russian revolution of 1917, for example, indeed encapsulate the political reality that preceded WWII or whether they happen to be exemplar instances of Schmitt's thinking put to work in life, but not, in fact, true reflections of the political self-understanding of the epoch. The definitive answer to this issue is outside of the scope of this paper. I will only allow myself to say here that, given Schmitt's proximity to and influence on the Third Reich (and despite his own intention and understanding of his work), a number of his theoretical expositions took on a prescriptive character, not the least of which is the power to suspend the constitution in the state of emergency granted to the dictator acting as the head of the German state[11].

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11. On the way in which Schmitt's theorizing played into the legal action and party ideology of the Nazis, see for example, W. E. Scheuerman, 1996: 571-590.

On Schmitt's attitude toward the Jews as enemies in the early 1930-ies, see R. Gross who writes that during this period, "consistently, the Jews and everything 'Jewish' are treated as Schmitt's main enemy, privately, emotionally, politically, collegially and professionally, and not least, nationally" (Gross, 2016: 105). See the rest of Raphael's chapter for a nuanced treatment of Schmitt's attitude toward and relationships with the Jews.

On the interest in Schmitt in the USSR, see M. Kiselev, 2020: 276-309. See also E. Bolsinger, 2001. However, see J. P. McCormick according to whom "[f]or Schmitt, the Soviet Union is the seat of a formal economic-technical rationality in communism, as well as an irrational substance-intoxicated counterforce to order of any kind in anarchism, the latter which is the logical outgrowth of radical Eastern Christianity" (McCormick, 1998: 832).

On Schmitt's work for and commitment to the Third Reich, see J. W. Bendersky, 1983. See also Mehring where he quotes from Schmitt's address at the 1933 *Deutscher Juristentag* convention: "Adolf Hitler [is] the leader of the German people, whose will today is the nomos [law] of the German people" (Mehring, 2014: 305). On Schmitt's role as a jurist in spearheading the goals of National Socialism, see Mehring, 2014: 311. Mehring is also helpful on Schmitt's complicated relationship with the Jews, i.e., on his anti-Semitism and also Schmitt's friendships with the Jews. Regarding Schmitt's support of violence, see R. Bernasconi, 2015: 214-236. Also, Marren in the final analysis indicts Schmitt (Marren, 2000: 157).

IV. Metaphysical Foundation of Political Reality

In this section, I rely on Schelling's elucidation of divinity in order to offer several criticisms of Schmitt's alignment between sovereign power and divine omnipotence. Effectively, Schmitt invests the sovereign dictator under the state of exception with the kind of close-minded and self-reliant authority that Schelling finds reprehensible and utterly hubristic in a human being. I admit that Schmitt would disagree with an interpretation of his view of the sovereign dictator as someone who utterly disregards the public good. Nonetheless, I argue that although Schmitt correctly identifies the metaphysical basis of sovereign dictatorship, he is incorrect to recommend such a form of political power — even, or perhaps especially, in extraordinary circumstances when the fate of the state is at stake.

To situate his thinking about the state of exception and sovereign decision in terms of their metaphysical underpinning, Schmitt presents his case against "[t]he idea of the modern constitutional state" (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 36). The latter "triumphed together with deism, a theology and metaphysics that banished the miracle from the world" (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 36). Schmitt does not hold that the political arrangements of his time lack a theological and metaphysical foundation altogether. On the contrary, he identifies the modern era with deism. However, he needs a different theological paradigm and a metaphysics that would support his preference for sovereign power. He argues that the "theology and metaphysics [of deism] rejected not only the transgression of the laws of nature through an exception brought about by direct intervention, as is found in the idea of a miracle, but also the sovereign's direct intervention in a valid legal order [*geltende Rechtsordnung*]" (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 36-37; 1922a: 43). Schmitt offers here a direct identification between nature and state as well as between the power of God to perform miracles and the power of the sovereign to break free from the established laws in pursuing an action needful in extraordinary times. For Schmitt, "the state of exception [or emergency] has the same meaning in jurisprudence as miracle has for theology" (Schmitt, 1922a: 43). Schmitt here is not directly identifying the sovereign with God, but by attributing an utterly miraculous character to the state of exception, he allows for an utterly awesome (in an ancient Greek sense of *deinos*, which is associated with divine power that is both wondrous and terrifying) power and action on behalf of the sovereign, who in the final analysis, is the sovereign dictator. To oppose this awesome power — rooted in a metaphysical vision of the world where one force and will dictate to and constitute the world order for all — means to face awful punishment. In fact, to oppose such a power is to become damned; to become forever an enemy of the righteous.

Heinrich Meier elucidates this thrust of Schmitt's metaphysical commitments and their alignment with the view of politics that Schmitt proffers. Meier explains that, as far as Schmitt is concerned, it is not the differences among the various theological and metaphysical views that guarantee the oppositions and enmities necessary for politics (Meier, 1998, 2011). What is needed is "a theology [that] claims to be blessed with the revelation of a sovereign authority that demands obedience. … It does not regard itself as being

faced with any inadequate or untenable metaphysics. It need not assert its insight against errors" (1998, 2011: 73). The demand of the sovereign power for obedience presupposes punishment for the non-compliant because to disobey the miraculous revelation of such power is to sin. It is also, presumably, sinful to question such power because it does not admit of a possibility of being in error or doing wrong. Schmitt's metaphysics of power presupposes the danger of transgressing against the sovereign will. This transgression is a sin. Furthermore, there is the alignment (which I have indicated in Section III) between the elements of friend and enemy and the dictatorial nature of the sovereign's constitutive power because all those daring to oppose it, sin and become enemies of those who uphold it. An especially problematic aspect of the structure of Schmitt's metaphysics and politics is the fact that the singular will, which at the level of metaphysics is all-powerful, miraculous, and inscrutable, translates at the level of politics into the sovereign decision-making and action that does not admit of being questioned, but must be obeyed. Mehring, in commenting on the "many people [who] broke with Schmitt for political, religious or moral reasons" notes that both "Wilhelm Neuß and Erik Peterson … saw him as an advocate of the totalitarian Leviathan and as someone who had done away with the distinction between Church and state" (Mehring, 2014: 286). On my presentation, what Schmitt does away with is the difference between the power wielded by the super-human divinity and the power that a human political leader may assume.

This congealment of the self-assured power in a human being — power that refuses to be questioned and that abhors being opposed — is what Schelling calls "overweening pride [*Übermut*]" and which he equates with "evil" (Schelling, 1809, 1998: 62). It is, indeed, a divine principle which, if it becomes predominant in a human being, propels that person to evil, which Schelling sees as operative in the case of hubris (Schelling, 1809, 2007: 39)[12]. Thus, Schmitt's political theology and metaphysics of social life correctly identify the metaphysical root of sovereign dictatorship. However, the power that Schmitt wishes to legitimize in a human being is thoroughgoingly reprehensible, if we analyze it through Schelling's concept of the relationship between God and the human world.

In the *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1809) or the *Freiheitsschrift*, Schelling derives the possibility of evil in the human world from a certain non-coincidence of the divine principles of 1) revealing light and 2) dark, withdrawing ground. These principles can become destabilized when they are raised from potentiality into actuality in a human being. In God, the two principles are not only forever harmonious and generative, but also necessary for the self-grounding and self-revelation of God as well as for the unfolding of the world of nature (Schelling, 1809, 2007: 32-33). However, in a human being, the dominance of the principle of the dark ground over the principle of light "accounts for the possibility of good and evil" (Schelling, 1809, 2007: 32). In God, the dark, withdrawing principle is divine longing that seeks and grounds

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12. Schelling does not directly or simplistically align human evil with the principle of the dark, withdrawing ground, which is one of principles operative in God, the other one being the principle of light or understanding in its universalizing and disclosing power.

itself. However, in a human being, this self-centered attitude, which prefers the egotistic self-assurance over the light of the universal understanding and which prefers the self over all others, manifests as the force for evil.

It can be argued that Schmitt would never agree that his view of sovereign power dismisses otherness and the public good in favor of itself. On the contrary and at first blush, it is precisely the good of the state that the sovereign dictator pursues in exercising constitutive power. For Schmitt, the sovereign "decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or the interest of the state, public safety and order, *le salut* public, and so on" (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 6). The trouble here is that instead of being subjected to the public discourse (which Schmitt opposes as a quagmire of bureaucratic ineffectiveness, which cannot be afforded in the state of emergency) and presented in the light of communal understanding, the decision regarding the fate of the state and the public lies solely with the sovereign dictator. The latter, on Schmitt's schema, could easily be embodied in a single human being or rather a single man. He will decide on "[t]he exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order [and which] … can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law" (Schmitt, 1922, 1985: 6). Laws are deliberated upon, ratified, and promulgated. However, the decision and action of the sovereign dictator, who as I showed in Section III, post-factum legitimizes their choices, are completely hidden from the public realm until they are carried out. As such, the sovereign will is imposed upon the state and its denizens as an effect of an all-powerful and insurmountable — divine — will. This, on Schelling's schema, is precisely the kind of hubris that feigns but always fails not only to stand in for the power of God on earth, but also to live up to the name of a good human being. Another thing that is crucial here is that, for Schelling, there is no hard necessity for the dark principle to manifest as evil in a human being. Thus, it is the sovereign dictator's choice that leads to the unconstitutional (but post-factum legitimized and even legalized) denigration of the humanity of some citizens under the state of exception (Marren, 2021: 105). To restate Schmitt's own formulation, "without ceasing to be citizens [some], would be treated as 'enemies' or 'rebels' without rights" (Schmitt, 1921, 2014: 119). In my analysis, this would constitute the work of an evil will. In Schmitt's own time (and whatever his intentions for the friend-enemy distinction may have been), the concrete historical example of such a treatment of a select group of citizens of the German state materialized as nothing short of unadulterated evil[13].

On my view and as I have indicated, although there is a degree of accuracy in the analyses and theories that Schmitt puts forth, to follow such incendiary notions as the friends and enemies distinction or the sovereign dictatorial constitutive power prescriptively, is to be utterly remiss. I would like to approach this question through a psycho-

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13. In his engagement with Schelling in *Political Romanticism*, Schmitt identifies Schelling's philosophy and his view of God as "emanationist" (Schmitt, 1919/1925, 1986: 55). He further presents Schelling's God and the basis that unites the two divine principles (or the *Ungrund*) as a less implausible version of the occasionalistic and romantic theology and metaphysics (Schmitt, 1919/1925, 1986: 87-88).

analytic lens, accounting for the surprisingly widespread uptake of monstrous political directives by identifying the psychological roots of mass-scale abominable cruelty.

V. Psychoanalytic Evaluation of Schmitt's Theory and its Practical Applications

In this section, I rely on Freud's articulation of the need for religion in society in order to conclude that Schmitt's theorizing about sovereign dictatorship and its metaphysical foundation ends up providing a sham substitute for a genuine restoration of the role of divine power in a state. This phantasm, with which Schmitt's thinking presents us, serves to enable, foment, and justify the unleashing of certain cruel and negative impulses of the masses onto a group of people labeled as "enemies".

Although Schmitt himself criticized Freud's psychoanalytic theory, he nonetheless read Freud's work. It is unlikely that Schmitt read such books as *Civilization and Its Discontents* (*Unbehangen in der Kultur* 1929), which contains Freud's political thought. It is in this text that we not only have Freud's reflections on the origins of religion and religious feeling, but also his application of his view of *eros* and *thanatos* to the socio-political dynamics[14].

At the very outset of the work, Freud presents Romain Rolland's view regarding the religious feeling and the origin of religion, which he then overturns, in chapter 2, in favor of his own insight into the reasons why human beings gravitate toward sharing a religion. The "oceanic feeling" or "ozeanische Gefühl" (Freud, 1930: 2) — the feeling of oneness and unity with all Being and eternity — gets replaced with Freud's rather caustic estimation of the need for religion as a coping mechanism, protection from suffering, and as a "*wahnhafte Umbildung der Wirklichkeit*" (Freud, 1930: 11) or the "delusional transformation of reality." Significantly, there is no denominational differentiation with the first model (the model, which Freud rejects), as it is the religious authorities that usurp the powerful feeling of oneness and belonging, splintering it into special cases of belonging to one church or another and longing to be one with this or that particular religious creed. The model that Freud proposes is effectively founded on his view of human weakness and our inability to process or deal with the harsh realities of life. We need to believe in a better world — whether as an eschaton or an afterlife — in order to accept that we must live in and somehow cope with this one. Another caveat is that the need for religion is the greatest, according to Freud, in the "ordinary man," who is neither an artist nor a man of science (Freud, 1930: 7). In the 3rd chapter, Freud contends that the modern developments in science and technology have turned "man, so to speak [into a] … prosthetic God" (Freud, 1930: 15). The power that was God's now extends to the technological prowess and seeming near-omnipotence of ordinary human beings. Things that were forbidden or out of reach are readily available. However, a human being

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14. See Schmitt's critiques of Freud in C. Schmitt, 2003: 36, 57–58, 246; C. Schmitt, 2007: 29. On Schmitt's encounters with Freud's works, see J. W. Bendersky, 2012: 143-154, esp. 144, fn. 3.

There is also continuity between Freud and Schelling. See G. Whiteley, 2018: 289-302, esp. 295. Whiteley shows that Freud read and drew on Schelling's ideas, despite the fact that he also criticized Schelling's work.

remains not only a "prosthetic" but also an unhappy, halfling divinity or pseudo-God. As Michael Staudigl puts it, commenting on Freud, "the lasting unhappiness of modern humankind … seems to date back to the enforced renouncement of instinctual desires, even in the obsessive pursuit to become God-like we remain bored and unfulfilled" (Staudigl, 2019, 384). Freud's point is that the satisfaction of renounced drives brings extraordinary pleasure because of the unprecedented degree of energy release involved in finally resolving the dissatisfaction accumulated during the repression of a powerful drive. However, Staudigl (and he is hardly the only one) further recommends that the return of religion, the demotion of a human being from God-like status, and the restoration to deity of its rightful place serves as another avenue out of the state of perpetual discontents. Interestingly, Schmitt's sovereign dictatorial power, which is conceptualized by an analogy with God, presents a shortcut, which is not a genuine restoration of God or religion, but a substitution of both with phantasms of divine power. As far as history goes, we can here recall the cultish, mystical displays of the ceremonial power of the Nazi and the Übermensch-like figure of the Führer.

What maintains real control and power over individual lives, rendering them largely discontent and unhappy, is the omnipotence of the state and orderliness of civilized society (Freud, 1930: 15-17). In the coincidence of the politically managed, rule-governed social life (which calls for multitudinous renunciations and limitations upon the individual) and the demands of civilization, Freud sees the "most important" aspect of his analysis (Freud, 1930: 19). Namely, it is "the extent to which civilization is built on the renunciation of instincts [and] how much exactly it has, as a requirement, the non-satisfaction (oppression, repression or something else?) of powerful drives" (Freud, 1930: 19). Civilization, then, sets itself up against such human instincts that always seek to dissolve the monotonous churning of the wheels of social apparatuses. Thus, the civil state is in constant need of protection against the unleashing of these drives because, as Freud indicates, it is precisely their unbridled satisfaction that brings us the greatest pleasure. But it is their repression or oppression, which leaves us despondent in the civilized society. Among these drives are *eros* and *thanatos* — the creative sex-, comradery-, care-, love- unity- and even indolence-seeking drive, on the one hand, and the destructive, violence-seeking death-drive, on the other.

Commenting on Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Bendersky observes that "the 'mutual hostility of human beings' threatens social cohesion so significantly that civilization has to expend enormous efforts to prevent domestic conflict and even societal disintegration. Since this inherent 'readiness for hatred and aggressiveness,' continues to exist within groups, 'We are no longer astonished that greater differences should lead to an almost insuperable repugnance, such as the Gallic people feel for the German, the Aryan for the Semite, and the white races for the coloured'" (Bendersky, 2012: 147). Although Bendersky himself denies the viability of the thesis that Schmitt's friends and enemies distinction contributed to the extermination of the Jews under the Nazis, he nonetheless and in the very next paragraph, analyzes precisely the friends/enemies distinction in both Freud and Schmitt.

Bendersky concludes that in Schmitt "[t]he enemy need not be considered morally evil or an object of hatred; neither is he the private competitor, but always only the public enemy of the group not the individual" (Bendersky, 2012: 184). However, even if Schmitt himself did not theorize the enemy as such, on Freud's psychoanalytic model, it simply is the case that the release of the aggressive *thanatos* drive against the group designated as the "other" or the "enemy" entails not only the elimination of an existential threat, as Schmitt would have it (Schmitt, 1932: 27). It would also presuppose the release of such psychic energies as are required for the demonization of the select group of opponents and a wholesale destruction thereof — all based on attributing to them the label of an "enemy".

Again in Bendersky, we find the claim that in order to prevent the dissolution of the civilized state by means of providing an outlet for the repressed destructive drives, "one method" can be employed, i.e., that "of binding a group together in love, [as] Freud argued, … by providing an outlet for their hostility in the form of 'the other people... [who are targeted] to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness" (Bendersky, 2012: 147). Schmitt may not have argued for an impassioned treatment of the enemy, but he passionately called for a concept of politics that is founded on one's readiness to face a mortal enemy and take their life as well as lay down one's own life. Although Schmitt's concept stresses that the opponents must be equally capable of destroying each other, the uptake of the friend-enemy distinction need not follow the noble imperative of matched powers. The factual denouement of this theorizing is what Freud espied in the aggressive tendencies of the masses, which unleash as a blind rage against the people declared "enemy" who are stripped of their rights, demonized, and dehumanized as the repulsive, existentially dangerous, and unwanted "other." United in their need for a release of pent-up hatred and aggression, the many Germans who believed in the decrees and promises of the Third Reich, found in the sovereign dictator's call for an elimination of the common enemy the needful outlet for their discontent with life in post-World War I Germany. Although, admittedly, the identification of the group demonized as "enemy" hardly followed the demarcations of Schmittean noblesse (Schmitt, 1932: 26-27).

VI. Conclusion

Contrary to Schmitt's intent, the sovereign dictatorial power fails at being a salutary and beneficial force of proper decision-making that is supposed to eventuate in choices and actions, which constitute the good of the state. As my analysis shows, because of the way in which Schmitt aligns the key elements of political power (Section III) and because he fails to put the dictatorial power in check (on the contrary, he gives it free and self-legitimizing reign in the state of exception), we would be utterly remiss if we took his political theorizing prescriptively. Schmitt is right in his identification of the metaphysical foundation of the power of sovereign dictatorship (Sections II and IV), but he is wrong (and we would be too) to recommend such a political leadership for any, let alone a precari-

ously positioned, state. The theologization of the sovereign, as exemplified in the state of exception, becomes a coping mechanism (Section V). As in Freud's treatment of religion, whereby religion becomes the veil or delusion fit to hide or at least ameliorate the harsh realities of life, so the God-like power of the sovereign dictator becomes a force that promises a different and better world — a world in which one attains salvation. Moreover, this power also offers a clear target for one's ire and aggression and a license to expend these violently upon the enemy or the unwanted "other." Schmitt's schemas are not historically invalid. Political power in its reliance on the tools of psychological and ideological formation (religion and moral categories of "good" and "bad" or "dejected" being some such tools) has real effects on social arrangements. The demonization of the "other" or of the enemy lends extraordinary power to the political decision-makers. It also sets the state on a deterministic path that precludes or severely limits freedom (i.e., freedom for thoughtful participation in the political process, for responsible decision-making, for dignified choices and good actions).

Although Schelling's account of good and evil gives credence to Schmitt's views regarding the metaphysical origin of sovereign power, it sheds a critical light on the effects of this power in the human world. Whereas Schmitt sees it as a necessary force of good, in fact, this power turns out to will and do evil. One reason for this is written into the very schema that Schmitt constructs for the sovereign dictatorial power in the state of exception, i.e., the alleged needfulness to forgo the open deliberative process that would involve other voices and views, and instead, leave the decision and choice of the appropriate action entirely with the sovereign. A paradox ensues whereby the deepest belief in and desire to identify with the "good" end up extinguishing political freedom because they deny any existentially meaningful (i.e., examined as opposed to ideologically conditioned) understanding of the good and of one's role in the political process.

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«Власть» в политической теологии: анализ суверенной диктатуры и различения друга и врага у Карла Шмитта сквозь призму концепций Фридриха Й. Шеллинга и Зигмунда Фрейда

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В предлагаемой статье делается попытка соединить взгляд Карла Шмитта на суверенную власть, диктатуру и чрезвычайное положение с его политической теологией и подчеркиваемой им важностью проведения различия между другом и врагом. Чтобы объяснить, почему было бы неверно воспринимать идеи Шмитта в области политической теологии в качестве обязательных, я обращаюсь к книге Ф. В. Й. Шеллинга «Философские исследования о сущности человеческой свободы». Затем, я обращаюсь к книге Зигмунда Фрейда «Недовольство культурой», позволяющей пролить свет на психологическую подоплеку различия «друг-враг», как оно проявляется в повседневной жизни. Я объясняю аналогию Шмитта между божественной и суверенной властью в разделе II. В разделе III я утверждаю, что роль суверенного диктатора в условиях чрезвычайного положения имеет особое значение, учитывая настойчивость Шмитта в проведении различия между другом и врагом. В разделе IV я обращаюсь к взгляду Шеллинга на Бога и на проявление божественных принципов в человеческом мире и утверждаю, что теологизированный суверенный диктатор Шмитта представляет собой "силу зла". В разделе V я рассматриваю понимание Фрейдом роли религии и его взгляд на последствия подавления базовых влечений (*эроса* и *танатоса*) в человеческом обществе. Затем я утверждаю, что, с точки зрения психоанализа, конечный практический результат политической теологии Шмитта и его понятия политического заключается в том, что они в конечном итоге демонизируют тех, кого считают "врагами".

Ключевые слова: диктатура, цивилизация, *эрос*, зло, бог, суверенная власть, чрезвычайное положение, *танатос*

Thomas Nagel's theory of justice

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Theories of justice have become the central theme of liberal philosophy over the past century. Among these, one devoted to the problem of global justice, which has come to be particularly relevant at the turn of the century, deserves particular attention. Among liberal theories of global justice numerous competing conceptions have emerged; they could be presented as three broad lines of argumentation: 'moral cosmopolitanism', 'political cosmopolitanism' and 'statism'. Thomas Nagel's Hobbesian conception of global justice has become one of the most influential 'statist' theories. Having used the key points of Hobbes' theory, Nagel significantly modified his original ideas. This allowed him, first, to invoke the principles of egalitarian justice at the level of the state and, second, to argue that international relations are not the territory of a moral vacuum. These modifications led to a two-level theory of ethics in which justice can exist only in separate sovereign states while the requirements of minimal humanitarian morality apply at the supranational level. As a result, Nagel's theory of justice at the level of the state proved to be highly logical and persuasive, as well as able to withstand criticism from its opponents; whereas the requirements of minimal humanitarian morality seemed inconsistent and unrelated to justice in separate sovereign states. This has led to an ambivalent attitude towards Nagel's theory. This article focuses on Nagel's theory of global justice and the debate surrounding his statist arguments. This article also offers further criticism of the problems and prospects of Nagel's theory of global justice.

Keywords: theories of justice, theories of global justice, moral cosmopolitanism, political cosmopolitanism, statism, minimal humanitarian morality.

Introduction

In the last decades of the twentieth century — and in the first decade of the twenty-first century — there has developed a widespread perception of the new stage of globalization and the creation of a truly global world. Two significant phenomena have made this possible. First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the turn of the 1990s marked the end of an era of bipolar world order. This era was characterized by the dominance of two sharply contrasting blocs — the capitalist and the socialist. The observable demarcations between these two blocs impeded the convergence of systems and the emergence of a unified global order. Second, the collapse of the socialist alliance resulted in the triumph of the neoliberal political-economic model on a global scale. This model was rooted in the expansion of global trade. It has fostered increased interdependence and interreliance among nations. At the beginning of the XXI century, it was common to discuss the formation of a homogeneous global world order, a vivid political and philosophical reflection of which was Francis Fukuyama's idea of the "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992). In addition, the need to discuss global world order was catalyzed by climate change issues, which emerged as an acute problem in the early 1990s.

The globalist worldview allows to rethink the existing problems of global order. Previously, the major issues of social development, inequality, and justice were examined either on the scale of nation-states or in the context of opposing ideological-political blocs. However, it has now become necessary to consider and scrutinize these problems from a unified global perspective. The current economic and political situation in the world has exposed significant inequalities between nations. At the beginning of the 21st century, 865 million people (13% of the world's population) lived on 99 cents per day (Banerjee, Duflo, 2011: 13), while the average US citizen lived on about $120 per day (IMF). The idea of a global society required new approaches to the problem of inequality. The liberal doctrine of political philosophy, which claimed the universality of its values, had to develop some new concepts to address these emerging challenges. The intellectual debate seeking answers to the challenges posed by liberal philosophy has turned to the problem of global justice. Contemporary liberal theories of justice, which emerged in the 1970s, initially focused on questions of a just social order within the limits of individual societies. In the work of the American philosopher John Rawls, "A Theory of Justice" (Rawls, 1999), and subsequently in the work of his followers (e.g., Dworkin, 1981), universal requirements for a just social order were formulated within the framework of a liberal worldview. Rawls's ideas, as well as those of others involved in the discourse of liberal justice, have become fundamental to contemporary Western political philosophy, political science, and the liberal approach to the theory of international relations. The challenges of the late 20th century required a revision of the basic postulates of contemporary liberal theories of justice from a globalist perspective.

Adapting these theories to a global scale proved to be a complex task, mainly due to the addition of new elements, such as collective subjects (states, nations, peoples) and supranational institutions, to existing theories, and also because of the scale of the problems at hand. The normative requirements that liberal philosophy imposes on individuals and political-legal systems, if transferred to the global level, would inevitably lead to revolutionary changes in the lives of humanity as a whole, but especially in the lives of the citizens of developed countries, a thesis that is of particular importance to the authors behind the theories of justice. As a result of these difficulties, there have emerged several competing approaches to understanding global justice, ranging from the most idealistic cosmopolitan conceptions to quite radical statist approaches that consider justice only within individual state boundaries. The most notable example of the latter approach can be found in the ideas of the philosopher Thomas Nagel, who published a programmatic article in 2005, entitled "The Problem of Global Justice" (Nagel, 2005). In this article Nagel defended a Hobbesian viewpoint, stating that justice could only be discussed within a society that already exists in a civil state. Hence, it would be wrong to talk about justice between individual states using terms that are applicable to a society only within the borders of a single state.

This article focuses on Nagel's approach and the discussion his work has generated. Section 1 provides a brief overview of existing concepts within liberal global theories of

justice and the main classifications of these approaches found in relevant literature. Section 2 considers Nagel's approach. Section 3 examines the debate that has arisen within various iterations of statist approaches, as well as discussions with cosmopolitan authors. Section 4 is devoted to the category of minimal humanitarian morality in Nagel's conception, while Section 5 presents critical arguments regarding both Nagel's theory and the debates surrounding it. The conclusion summarizes the main findings and identifies promising directions for the future development of Nagel's conception.

Section 1. Contemporary Liberal Approaches to Global Justice

As noted above, John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*, published in 1971, has had a significant impact on modern liberal ideas of justice. Rawls debates liberal utilitarian concepts and advocates for a unique approach to establishing just social order. He also formulates a theory based on the deontological ethical-philosophical paradigm, with human rights and freedoms as essential values[1].

Rawls advocates for an egalitarian version of the theory of justice, utilizing specific methodologies. One of the distinctive methods is the use of "thought experiments". Rawls aims to simulate a scenario where human society exists in its pre-state condition and is faced with the task of devising fundamental principles of justice that can serve as its foundation. To ensure the experiment's integrity, Rawls employs the "veil of ignorance", a concept that prevents the individuals involved from knowing anything about their future: "It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know certain kinds of particular facts. First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism" (1999: 118).

According to Rawls, this thought experiment will result in the development of two basic principles:

"First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all" (1999: 53).

The second principle, also referred to as the "principle of redress", embodies the egalitarian aspect of Rawls' theory. It states that "undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow compensated for" (1999: 86).

For Western society, Rawls' analysis has become a fundamental basis for the contemporary philosophy of political liberalism. Although his theory was immediately criticized

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1. Read more about the discussion between the deontological Rawlsian conception and utilitarianism in my article "Distributive Theories of Justice: From Utilitarianism and Back" (2021).

by representatives of analytical Marxism such as Gerald Cohen (Cohen, 1995) and libertarian proponents such as Robert Nozick (Nozick, 2016), it can be argued that Rawls' approach, in which justice secures a more central position compared to other theories, has emerged as the primary concept of liberal philosophy.

Perhaps one of the first efforts to extend Rawls' theory of justice to the level of international politics was made by Charles Beitz (Beitz, 1983: 591–600), when he conducted Rawls' hypothetical experiment on a global scale. Within the framework of this experiment, assuming that all individuals are behind the "veil of ignorance" regarding the basic principles of their future social organization, it is reasonable to assume that they also have no knowledge of their eventual place in the world. This leads to the conclusion that Rawls' principles of justice are universally applicable to all of humanity, and therefore there is an obvious need to redistribute goods on a global scale from the most prosperous people on the planet to the least endowed. To understand the scale and radical nature of these conclusions, it can be said that in 2011, US citizens living below the poverty line (i.e., less than $11,000 per year) were richer than 85% of the world's population (MacAskill, 2016: 26). In other words, if one were to scale up Rawls' principle of redress, it would lead to developed countries having to give a certain portion of their wealth to the poorest people on the planet. Even Rawls, whose position on global justice will be described below, did not agree with such a radical interpretation of his theory.

Another radical cosmopolitan approach was developed in the context of utilitarian ethics by Peter Singer, a prominent contemporary philosopher in this tradition. He emphasizes that "we would also agree that all humans are created equal, at least to the extent of denying that differences of sex, *ethnicity*, *nationality*, and *place of residence* change the value of a human life" (Singer, 2016: 52). He argued that justice necessitates the fair treatment of all individuals worldwide, without exception. The distinctive feature of the utilitarian approach was its focus on the ultimate outcome or benefit rather than on the rights-based principles that are typical of Rawls' deontological theory.

The emphasis on achieving the ultimate objective leads utilitarian supporters to consider certain calculations for attaining acceptable objectives and maximizing outcomes. For instance, Singer, citing calculations done by the development economist Jeffrey Sachs, stated that "in 2001 it would have taken $124 billion a year to raise everyone above the poverty line. The combined gross annual income of the twenty-two rich OECD nations in that year was $20 trillion. Therefore, the contribution needed to make up the shortfall is 0.62 percent of income, or 62 cents of every $100 earned" (Singer, 2010: 141). With this example, Singer illustrates the minimal sacrifice required to tackle global poverty, although this represents only the initial stage in a broader framework of global justice based on the equality of all individuals. This principle disregards nationality and citizenship, aligning Singer's and Beitz's approaches in their radical conclusions.

This approach failed to satisfy all those who attempted to develop a theory of global justice. The issue is not only the radical nature of the demands. Another significant aspect is the disregard shown by the aforementioned authors towards the fundamental

importance of the institutional structure of society for justice theory. Many others argue that political and social institutions are prerequisites to theories of justice.

One prominent adherent to this approach is Thomas Pogge, who also subscribes to Rawls' theory. Pogge considers the institutional structure as a crucial condition that should be directly derived from Rawls' theory. In addition to Rawls' principles of justice, Pogge emphasizes that Rawls' theory is essentially contractual[2], i.e. *agreement* is a necessary framework to meet the requirements of justice. For Pogge, the world system operates within the framework of numerous treaties among individual states and supranational structures. All interactions between states and societies on a global scale are based on this framework. In other words, one can speak of a planetary contractual framework. The problem is that the global system is inherently unjust, and currently, "there is a shared institutional order that is shaped by the better-off and imposed on the worse-off. This institutional order is implicated in the reproduction radical inequality…" (Pogge, 2002: 199). Therefore, achieving global justice necessitates reforming existing structures and bringing international institutions in line with the egalitarian principles initially put forth in Rawls' theory.

An alternative method to achieve global justice is presented by advocates of the capability approach, who emphasize the crucial role of international institutions while eschewing Rawlsian contractual frameworks. This approach underscores the fundamental nature of institutions in promoting justice. A prominent example of this approach is that of Amartya Sen, who formulated his concept of justice on the basis of *comparatives* and the process of *public reasoning* and *social choice*, which already implies democratic procedures (Sen, 2000; 2009). Democracy itself assumes a certain institutional form of implementing this practice. While Sen doubts that global democracy is possible in the foreseeable future, he argues that existing global institutions including the UN, various NGOs, and other global initiatives enable public discussions on a global scale, which can lead to the realization of justice worldwide.

In the next set of theories, for a variety of reasons, the inquiry into global justice has been significantly shifted towards individual societies or states. For example, Rawls formulated his position on global justice in his work "The Law of Peoples" published in the 1990s (Rawls, 1999). Unlike some of his followers (e.g. Beitz, Pogge — D. B.), he did not apply his concept directly to the global level. Instead, he extended his thought experiment in "A Theory of Justice". Initially, individuals behind a veil of ignorance select the principles of social justice. During the second, international stage of this experiment, collective subjects — *peoples*[3] — also formulate principles of global justice behind that veil (Rawls, 1999a: 331-335; 1999b). These principles may differ from those governing a particular society. This allowed Rawls to abandon the principle of egalitarianism at the

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2. Contemporary deontological theories of justice are also often referred to as the "social contract approach".

3. Rawls deliberately avoids using the concept of *nations* which may seem logical in this approach, because he seeks to construct his conception independently of elements such as *language, culture*, etc., which are determinants in defining the notion of a nation.

global level and to concentrate the demands of his theory only within the confines of a single state.

Other leading advocates of state-centered approaches to justice have gone even further, basing their thinking exclusively on the concept of the State. Notable authors in this regard include Thomas Nagel and Andrea Sangiovanni. The concepts of these authors will be discussed below, after a brief outline of some features that classify contemporary liberal theories of global justice.

Different Approaches to Classifying Contemporary Theories of Global Justice

When trying to draw a line between different concepts of global justice, advocates of the first classifying approach prefer to use the "political" and "cosmopolitan" categories. For example, this is characteristic of Thomas Nagel, who in his work gives the following definitions of existing approaches:

"According to the first conception, which is usually called *cosmopolitanism*, the demands of justice derive from an equal concern or a duty of fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human beings, and the institutions to which standards of justice can be applied are instruments for the fulfillment of that duty" (Nagel, 2005: 119) and then:

"On the *political conception*, sovereign states are not merely instruments for realizing the preinstitutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is precisely what gives the value of justice its application, by putting the fellow citizens of a sovereign state into a relation that they do not have with the rest of humanity" (Nagel, 2005: 120).

Another approach is used by Andrea Sangiovanni, who identifies a pair of binary oppositions based on the chosen criteria. The first criterion is the *grounds of justice*, and in this case concepts of global justice can be divided into *relational* and *non-relational*. Sangiovanni's main idea here is that different conceptions of justice have different attitudes to the importance of mutually binding relationships. Proponents of the first approach believe that binding ties between individuals are necessary for the existence of justice, while proponents of the second approach do not consider such requirements to be mandatory. The second criterion identified by Sangiovanni is *the scope of equality*, which, according to existing concepts, is divided into *globalism* and *internationalism*: "According to globalists, equality as a demand of justice has global scope. Internationalists, by contrast, believe that equality as a demand of justice applies only among members of state" (Sangiovanni, 2007: 6).

Also relevant is the approach that posits a distinction between *"moral cosmopolitanism"* and *"political cosmopolitanism"* (Kleingeld, 2019), as well as *"statism",* a separate large group of theories focused on the state. This approach is justified by the fact that different proponents of cosmopolitanism may have different views on the requirement for justice at the global level. Adherents of moral cosmopolitanism believe that the requirement of equal treatment for all individuals implies an automatic extension of this requirement to the global level, while the presence or absence of political institutions is not fundamental.

For other proponents of cosmopolitanism, global justice is only possible in the setting of institutions designed to ensure the requirements of justice and to create mutual obligations between individuals within the boundaries of these institutions.

This is not an exhaustive list of possible classifications, but it is hardly possible to explore all of them in detail within the scope of this article. However, in order to avoid confusion, it was necessary to provide some explanation of the main existing approaches. The author of this text follows the third approach to the classification of concepts of global justice, so the categories of "moral cosmopolitanism", "political cosmopolitanism", and "statism" will be used in the text, with other designations being included in the footnotes when necessary.

Section 2. The Problem of Global Justice by Thomas Nagel

In 2005, Thomas Nagel, a renowned contemporary Western philosopher with interests spanning from epistemology to moral philosophy, presented his perspective in his article "The Problem of Global Justice". The work generated a broad response and sparked substantial discussion in academia. This attention was due to the fact that Nagel formulated his thesis in defense of the statist perspective on global justice using Hobbesian language, which looked quite radical for discussions on global order within the liberal tradition during the 21st century.

The core idea, which Nagel adopted from Hobbes, was that a category of justice exists only within the borders of a sovereign state. With reference to Hobbes, Nagel observed: "… although we can discover true principles of justice by moral reasoning alone, actual justice cannot be achieved except within a sovereign state. Justice as a property of the relations among human beings (and also injustice, for the most part) requires government as an enabling condition" (Nagel, 2005: 114).

Hobbes argued that in a state of nature individuals pursue their personal ends with survival as the primary goal. As atomized and non-related beings, these individuals cannot establish stable guaranteed relationships through agreements, because each participant can easily disregard their obligations in favor of their egoistic goals. This understanding diminishes the authority of any agreements to zero.

In this context Nagel posits: "Precisely to ensure compliance with agreements, a sovereign is required. The only way to provide that assurance is through some form of law, with centralized authority to determine the rules and a centralized monopoly of the power of enforcement. This is needed even in a community most of whose members are attached to a common ideal of justice, both in order to provide terms of coordination and because it doesn't take many defectors to make such a system unravel" (Nagel, 2005: 116).

Such a position leads him to conclude that all discussions on global justice are illusory, because there is currently no question of the existence of a sovereign at the global level. Consequently, the point is not that agreements between countries will not be upheld without a global guarantor, but that justice is a uniquely *domestic phenomenon*.

Clearly, Nagel must have faced a wave of criticism for adopting this classically Hobbesian position, which denies the idea of *global justice* and grants the sovereign unlimited power over his subjects. This critique argues that Hobbes' approach is unacceptable for the contemporary world because, first, it legitimizes the hypothetical possibility of unlimited sovereign violence against subjects. Second, it presupposes the fact of a state of nature, i.e., "a war of all against all" in international relations. For contemporary liberal conceptions of the state, such an understanding is marginal.

Nagel does not adopt all Hobbes' ideas here. He significantly modernizes his concept and adapts it to the contemporary context, as well as to the global level. First, it is necessary to show how Nagel perceives the power of the sovereign in the contemporary world and how, under these circumstances, the egalitarian demand for justice, shared by Nagel, can be justified within the political boundaries of a particular society. The solution to the ethical problem of relations between separate sovereign societies in the international arena will be discussed in Section 5.

To demonstrate that a society has the right to demand from the state not only security under the unchecked power of the sovereign, but also what can be called egalitarian or socio-economic justice, i.e., the redistribution of wealth among citizens, Nagel presents a thesis that illustrates the evolution of the relationship between the society and the sovereign within the framework of the civil state.

For Nagel, a key aspect is the idea of *involuntary membership* (Nagel, 2005: 128) of citizens in a collective association under the authority of a sovereign. This is not only a security benefit, but also an obligation to obey the demands of the sovereign. "A sovereign state is not just a cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage. The societal rules determining its basic structure are coercively imposed: it is not a voluntary association", asserts Nagel (Nagel, 2005: 128). This is a much more realistic view of contract theory than the one currently found in most normative liberal theories. Beyond this quite realistic position, however, Nagel makes a normative claim. The philosopher asserts, "it is this complex fact — that we are both putative joint authors of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms, i.e., expected to accept their authority even when the collective decision diverges from our personal preferences — that creates the special presumption against arbitrary inequalities in our treatment by the system" (Nagel, 2005: 128).

Nagel argues that under the sovereignty of the state, individuals become both the authors of the enforced coercive order and are personally responsible for it, along with all their fellow citizens. The obligation to obey the will of the sovereign implies sacrifice on the part of each individual. This creates a society that requires interdependence and responsibility. Consequently, a normative requirement for justice emerges in this society.

According to Nagel, "the state makes unique demands on the will of its members — or the members make unique demands on one another through the institutions of the state — and those exceptional demands bring with them exceptional obligations, the *positive obligations of justice*" (Nagel, 2005: 130).

All this leads to the conclusion that citizens of one country have no obligations towards citizens of other countries with whom they do not share the burden of being under

the sovereign's authority. "Everyone may have the right to live in a just society, but we do not have an obligation to live in a just society with everyone. The right to justice is the right that the society one lives in be justly governed," — asserts Nagel (Nagel, 2005: 132).

Further examination is required to understand Nagel's comprehension of the established world order and the relations between sovereign states. First of all, it is important to note that Nagel made significant modifications to Hobbes' approach to international relations, while still retaining its fundamental features. Hobbes had a radical view on relationships between states, considering them to be a specific form of a state of nature, which he described as follows:

"There may never have been any time where particular men were in a condition of war against one another. Yet in all times, kings and persons of sovereign authority because of their independence, are in continual jealousy, and are in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another. They have forts, garrison and guns on the frontiers of their kingdoms and are continually spying on their neighbors. This is a posture of war. But because they uphold by this the industry of their subjects, the misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men does not occur in the kingdoms" (Hobbes, 2016: 84). Nagel does not agree with Hobbes' radical position. He emphasizes that contemporary global society is permeated by institutional relations, both between individual states and between their citizens, as well as between various globally operating non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which, in certain cases, exert significant influence on society. Thus, Nagel does not adopt Hobbes' position of absolute or near-absolute autonomy.

At the same time, Nagel distances himself from cosmopolitan views, because he believes that while something akin to an *erosion of sovereignty* can be observed, this phenomenon is actively resisted, particularly by the *fortunate nations* that fear such a development (Nagel, 2005: 143). Nagel supports his position with examples such as the United States' refusal to join the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions, as well as their criticism of the International Criminal Court.

Analyzing the current situation, Nagel comes to the rather realistic conclusion that, in the absence of a monopoly on coercive force in international relations, the agreements between states will be similar to agreements between individuals in a state of nature, i.e. not secured by a sovereign power.

Nagel asserts: "The absence of sovereign authority over participant states and their members not only makes it practically infeasible for such (global / international. — *D. B.*) institutions to pursue justice but also makes them, under the political conception[4], an inappropriate site for claims of justice. For such claims to become applicable it is not enough that a number of individuals or groups be engaged in a collective activity that serves their mutual advantage. Mere economic interaction does not trigger the heightened standards of socioeconomic justice" (Nagel, 2005: 137-138).

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4. In this article, *political conceptions* refers to *statist approaches / conceptions* of global justice.

In addition, Nagel draws several normative conclusions directly stemming from his conception. Consider, for example, the notion of *legitimacy* when discussing *domestic justice*. Existing international / global institutions, despite the extent of their spread and influence, lack "something that according to the political conception is crucial for the application and implementation of standards of justice: They are not collectively enacted and coercively imposed in the name of all the individuals whose lives they affect; and they do not ask for the kind of authorization by individuals that carries with it a responsibility to treat all those individuals in some sense equally … responsibility of those institutions toward individuals is filtered through the states that represent and bear primary responsibility for those individuals" (Nagel, 2005: 138).

Thus, according to Nagel, in the contemporary world: 1) it is not possible to know whether there is any authority that can challenge the sovereignty of individual states; 2) existing international / global institutions cannot extend coercive order to everyone, thus making each person responsible as a *co-author of this imposed order*, which, according to Nagel, is the basis for demands for justice.

To conclude the analysis of Nagel's position, it is interesting to focus briefly on his understanding of the evolution of the modern sovereign state and the possible prospects of this process.

In a Hobbesian vein, Nagel asserts: "thinking about the future, we should keep in mind that political power is rarely created as a result of demands for legitimacy, and that there is little reason to think that things will be different in this case. If we look at the historical development of conceptions of justice and legitimacy for the nation-state, it appears that sovereignty usually precedes legitimacy. First there is the concentration of power; then, gradually, there grows a demand for consideration of the interests of the governed, and for giving them a greater voice in the exercise of power" (Nagel, 2005: 145).

This realistic position leads Nagel to conclude that global justice can only emerge within global power institutions, in a kind of global Leviathan. Moreover, the establishment of this authority will not take place within the framework of some treaty, but through the imposition of coercive power on the whole of humanity. The fact that the relevant issues for today's developed countries are those of egalitarian justice does not mean that this was the case at the time when the first sovereign states were formed. The centuries-long evolution of the sovereign state legitimized Leviathan's authority by reaching a consensus on justice that included an egalitarian component. The entire world must undergo a similar evolution when a force arises that claims to extend its power to a global level.

Nagel concludes his text with a telling phrase: "But if we accept the political conception, the global scope of justice will expand only through developments that first increase the injustice of the world by introducing effective but illegitimate institutions to which the standards of justice apply, standards by which we may hope they will eventually be transformed. An example, perhaps, of the cunning of history" (Nagel, 2005: 147).

Finally, it is important to note that Nagel does not see any real prospects for the emergence of a global Leviathan in the foreseeable future. The path of conquest, which pre-

viously led to the formation of large-scale political entities, is a thing of the past and is not relevant any longer. Thus, Nagel believes that justice will remain a phenomenon in domestic politics.

Section 3. Critical Arguments Against Nagel's Conception

"Reciprocity-Based Internationalism"[5]: Andrea Sangiovanni as an Example of a Critique of the Statist Approach to Global Justice by Thomas Nagel

One of the proponents of the statist approach to the issue of global justice is Andrea Sangiovanni, who in 2007 published the article "Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State" (Sangiovanni, 2007). In this work, Sangiovanni formulates his conception, demonstrating that justice requirements apply only within state borders. However, his argument is based not on Nagel's *Hobbesian* approach, but on *reciprocity* that exists in societies within the institutions of the state. Reciprocity is either absent or insignificant among citizens from different states. The author coined the term *Reciprocity-Based Internationalism* to describe this conception.

Sangiovanni agrees with Nagel's assessment of the weakness of supranational institutions and their failure to compete against sovereign states. For instance, he notes that the civil service budget, even within an integrated supranational body like the EU, amounts to only 1.23% of the GDP of the entire union. This is roughly equivalent to the budget of an average European city (Sangiovanni, 2007: 21). Furthermore, current supranational/global institutions lack the autonomy to mandate compliance with regulations, except by drawing on the resources of individual sovereign nations.

He argues: "Without states, the global order would lose the capacity to govern and regulate those delegated areas within its jurisdiction. This is only in part because the global order lacks an autonomous means of coercion" (Sangiovanni, 2007: 21). This is a realistic view that confirms the established order of things. However, a normative conclusion follows that demonstrates why the primary obligations in society exist within the framework of established political entities — sovereign states.

Unlike Nagel, Sangiovanni posits that *reciprocity* is the primary requirement for achieving justice within the state's border. He asserts: "Equality is a *relational* ideal of *reciprocity* among those who support and maintain the state's capacity to provide the basic collective goods necessary to protect us from physical attack and to maintain and reproduce a stable system of property rights and entitlements" (Sangiovanni, 2007: 19–20).

This emphasis on maintaining stability within the system of rights and other state institutions is deliberate. Prosperity is possible only in a society where the institutional conditions for it are present and supported. These institutions operate on the principles of reciprocity, not coercion, in contrast to the beliefs of Hobbes and Nagel. During the

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5. As previously mentioned in the article, Sangiovanni distinguishes internationalism from cosmopolitanism, offering a primarily statist viewpoint on global justice. For example, he labels Nagel's theory as "Coercion-Based Internationalism".

discussion with Nagel, Sangiovanni proposed a thought experiment: "Let us now suppose that all local means of law enforcement — police, army, and any potential replacement — are temporarily disarmed and disabled by a terrorist attack. Suppose further that this condition continues for several years. Crime rates increase, compliance with the laws decreases, but society does not dissolve at a stroke into a war of all against all. Citizens generally feel a sense of solidarity in the wake of the attack, and a desire to maintain public order and decency despite the private advantages they could gain through disobedience and noncompliance; this sense of solidarity is common knowledge and sufficient to provide assurance that people will (generally) continue to comply with the law"(Sangiovanni, 2007: 10).

Sangiovanni's thought experiment seeks to demonstrate that modern societies rely on the fundamentals of solidarity and reciprocity. These two feelings, rooted in equal concern for all, foster the implementation of an egalitarian justice program. In this case, the state is dependent on society due to the provision of resources, i.e., taxes. In exchange, society receives stable institutions. Referring to Karl Polanyi's famous work "The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time" (Polanyi, 2001), Sangiovanni asserts that successful states require strong institutions for both civil and criminal law.

Sangiovanni's criticism of Nagel's position seems unjustified, and there are several observations to be made in this regard. First, Hobbes' theory, much like Nagel's later, also assigns an extremely important role to the institutions possible in a civil state, primarily legal institutions such as property rights, civil law, and criminal law, and there is no contradiction here. The main question is when these institutions would start functioning, and this necessarily implies a monopoly on power and justice. The question is whether these institutions can exist without sovereign authority. At this point, it is necessary to consider a second remark about the unconvincing nature of Sangiovanni's thought experiment. His intuition regarding the situation in which society continues to exist on the basis of solidarity in the absence of law enforcement agencies and other authoritative institutions is completely incomprehensible. Turning to Hobbes, one can find the following passage there: "So it is manifest that during the time that men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war. This war is every man against every other man. WAR consists not only in battle or the act of fighting, but also in the tract of time when it is sufficiently known that there is the will to contend in battle. The notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war as it is in the nature of weather. The nature of foul weather does not lie in a shower or two of rain, but in the inclination of rain for many days together. In the same way the nature of war consists not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition to fight, during all the time there is no assurance of the contrary. All other time is PEACE" (Hobbes, 2016: 83). It seems that such a position corresponds to Sangiovanni's thought experiment much better.

Rather, the situation that seems to be more realistic and logically justified is the one in which society will try in every possible way to form some other power institutions that can provide basic protection. Of course, a polemic about intuitions arising from

a thought experiment may seem purely subjective, so it would be much more productive to turn to historical examples and existing experience. In this case, Hobbesian arguments that legal and economic institutions follow the establishment of a coercive order in a society look much more convincing. Third, Sangiovanni claims that the demand for egalitarian justice arises within the framework of solidarity and reciprocity between the authorities and society. But at the same time he does not contradict the conception of Nagel, who argues that the power of the Leviathan changes over time and becomes more and more comfortable for the people living in these societies. This argument is based on an element of legitimacy in Nagel's conception and the sense of solidarity in establishing a coercive order for everybody. This is exactly how Nagel justifies egalitarian justice. Nagel's main ideas coincide with most of Sangiovanni's arguments, and the main difference lies in Nagel's assertion that a monopoly of power precedes all social institutions — here, Nagel's ideas sound generally more realistic than those of his opponent.

Critique from Political Cosmopolitanism

A significant group of authors advocating the position of political cosmopolitanism criticize Nagel and other supporters of the statist approach for underestimating the role of international, supranational, or global institutions in the contemporary world. The criticisms can be categorized into three groups. The first one contends that international institutions wield much more significant control than Nagel implies and can impose a coercive order at the supranational / global level. Consequently, there is a need to discuss the requirements of justice on a global scale. The second group argues that in today's world it is inappropriate to focus exclusively on the power of states, since international relations involve a complex interplay of various *non-state actors* whose combined influence on international processes is comparable to that of states. Consequently, it is wrong to associate issues of justice exclusively with the state. The third argument postulates that contemporary international relations are built on principles other than the *coercive power* of the state alone. The main methods of regulating international affairs are *soft power* and other *incentivizing* mechanisms of influence. It is, therefore, a fallacy to insist, as Nagel does, on associating issues of justice with hard power. Now, to examine these arguments in more detail.

There are numerous critics of Nagel, including notable authors such as Andrew J. Walton and Michel Pandlebury (Walton, 2009; Pandlebury, 2007), who argue that international institutions have a significant influence on societies within individual states and that this influence is often stronger than the coercive power of the state.

For example, Walton criticizes Nagel's thesis that existing international organizations are characterized by voluntary membership and therefore cannot automatically establish a coercive order through these organizations. As an example, Walton cites the World Trade Organization (WTO) which he argues establishes a non-voluntary order of interaction between individual states. Walton notes that "it would be a mistake to think that it (world order — *D. B.*) is now constituted by nothing more than a set of private contracts,

established and easily revocable at state discretion… The stigma associated with withdrawing and likely consequences for other areas of a state's political and economic life would be far too high for us to consider this an 'acceptable alternative'" (Walton, 2009: 224).

To some extent, one can agree with this position. The influence of international institutions cannot be denied, but it is also necessary to recognize that Nagel's approach refers to a coercive order in its most basic, *Hobbesian* sense — an order that enforces a monopoly of power. Despite the importance of global institutions, it is not always possible for them to exercise coercive power of that type. There are many examples where, on the one hand, certain societies were able to exist quite successfully without participating in global institutions (e.g., the USSR, Iran, Cuba, etc.), and, on the other hand, illustrative cases show that countries with the greatest influence can refuse to comply with the demands of global institutions and even resist them if the policies of these institutions contradict their interests (e.g., the USA). Indirectly, the authors of this position acknowledge this fact by pointing to US policies that are often directed at global institutions. However, the main conclusion drawn by these authors is that the US position will change over time and that the coercive power of global institutions will increase, which in my opinion sounds unreasonably optimistic.

Pandlebury's main argument focuses on the highly interconnected and interdependent nature of states in the contemporary world, with numerous non-state actors such as corporations, NGOs, and the media as the main agents of this interdependence. "As a result of political developments and massive technological advances that Hobbes could never have imagined, people today are at the mercy of numerous powers other than church and state", asserts Pandlebury (2007: 46). The outcome is a situation in which the internal order within countries is highly dependent on investments, finances, and technologies provided by transnational corporations, on information and news provided by international media, and on the active participation of various NGOs in domestic political affairs.

This stance is prevalent in a number of international studies that examine the impact of globalization on contemporary life. When it comes to Nagel's approach, however, such criticisms fail. Recent global interdependence and interconnectedness do not undermine Nagel's basic arguments that the institutions to which Pandlebury refers cannot match the commanding power of the state authority to which Nagel appeals. There are many instances that reveal the dependence of corporations, the media, and NGOs on the power of certain states. Only the state possesses the legal and coercive tools to influence non-state actors through a variety of ways. For example, nationalization, monopoly laws, tax law, and criminal law are instruments that can neutralize any *corporation* that attempts to compete against sovereign states. Critics of Nagel's theory often point to weak states that are unable to resist the influence of non-state corporations, while neglecting more illustrative examples such as the US.

Related to this is the third argument that the primary means of international relations involve soft power, which proves to be more effective in achieving goals than the

hard power promoted by Nagel. Joseph S. Nye, who originated the concept of *soft power*, describes this phenomenon as follows: "Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others… The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority" (2004: 5-6). Pandlebury's argument is consistent with this approach, stating that in today's world, incentives are much more effective than *methods of punishment and prohibition* (Pandlebury, 2007: 46). The scholar points to extensive research showing that positive incentives are much more effective than coercion (Sunstein, 2005; Brennan, Pettit, 2005; Aronson, 1995; Ross, Nisbett, 2011).

These arguments, like the previous ones, however relevant, cannot be taken as counter-arguments to Nagel's approach. As noted above, Nagel discusses the very foundations of modern society. Soft power and other positive incentives have never been the basis for building sustainable social institutions from scratch. Moreover, the growing influence of soft power does not negate the coercive power of individual states. A vivid example is the country that apparently exerts the most influence on global society in terms of soft power — the United States. The increase in soft power instruments has not lead to any reduction in US hard power. This leads to the conclusion that soft power and positive incentives are a kind of additional tool to the existing hard power instruments. This is exactly what Nagel meant when he spoke of the most basic manifestation of power, the destruction of which leads to falling back into the state of nature. In today's world, few would dare to remove hard power instruments from society, leaving only soft positive incentives.

Section 4. The Idea of Minimal Humanitarian Morality in the Work of Thomas Nagel

Considering only the above-mentioned theses of Nagel's theory, it can be concluded that he holds a position commonly known in the theory of international relations as *political realism*. This approach has a long tradition that goes back to the ancient historian Thucydides. It argues that in interstate affairs there is no ethical principles characteristic of relations within a state. Although political realism has evolved and undergone certain changes in the 20th and 21st centuries, a complete moral vacuum or significantly unconvincing moral space in international relations remains an intrinsic feature of this approach.

As the author in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy points out: "Realists are generally skeptical about the relevance of morality to international politics. This can lead them to claim that there is no place for morality in international relations, or that there is a tension between demands of morality and requirements of successful political action, or that states have their own morality that is different from customary morality, or that morality, if employed at all, is merely used instrumentally to justify states' conduct" (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017).

Nagel cannot be classified as a supporter of this approach, because of the idea of *minimal humanitarian morality*[6] embraced by the philosopher. This is another element of his theory where he differs significantly from Hobbes, who is often referred to as one of the classics of political realism. Nagel's position in this regard can be linked to the Kantian approach to the universality of rights, which is based on the requirement of adherence to the *categorical imperative*. "The normative force of the most basic human rights against violence, enslavement, and coercion, and of the most basic humanitarian duties of rescue from immediate danger, depends only on *our capacity to put ourselves in other people's shoes*", Nagel notes (2005: 131). These requirements are universal and "*not contingent on specific institutional relations between people*" (Ibid: 130). Thus, on the question of fundamental human rights, the philosopher adopts a position close to moral cosmopolitanism, which differs radically from what he initially advocated in his statist conception of global justice.

For Nagel, morality is a *multilayered* phenomenon (Ibid: 132). And if the demands for justice, understood primarily in egalitarian socio-economic terms, are state-level phenomena, then in the global context there are numerous moral demands that are not bound by state borders. Nagel asserts: "Humanitarian duties hold in virtue of the absolute rather than the relative level of need of the people we are in a position to help. Justice, by contrast, is concerned with the relations between the conditions of different classes of people, and the causes of inequality between them" (Nagel, 2005: 119).

Nagel does not provide a detailed description of the basic rights to which moral demands extend on a global scale. Instead, he considers *positive rights* that people do not possess in a pre-political state. It cannot be said, however, that Nagel appeals exclusively to *negative rights*. In his work he also points to an extremely broad sphere in which requirements unrelated to the state apply: "the protection of human rights; the provision of humanitarian aid; and the provision of global public goods that benefit everyone, such as free trade, collective security, and environmental protection" (2005: 136).

Two tentative conclusions can be drawn.

First, Nagel interprets the idea of justice very narrowly, equating this phenomenon with what is often referred to as socio-economic or distributive justice. In this context, justice is considered to be exclusively domestic in nature and non-existent in a global and supranational version.

Second, in a global context, Nagel adopts a position similar to that of moral cosmopolitans, for whom ethical obligations among individuals are independent not only of particular states but also of any social institutions, since they appeal to the intrinsic value of every human life. This allows seeing the dual nature of Nagel's theory, which integrates a fully realistic understanding of justice with idealistic aspirations for moral obligations shared by all individuals worldwide. Moreover, Nagel does not provide a detailed account of what he specifically calls minimal humanitarian morality in his work. His primary aim

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6. In his conception of *minimal humanitarian morality*, Nagel refers to the *contractualist* tradition, particularly to the works of Immanuel Kant and Thomas Scanlon.

is to separate the demands of justice from the global context and confine them within the boundaries of the state.

The main provisions of Nagel's conception of global justice presented in this article may seem both logical and open to criticism. A number of critical remarks about Nagel's approach, which emerged in the discussion following the publication of his article "The Problem of Global Justice", have been analyzed above. In the following paragraphs, further critical arguments which, in the opinion of the author of this text, appear to be significant for either confirming or refuting the main theses of Nagel's theory, will be examined.

Section 5. Nagel's Theory of Global Justice: Critical Arguments and Remarks

Empirical Arguments

In this article, we have discussed theories of global justice, which are political and philosophical ideas about what is morally right to do. At the same time, when examining the arguments of Thomas Nagel and his opponents, one cannot help but notice that a significant amount of historical facts and real-life examples — facts that show *how things are*, not *how the world should be* — are discussed primarily by representatives of moral cosmopolitanism — the most idealistic approach in contemporary theories of global justice. On the other hand, the proponents of statism and political cosmopolitanism supplement their arguments extensively with references to history and real life. This seems natural when one is trying to bring highly abstract political and philosophical theories closer to real life. However, since these arguments are empirical in nature, it is necessary to bring more clarity to them in order to confirm or refute the validity of either side.

For example, one of the most pressing issues in the debate between political cosmopolitans and statists is the question of the role of supranational/global institutions in today's world. Proponents of political cosmopolitanism argue that contemporary international institutions are crucial for citizens around the world and can rival individual states in terms of coercive power; moreover, the influence of these institutions is on the rise. On the other hand, proponents of statism object that nothing can match the power of states.

It seems that the dispute has currently reached a kind of stalemate, as the parties each tend to use sets of facts that confirm their correctness for argumentation. For example, the proponents of political cosmopolitanism, when trying to demonstrate the role and influence of supranational structures, often refer to the impact of these institutions on weak, developing, or simply smaller states. In this situation, this position seems valid, because the power of the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), transnational corporations, and other supranational actors can be much greater than that of an average African state. On the other hand, proponents of statism tend to appeal to large sovereign states, especially to the United States, which are influenced very little by international institutions. This supports the validity of the statist view. Empirical research on the actual conditions of world order, taking into account the role and capabilities

of supranational institutions and states according to various indicators would help to resolve this debate. However, it should be recognized that the likelihood of such comprehensive research that could put an end to this issue is rather low due to the very nature of social sciences, where there is always the possibility of completely different interpretations of the facts at hand. In this case, the debate within the framework of political and philosophical theories can be reduced to the defense of intuitive notions of justice by the proponents of certain positions[7].

From our perspective, Nagel's Hobbesian position seems far more compelling. First, following Hobbes, Nagel appeals to the most fundamental forms of human social organization, in which the civil state opposes the state of nature. History shows that every civil society based on ethical principles had its origins in elementary forms of dominance, where the monopoly of violence played a decisive role in establishing an order that allowed the state form to develop further. Second, even at the peak of the globalization process, there were states such as the US, Russia, China and India, which served as clear evidence that the role of global institutions is limited. Third, the historical process of the last 10-15 years has shown a decline, not an increase in the influence of supranational institutions and the growing role of sovereign states. Of particular note are the events of recent years when the COVID-19 pandemic challenged supranational institutions for the first time and highlighted the role that states continue to play in the modern world (Krastev, Holmes, 2019; Krastev, 2020; Kaspe, 2021; Sakwa, 2020). Subsequently, the confrontation between Russia and the Western countries triggered a rapid process of states disengaging from international institutions as it became clear that they offered not only benefits but also risks associated with the use of coercive (in this case, economic) power. In our view, this proves that Nagel was right to develop his Hobbesian conception.

Another important issue that deserves a separate empirical study is the question of the role of the United States — the most significant country in international affairs for more than 30 years. In the arguments of political cosmopolitans, the discussion always revolves around supranational institutions, including the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), transnational corporations and numerous NGOs. It is assumed that the supranational status of these organizations makes them independent of states and autonomous in their activities. However, to what extent does this correspond to reality remains to be seen. For example, Andrea Sangiovanni, a proponent of the statist approach, has pointed out that supranational institutions require state resources, at least in terms of coercive power, to implement their policies. Of particular interest, however, is the question of how independently all these institutions pursue them.

Indeed, it is obvious that the broad international representation in these organizations, the charters that govern their work and the private nature of transnational corporations do not allow to say, that the supranational structures mentioned above are dependent on anyone in particular. At the same time, however, it is not possible to claim that

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7. e.g. John Rawls, Robert Nozick

these institutions are completely independent. In recent years, there has been a tendency to create new international organizations. This has been caused by the fact that existing international organizations represent a position that is largely shared by developed Western countries. Some authors argue that in a unipolar world, the US has acted in the form of a new type of empire, and that US-controlled supranational institutions have served as instruments to maintain American power in a unipolar world (Ferguson, 2004; Friedman, 2012). Others argue that Western dominance in supranational institutions is an indication of the neocolonial character of the global order (Antwi-Boateng, 2017; Pogge, 2002).

For the purposes of this study, the correctness of any particular position is not crucial, as it would require a separate study. However, it is important to emphasize that supporters of political cosmopolitanism appeal to the independent status of supranational institutions. But if these institutions are considered as structures that implement the will of a particular state or states, this may be another argument in favor of the statist approach, in which supranational institutions are seen as mere extensions of state power.

I do not attempt to prove the correctness of the specific empirical arguments presented in this section. What is important for my research is the framing of the question itself: the appeal to empirical data commonly used in discussions concerning theories of global justice is often subjective and can be challenged by different empirical evidence. In my view, Nagel's theory currently seems to be the most grounded as it appeals to the core foundations of the modern state.

Normative Arguments

The main questions regarding Thomas Nagel's concept may arise when one considers the issue of minimal humanitarian morality, which Nagel does not seem to have fully elaborated on within the framework of the global justice theory. As mentioned above, Nagel's idea of basic moral concepts is characteristic of the proponents of moral cosmopolitanism. Thomas Pogge has succinctly formulated the three main foundations of liberal cosmopolitanism: "First, *individualism*: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons — rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, *universality*: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally — not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites or Muslims. Third, *generality*: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone — not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like" (Pogge, 1992: 48-49). Pogge goes on to defend the position of political cosmopolitanism by supplementing these provisions with arguments about the role of supranational institutions. In our case, however, this quotation effectively characterizes the basic provisions of liberal cosmopolitanism as such. Despite his adherence to the statist approach, Nagel takes a thoroughly cosmopolitan position on minimal humanitarian morality.

This raises a number of questions that various cosmopolitan thinkers are actively exploring. Nagel, for example, points out that our moral obligation "does require us to pursue our ends within boundaries that leave them free to pursue theirs, and to relieve them from extreme threats and obstacles to such freedom if we can do so without serious sacrifice of our own ends" (2005: 131). A similar position is taken by the utilitarian advocate of moral cosmopolitanism, Peter Singer, who argues that the existing suffering in our world can be alleviated if the inhabitants of wealthy countries allocate some of their resources to the benefit of the least well-off. As for the amount of resources that should be transferred, Singer notes: "According to Richard Miller, a philosopher who has written widely about global justice, we ought to give to the point at which, if we were to give more, we would run a 'significant' risk of worsening our lives — but we do not need to go beyond this point. Miller's idea is that morality allows us to pursue 'the underlying goals to which we are securely attached' but that, when others are in need, it does not allow us to spend more than we need to achieve those goals" (Singer, 2010: 146-147; Miller, 2004: 357–383).

Is Nagel prepared to correlate his demands for a minimal humanitarian morality with the views of Singer and Miller? And how would this affect his theory? Can we say that within the framework of the state we have the requirements of egalitarian justice on the basis of which goods are redistributed in society? And then, after this initial redistribution, should wealthy residents of developed countries redistribute some of their resources around the world again to ensure minimal humanitarian needs? This does not follow from Nagel's work.

Another issue concerns *basic human rights*, which Nagel also mentions in relation to minimal humanitarian morality. The issue here is which rights can be considered *basic* and which cannot, and where the line is. There is also the question of interpreting these concepts.

One can turn, for example, to *the capability approach* advocated by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (Sen, 2004, 2016; Nussbaum, 2011). For proponents of this theory, which can be linked to the field of global justice within the framework of political cosmopolitanism, all rights that enable individuals to flourish, i.e., to realize their capabilities, are fundamental. And this is not just a matter of life and death, as Nagel points out. If a person cannot get proper food, medical care, education, then we cannot say that basic human rights are guaranteed.

In her theory, for example, Nussbaum presents "The Central Capabilities", of which *bodily health* is the second on the list. She defines health as "being able to have good health, including reproductive health, to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter" (Nussbaum, 2011: 33). Moreover, according to Nussbaum, all *capabilities* are secured by *basic human rights* (Nussbaum, 2001). This implies that basic human rights include the right to health care, food, and shelter. Nagel's theory does not specify which rights fall under the concern of minimal humanitarian morality. But if, for example, the right to housing is not included in this category, how does Nagel argue against proponents of this "expanded" interpretation of basic human rights?

Another argument can be found in the concept of the above-mentioned Thomas Pogge, who understands the category of positive and negative human rights in a different way, precisely in the context of global justice issues. Pogge develops an *ecumenical* theory of human rights precisely in order to understand how problems at the global level should be approached. "The case I seek to build is broadly ecumenical. I am trying to convince not merely the adherents of some particular moral conception or theory — Lockeans or Rawlsians or libertarians or communitarians, for example. Rather, I am trying to convince the adherents of *all* the main views now alive in Western political thought", Pogge writes (2005: 36). According to his theory, the world's problems are not caused by wealthy countries' failure to ensure the *positive rights* of the planet's poorest inhabitants. Rather, it is the widespread violation of the *negative rights* of these inhabitants that has led to their miserable conditions. This is largely related to both colonial practices and the neo-colonial nature of existing supranational institutions. Thus, if we consider Pogge's arguments in relation to Nagel's concept of minimal humanitarian morality, we can conclude that Nagel should agree to a significant redistribution of goods (as a form of compensation for the rights that are or have been violated). But this does not follow from Nagel's theory.

Nagel's theory thus produces a dual impression. On the one hand, one can speak of a consistent and logically compelling statist theory of global justice, inherently Hobbesian in its character and appealing to the monopoly of power as the basis of justice. On the other hand, the requirements of Nagel's minimal humanitarian morality are not clearly articulated, primarily not in an ethical or philosophical sense, but in relation to the problem of global justice — how to implement it and how it relates to human rights, the existence of sovereign states, and questions of global ethics.

Conclusion

In this article, I examine Thomas Nagel's statist liberal theory of global justice in the context of other existing approaches. An attempt has been made to demonstrate the credibility and logical coherence of Nagel's theory, which undoubtedly distinguishes it from other numerous (often biased) theories of global justice. A distinct advantage of Nagel's theory is its realistic nature, which, in my opinion, confirms its validity to a great extent. It proves to be much more applicable to contemporary realities than many idealistic and cosmopolitan conceptions.

At the same time, the dual nature of Nagel's theory has been outlined, in which beyond the level of justice existing within autonomous states there is the level of minimal humanitarian morality that is universal and therefore global in its scope. As outlined in Section 5, the concept of minimal humanitarian morality is not sufficiently developed by Nagel, although it is a fundamental element, no less important than the question of the statist nature of justice. And, although the general ideas of minimal humanitarian morality have been discussed in detail by Nagel in various other works, they have not been thoroughly addressed in the context of global justice.

In other words, it can be assumed that the further development of Nagel's theory could go in two opposite directions. One should formulate the concept of minimal humanitarian morality more precisely and compare these provisions with existing concepts of human rights, as well as relate all this to Nagel's statist idea of justice, the other should abandon the idea of minimal humanitarian morality, leaving only the statist core of Nagel's theory, in this case aligning the concept with the position of the proponents of political realism (something that Nagel probably did not intend). In any case, Nagel's theory is currently unfinished and in need of further development.

In response to the question as to why Nagel formulated his idea in this particular way, the author himself provides a clue: "Without trying to refute cosmopolitanism I will instead pursue a fuller account of the grounds and content of the political conception. I am going to follow this fork in the path partly because I believe the political conception is accepted by most people in the privileged nations of the world, so that, true or false, it will have a significant role in determining what happens. I also think it is probably correct" (2005: 126). Therefore, it can be assumed that for the majority of prosperous nations, the issue of separation from egalitarian demands on a global scale is important. However, these nations do not intend to abandon minimum moral standards and active involvement in international affairs. This seems practical from a pragmatic point of view but not for political and philosophical theory, which still needs to be improved.

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Теория глобальной справедливости Томаса Нагеля

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Одним из ключевых вопросов либеральной философии XX–XXI вв. стали так называемые современные теории справедливости, в которых необходимо выделить область, посвященную проблеме глобальной теории справедливости, ставшей наиболее актуальной к концу XX — началу XXI в. Среди либеральных теорий глобальной справедливости сложилось множество конкурирующих концепций, которые можно объединить в три больших направления: «моральный космополитизм», «политический космополитизм» и «этатизм». Одной из наиболее влиятельных теорий в рамках этатистского подхода стала концепция глобальной справедливости американского философа Томаса Нагеля, гоббсианская по своему духу. Взяв основные положения теории Гоббса, Нагель значительно изменил заложенные Гоббсом идеи. Это позволило Нагелю, во-первых, апеллировать к принципам эгалитарной справедливости на государственном уровне, а во-вторых, отстаивать позицию, что международные отношения не являются территорией морального вакуума. Итогом таких изменений стала двухуровневая этическая теория, в которой справедливость может существовать исключительно в рамках отдельных государств, а на надгосударственном уровне действуют требования минимальной гуманистической морали. Следствием этого стало то, что на уровне отдельных государств теория Нагеля оказалась крайне логичной и убедительной, выдерживающей критику со стороны оппонентов, в то время как на надгосударственном уровне требования минимальной гуманистической морали оказались мало проработанными и соотнесенными с уровнем справедливости в границах отдельных государств. Все это привело к двойственному отношению к теории Нагеля. В настоящей статье рассматривается глобальная теория справедливости Нагеля, критика и дискуссия вокруг этатистских аргументов Нагеля, а также высказываются критические замечания, касающиеся проблем и перспектив глобальной концепции справедливости американского философа.

Ключевые слова: теории справедливости, теории глобальной справедливости, моральный космополитизм, политический космополитизм, этатизм, минимальная гуманистическая мораль

Rus' — the New Israel: the Medium and the Message of Medieval Russian Political Philosophy

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The article explores the influence of the religious and political concept of "Rus' — the New Israel" on the public consciousness of Russia and its foreign policy culture. Over several centuries of Russian history, this concept played a leading role for understanding and conceptualizing the major political events in Russian chronicles and religious literature. The Russian land was identified with ancient Israel, affecting the perception and interpretation of the events of the time and the way people thought, helping to establish a national foreign policy culture. The influence of the idea of "Rus' — New Israel" is dominant as a way of transmitting the message (medium) and thus becomes a message as such. This suggests that it was this religious-political construct that, in the early stages of the evolution of the Russian state, became the most fundamental way in which it identified itself in the surrounding world.

Keywords: political culture, self-consciousness, medieval history of Russia, God's chosenness, Russian Land, New Israel, Russian lands.

Vasiliy Klyuchevsky, addressing the question of the significance of the spiritual and educational activities of St. Sergius of Radonezh for Russian political history, wrote in 1892: "A person who once breathed such faith into society and made it vividly feel the presence of moral forces that it did not expect within itself, becomes for it the bearer of a miraculous spark, capable of igniting and bringing to action these forces whenever they are be needed when the available means of the people's everyday life are insufficient. The impression of the people of the 14th century became the faith of the following generations. The fathers passed on the inspiration they perceived to their children, and they traced it back to the same source from which their contemporaries first drew it" (Klyuchevsky, 1969: 49).

These words were spoken at a time when Russian historiography was at its greatest flourishing; they convincingly characterize the meaning of these symbols and images. They helped to spread the understanding of historical experience and contributed to the formation of a national political consciousness.

If a people's ability to respond to the external threats and opportunities that arise in the course of human civilization's development can be characterized as a plant, its foreign policy culture can be thought of as the soil in which it either grows or withers. This culture is a complex set of beliefs, practices and expectations that shape the ability of its bearers to make and act on assumptions about the limits of the possible. It also determines the forms and symbols that express their behavior in relations with other peoples (Keenan, 1986: 116). Written tradition, as expressed in historiography and literature, is

a way of transmitting foreign policy culture, but under certain conditions it becomes a means of its formation. This is especially important when we are talking about those stages of development of a society when it is holistic in spiritual and moral terms, and all its social strata turn to one source for the satisfaction of their spiritual needs.

The debate between historians and philosophers regarding the ideological basis of Russian political culture, particularly in relation to foreign policy, raises the question of the significance of the concept "Rus — New Israel" in comparison with the idea of "Moscow — Third Rome", which is more prevalent in historiography. It is important to examine why the idea of the "Rus — New Israel" occupies such a dominant position in the religious-political philosophy of medieval Russia. My hypothesis is that this idea asserts the intrinsic value of the Russian land in relation to other peoples. It is important to examine why the notion of "Rus — New Israel" occupies such a dominant position in medieval Russian religious-political philosophy. The evolution of the concept of God's chosenness of the Russian land (known as "Rus — New Israel") provides an excellent example of how the medium becomes the message and gives order and fundamental meaning to political life.

There is nothing exotic at the core of Russian religious and political philosophy that would radically distinguish it from the ideas shared by all the Christian peoples of Europe in the Middle Ages. At the same time, I see parallels with the concept of "Rus' — the New Israel" and the idea of the chosenness of the Russian land in the concept of the *covenant of grace*, which spread in the 17th century within the Protestant communities of Europe, then in America and South Africa. The differences, of course, are significant. First of all, this was due to the fact that on Russian soil, the object of choice was the "land", i.e. the territory controlled by the Russian state, and not the people who lived there. While the belief in a Covenant between God and England (or Scotland) was common among the English and Scottish Puritan, the place of the state in their worldview is different, from that of the New England Puritans. This is particularly pointed out by D. Rowland, who notes in his work that the followers of the Covenant did not associate it with any specific political form (Rowland, 1996: 614).

The particularly strong connection between the ideology of God's choice of the Russian state and the land under its rule suggests that here the impact of the main political-religious doctrine on political consciousness and foreign policy behavior turned out to be different in duration and depth due to the main factors determining the external context of the development of the Russian state. First, the antagonistic relationship between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, which worsened with the weakening of the Byzantine Empire and its death in 1453. Second, the special position of the Russian lands in terms of military strategy, which made the achievement of their self-reliance within the framework of a unitary state a task directly related to physical survival. Both determined the special conditions in which religious and political doctrines developed in their own way and became the ideological basis of a state that was equally autonomous in its domestic and foreign policy manifestations. In other words, one can agree with Dominique Lieven's idea that for Russia, "its medieval imperial heritage and geographical location

ensured that it would never fit into the European scheme" (Lieven, 2007: 331). The fundamental division between Russia and Europe occurred not as a result of the expansionist aspirations of each of these political civilizations, but as a result of their independent interpretations of the basic tenets of Christian political philosophy.

This article aims to demonstrate the reasons for the dominance of the religious-political idea of "Rus' — the New Israel" as a tool for interpreting current events, and at the same time, to understand their nature in Russian medieval literature. I will also examine several striking examples of how the interpretations made by Russian scribes and theologians of the message of the lived historical experience led to the emergence of established ideas about cause-and-effect relationships in political life, as well as certain categories accepted in Russian and foreign historiography. For this reason, I will turn to the literature and sources available to modern researchers, covering the most important stages of the development of Russian statehood in the Middle Ages.

Written at the turning point (fall of 1480) of the last large-scale confrontation between the Russian lands and the Horde state, Bishop Vassian Rylo's "Message to the Ugra" turned out to be the most important political document of the era. At the same time, it summarized the religious and political heritage that Russia had accumulated by that time (PLDR, 1982: 523 — 536). The argumentation of the confessor of the Grand Prince of Moscow and All Russia Ivan the Third contains characteristics of the nature of the power of the Russian sovereign and his main opponent, explanations of the causes of the events that took place in previous historical periods and, finally, a forecast and prescription of how the addressee of the message should act in terms of providentialism characteristic of the Russian religious thought (Kudryavtsev, 1951; Rudakov, 2017; Seleznev, 2019; Gorsky, 1999; Miller, 1968).

It will become clear how consistent and convincing the components of the "Message to the Ugra" are in their logic, based on the identification of the Russian land with ancient Israel. However, this already allows us to assume that we are talking not only about the completion of the process of forming a certain doctrine, but about the application, in extreme conditions, of an already deeply rooted system of analysis and prescriptions for political actions. The emergence of this rootedness can be attributed to the consistent, centuries-long activity of Russian scribes and theologians, which started almost from the moment the Russian lands became Christian in the late 10th century. Thus, we also observe here the stability of the Russian religious and philosophical tradition, despite the shift at the beginning of the 14th century of the political and spiritual center of the Russian land from Kiev to the Vladimir-Suzdal region.

It is all the more remarkable that the issue of the role of the concept of Rus' as the New Israel has received so little attention in Russian and foreign historiography. The only complete monograph known to us is the work of N. Efimov: "Rus' — the new Israel: the theocratic ideology of the native Orthodoxy in the pre-Petrine literature", published in Kazan in 1912. We can also turn to the wonderful article by the American historian Daniel Rowland, "Moscow — the Third Rome or the New Israel?" (Rowland, 1996), and a limited number of studies that deal with the theme of the Russian land being chosen by

God in the historical period of interest to us in sufficient detail (even if indirectly through other topics), or are devoted to its individual manifestations in Russian literature and chronicles (Goldberg, 1976; Laushkin, 2019; Perevezentsev, 2019).

In addition to the above-mentioned works, topics related to the emergence and development of the concept "Rus' — the New Israel" in Russian religious philosophy and in literature are found in the works of K. Bazilevich, I. Budovnits, A. Gorsky, M. Dyakonov, V. Kargalov, N. IN. Sinitsina, Yu.G. Alekseev, Y. Krivosheev, Ch. Galperin, A. Zamaleev, D. Likhachev, A. Korenevsky, V. Kuchkin, Y. Lurie, V. Nazarov, A. Nasonov, S. Perevezentsev, V. Tomsinov, L. Cherepnin and a number of others (Alekseev Yu., 1989; Bazilevich, 2001; Budovnits, 1960; Gorsky, 2000; Dyakonov, 1889; Zamaleev, 1998; Kargalov, 1984; Krivosheev, 2015; Korenevsky, 2001; Kuchkin, 1990; Likhachev, 2012; Lurie, 2021, 1960; Nasonov, 1969; Perevezentsev, 2008; Cherepnin, 1960).

Among the works of foreign scholars, one can mention the studies of P. Bushkovich, Ch. Keenan, D. Ostrowsky and N. Andreev (Andreyev, 1959; Bushkovitch, 1986; Keenan, 1986; Ostrowski, 1990). Of course, the issue that interests us is touched upon, albeit "in passing", in the classic works of S. Solovyov and V. O. Klyuchevsky. Even in Klyuchevsky's case, however, he addresses the subject without delving too deeply into it in order to determine its place in the history of the religious and political ideology of the Russian state. This topic is almost completely avoided in the historiography of the Soviet period, with the exception of Kudryavtsev and Goldberg (Kudryavtsev, 1951; Goldberg, 1976).

Indeed, one can, speculate endlessly on this relative (and in my opinion, unfortunate) lack of attention. Among the more obvious reasons, I would like to highlight at least two. In the literature on Russian religious and political philosophy, the dominant position is occupied by the discussion of the later idea of Moscow being "the Third Rome". Despite the fact that the bibliographic list of its mentions as an object of research is minuscule compared to the presence of this concept in Russian chronicles and literature, it is this concept that has been popular among scholars for the past 100 years. For foreigners, this concept provides convincing support for the thesis that Russian foreign policy is first and foremost imperial and messianic in character. It is hard to argue with the fact that such an idea is extremely valuable to some European and American researchers.

In addition, the emphasis on the idea that "Moscow is the Third Rome" allows one to place the foreign policy behavior of the Russian state in the general context of European international politics in the second half of the 15th and early 16th centuries. This, in turn, has been a major intellectual task for all those engaged in historiography since Peter I (Bauer, 2011). In short, the idea of Moscow as "the Third Rome" is quite understandable to the Western reader since it is associated with Byzantium and Rome, i.e. the most important episodes in the history of European political civilization, and thus fits well into the conventional framework of Western historiography. According to the author, this is the most reliable way to provide a relatively simple explanation of the differences between Russia and the West, precisely within the Western coordinate system (Rowland, 1996: 596).

A thorough study of the role and place of the concept that Rus' is the New Israel may be hampered by its appeal, not outside the Russian state, but inside Russian society. In this sense, "Moscow is the Third Rome" is indeed of greater importance for researchers outside Russia, and our own scholars are attracted by the opportunity to clearly explain to foreigners the nature of Russian foreign policy behavior within the framework of accessible categories of topics and, above all, without plunging them into the jungle of Russian religious philosophy itself. This is especially true when one takes into account that the idea of God's chosenness, in its content, appeals to experiences and sources that have little to do with the formation of European political civilization. This is not to say that there is not a close connection between the two concepts; they can even be seen as intellectually complementary to each other. However, if the idea that "Moscow is the Third Rome" is, in many ways, a product of the unique external conditions of the middle and second half of the twentieth century, then the idea that "Rus' — the New Israel" is a tool and in part a product of the constant understanding of the nature of Russian statehood since the adoption of Christianity.

Finally, it seems acceptable to assume that the reason for the comparative unpopularity of studying the ideological structure that interests us is precisely its deep-rootedness; it is such an organic presence in the self-consciousness of Russian society that its careful study is not considered necessary. Perhaps this is the origin of our illusion that the practical foreign policy of the Great Moscow Princes and Russian Tsars was not strongly dependent on the ideas of their religious mentors. Formally, of course, they were. However, I assume that the influence of the idea of "Rus' — the New Israel" on political practice was indeed not direct, but much more complex, mediated by the entire ideological system of the Russian nation of that time.

That is why the perspective chosen in the works of N. Efimov and D. Rowland, to interpret the position in Russian religious philosophy of the concept that "Rus' — the New Israel", seems so successful. Both authors focus not so much on the doctrinal articulation of this category in the political documents of the period, but rather on its impact on the developing Russian political culture. This ultimately allows us to understand the relationship between the concept and the new organizational and spatial form of Russian statehood, centered in Moscow[1]. At the same time, it is independent of the specific sphere of state activity in which it is reflected. It seems to us that this perspective is it seems to us, important — it allows to evaluate the deeper meaning of the phenomenon of Russian intellectual life that interests us.

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1. According to contemporary Russian historiography, the term 'Russian land' has implied the territory inhabited by Russians in its entirety. From the 12th to the 16th centuries, the term "land" in common parlance came to not only be applied not only to Rus' (Russian land) as a whole, but also to individual regions of Rus'; i.e. political entities that are usually called "principalities" in historiography, were called "lands" at that time (Gorsky, 2014: 7–12.). The meaning of "Russian state" is used in historiography to designate the administrative form of management of the Russian land (lands); see the example of such use in "History of the Russian State" by N. M. Karamzin, which is devoted to the historical period from the emergence of statehood in the Russian land to the Interregnum of the first quarter of the 17th century.

The authors conclude that the appeal of Russian scribes to Old Testament categories, meanings and comparisons to describe the nature of current or past events in social life is highly characteristic of most of the sources available for study throughout the development of Russian statehood since the adoption of Christianity. In particular, Efimov points out that the Primary Chronicle is literally replete with applications of Holy Scripture: "plots, external cladding, tone and turns of speech, material for descriptions and characteristics are drawn from it" (Efimov, 1912: 9). Whatever the chronicler does not do, he does precisely in biblical terms, since they seem to him to be a divine revelation.

Metropolitan Hilarion in his "Sermon on Law and Grace" (between 1037 and 1050), wishing to glorify Vladimir the Holy and Yaroslav the Wise, "compares them with David and Solomon, Jacob Mnich equates the epic favorite to David, Hezekiah and Josiah, and Theodosius "The Greek" — to Moses. Rev. Nestor sees in St. Gleb a resemblance to David; Andrei Bogolyubsky's chroniclers place him closer to Solomon" (Efimov, 1912: 25). The author also notes with irony the political reasons why the scribes used this particular method to convey their message: "biblical history was more flattering to the patriotic sentiment of the time than the history of Byzantium, and similarities with its figures were valued more than similarities with the Bosphorus autocrats" (Efimov, 1912: 27). The complex relations of the Russian land with Byzantium have been well studied in domestic and foreign historiography: "The essence of Greece has been flattering to this day" (PSRL: 971). The sacred texts of the Old Testament, selected by Russian scribes, were not used to justify a ready-made concepts, but shaped and generated them throughout the early history of Russian religious historiography.

Efimov notes: "State theorists were imbued with biblical legal consciousness and combined legal systems on the basis of scriptural texts" (Efimov, 1912: 29). The leitmotif of the Bible — the idea that God chose Israel from the moment Abraham was called — characterizes history as a process of interaction between the divine and the human. Russian scribes knew no other language than the language of the Old Testament and no other categories for describing the destiny of the people, other than the Old Testament categories of their direct interaction with God. Efimov points to those of them that are central: that God chose Israel and that God is the ruler, King and zealot of his people (Efimov, 1912: 31).

The comparisons and interpretations inherent in the Old Testament were not only integrated into the Russian political consciousness, but also determined its main categories for assessing social interactions. At the same time, this was true not only within the society, but also in interaction with other ethno-social systems. It could not have been otherwise when for the Russian scribes themselves, biblical meanings were the only tool not only for knowledge, but also for interpretation of the existing reality. They formed the basis of an ideal image, the desire for which was always the main factor in their political development (Adrianova–Perettz, 1964: 12, 14; Perevezentsev, 2008: 18 — 19; Efimov, 1912: 33-34). In relations with other peoples, the Rus', proclaimed God's Chosen People, in this capacity "contrasted with their stepp. neighbors, and, in the following centuries, with the Tatar-Mongol enslavers" (Gol'dberg, 1976: 111).

Rowland, who believes that biblical examples functioned for Russian scribes "both as a means of conveying a certain meaning and as meaning itself," comes to the same conclusion (Rowland, 1996: 595). Note that the assessments of both authors go significantly further than the views of D. S. Likhachev, who points out that "a verbal definition, a verbal analogue, selected in the Holy Scripture or in the existing literature," was primarily a tool for cognition of current events (Likhachev, 1994: 284). At the same time, it is Rowland who draws attention to the popularity of Old Testament examples and comparisons in the religious and philosophical works of medieval Europe, which indicates the unity of the spiritual heritage of Russia and Europe mentioned above, rather than their fundamental differences, as is commonly believed in the Russian and, especially, foreign historiography (Rowland, 1996: 596). This in itself is extremely important, because it calls into question the popular thesis that the differences that define the nature of relations between Rus' and Europe are of a fundamental nature. No, these differences were formed from the same soil, but through fundamentally different historical experiences.

Rowland sees the triumph of "Rus — New Israel" already in the pre-Mongol period of Russian history in the fact that "Russian scribes, like the ancient Israelites, saw their political and military history as a sequence of punishments and rewards from God" (Rowland, 1996: 598). He draws attention to the fact that turning to Old Testament examples and meanings forms "not the desire for a universal empire and the intention to rule the world, but a feeling of special divine protection and mercy" in relation to the Russian people and their state (Rowland, 1996: 613).

Thus, the two main works of the aforementioned Russian and foreign authors, which deal in detail with the idea of God's chosenness of the Russian land and the position of the idea of "Rus — New Israel" in its political life, allow us to arrive at the following hypothesis: *an appeal (of Russian religious and philosophical literature) to Old Testament examples was the basis of how Russian literature, almost from the moment of Russia's Baptism, looked at events and phenomena of political life, determining their interpretation and the generalizations. The more and more direct identification of "Rus — New Israel" in the world view of Russian literature has gradually occupied a central place in the interpretation of the Russian state's destiny, understood in terms of its relationship with God.* Beginning with Metropolitan Hilarion's apology for the Russian land and the First Chronicle, the idea is affirmed that the Russian people are especially pleasant to God. The Russian scribes, who likened their heroes to Old Testament kings and filled their thoughts with constant references to the Old Testament, were confident that Rus' had taken the place of the ancient "people of God" on the paths of divine Providence, had taken the place of the ancient "people of God" (Efimov, 1912: 36). With this confidence they taught their audiences, who turned to the books for explanations of current events and inspiration for new achievements.

The limited number of studies dealing directly with the topic of this particular interest makes it necessary to turn to works that enable to see the place of the idea that Rus' is the New Israel in terms of the various historical experiences of the Russian people in the medieval period of its history. In all cases considered in these studies, this idea becomes

a way for Russian literary scholars to interpret current events and, at the same time, a prescription for the most appropriate behavior in the prevailing circumstances. At the same time, the way Russian scribes interpret the most significant political events fully reflects their "psychology of compilers", for whom the most common form of expressing the author's power and thought is a collection of extracts from Divine Scripture, welded together with introductory lines, reasoning and conclusions, according to the principle: "It is not written, but collected from Divine messages" (Efimov, 1912: 22).

In A. Laushkin's book "Rus' and its Neighbors: the History of Ethno-Confessional ideas in the Old Russian literature of the 11th–13th Centuries", the question of God's chosenness is raised in the context of the evolution of ideas about neighboring peoples in the Russian literature of the pre-Mongol and early Mongol periods. The author comes to the important conclusion that not only the connection of the "Russian language", with biblical history, as with other Christian peoples, but also the self-identification as the "New Israel" was already present in Russian literature by the middle of the 11th century (Laushkin, 2019: 193). This allows creating a solid basis for the formation in chronicles and other works of an archetypal ethno-confessional and ethno-social systems, differing in relation to the Russian land. The main experience here is the interaction with nomadic neighbors, which accompanied the Old Russian statehood from the moment of its emergence in the 9th century, i.e. always. At the same time, for the authors of chronicles since the 11th century, the most important thing is not the search for specific situations from the Old Testament past, but the identification of certain general approaches and modes of action of the Lord in relation to the chosen people, with whom the Russians are consistently associated (Laushkin, 2019: 150). This seems to indicate that in the Russian literature of the time the question of God's chosenness of the Russian land was an obvious given, and Old Testament references and analogies were already being used as indications of how the "New Israel" should act in a certain situation, or why it developed in a certain way. The latter, quite accurately, is placed in the context of God's direct relationship with His Chosen People.

The negative experiences Russians had in interacting with other ethno-confessional communities became the main reason they turned to the Old Testament to assign categories to different groups (Laushkin, 2019: 133). It is impossible, therefore, to overestimate the influence exerted by the interaction of the Russian people with its neighbors on the formation of the idea of God's chosenness and the political-religious concept that "Rus' is the New Israel". These relations are usually hostile — especially in the East, from where a serious military threat most often arrived on Russian land. But the Christian West also had to deal with Russian scribes. A researcher studying the question of the formation of the archetypes of Rus' neighbors in the chronicles draws attention to the remarkable comparison. First of all, while describing the disasters that befell the Hungarian army of King Béla IV during the campaign against Galich, the chronicler identifies the Hungarians with the Egyptians, and their Russian opponents with the chosen people of Israel (Laushkin, 2019: 151). Against the backdrop of constant military confrontations with neighbors, as Efimov notes, for the Russian masses Orthodoxy is "a religious advantage

that determines the success of the struggle itself. This native advantage served as a sufficient reason for the scribes, brought up on the Bible, to transfer to Rus' the characteristic features of the Chosen People of whom the Holy Book narrates" (Efimov, 1912: 34).

On the already prepared ground of Old Testament interpretations and their perception in the national consciousness, in the middle of the 13th century, came the most difficult experience in terms of its magnitude (and influence on the moral state of Russian society) — the Tatar-Mongol invasion, as well as then established tributary dependence on the Horde. Due to the dramatic nature of the events, they turn out to be central to the process of the entire development of the idea of God's chosenness and the related concept of "Rus' as the New Israel". First of all, an appeal to Old Testament categories underscores the Russian scribes' understanding of the causes, meaning and consequences of the invasion. The richness of the historiographical material in this case is connected with the fact that the disclosure of the theme of "Batu's pogrom" in books helps to understand the nature of the special relations between the Russian lands and the Horde state for quite a long historical period (until the end of the 15th century).

Understanding the "destruction of the Russian land" within the framework of providentialism helps, among other things, to understand the refraction of the already established idea of God's chosenness in extreme foreign policy circumstances. According to the most accepted interpretations of the chronicles, the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' is interpreted as "God's punishment," and the conquerors themselves act as an instrument of God's wrath against His Chosen People for numerous sins (Krivosheev, 2015). The Tatars are a "punishing sword" in Rus' according to God's will and, as V. Rudakov notes on the basis of a comparison of chronicles, they act fantastically successfully, easily destroying all attempts to resist them (Rudakov, 2017: 60). However, it is known that in a number of cases, the Tatar forces met stubborn resistance, suffered considerable losses and, sometimes, completely failed to achieve their immediate objectives, preferring a peaceful settlement with their enemy (Kargalov, 1967; Krivosheev, 2015). We can see, therefore, that widespread assessments of the relative ease with which the Tatars accomplished their military tasks during Batu's campaigns in Rus' may be due to an insufficiently critical perception in Russian literature. For the medieval Russian author it was important to show that resistance to God's will was "by definition" doomed; the invasion had a providential character, as indeed did every event in the life of the people directly under God's hand. In other words, the exaggerated ease with which the Tatars achieved their goals is a projection of the interpretation of events in Old Testament categories accepted in Old Russian literature.

In telling the story of the invasion, the chroniclers repeatedly drew parallels and made comparisons with biblical texts, which were already fully rooted in the Russian literary tradition. Therefore, as A. Alekseev notes, at the time of the invasion, "the misfortunes of Jerusalem and its inhabitants became for Rus' the historical model that shaped social thought and provided a criterion for evaluating its own history" (Alekseev A., 2003: 448). No other historical comparisons would be easily accepted by readers who have been brought up on strictly defined images and symbols for about 200 years. Accordingly, the

acceptance of God's punishment, as well as all its consequences, seems necessary to Russian scribes within the framework of the ongoing relationship of the Russian land with God (Adrianova-Perettz, 1974: 12, 14). The assessment of the invasion as an "execution by God" (divine punishment), which has no alternative in Russian literature, is a product of the tradition of formally identifying the Russian land with the ancient Kingdom of Israel, which had taken root in Russian intellectual soil (by the middle of the 13th century). In exactly the same way, it is reflected in contemporaneous works of folk art about the Tatar invasion (Budovnits, 1974).

At the same time, in the Russian literary tradition, the apparent success of the Tatars' campaign against the "New Israel" is in no way connected with God's grace towards the "filthy" aliens. Moreover, the Tatars are consistently endowed with exclusively negative traits as has always been the custom to describe the relations of the chosen people with their adversaries — be it in ancient Israel or in the new, Russian land (Efimov, 1912: 33). The compiler of the Laurentian Chronicle goes so far as to point to their struggle with the Orthodox faith as the motive for the atrocities of the invaders. Summing up how Russian literature of the time interpreted the invasion, we see that the concept of God's chosenness of the Russian land is the most important theoretical (ideological) construct, based on the awareness of the disaster. Then only the defining of the paths of spiritual and political revival can provide the basis for the organized resistance of the Chosen People, who have "corrected" themselves by abandoning their sinful ways.

The activity of Alexander Nevsky at the head of the Russian lands falls within this historical period (1249–1263), when it was far from not only correction, but even full awareness of causes of Divine punishment. His "Vita" is one of the most important documents of the Russian Middle Ages, combining hagiographic and secular features. It is no coincidence that the interaction of these dimensions of the "Vita" became the object of attention of several serious works on the history of Russian literature (Ostrowski, 2013; Selart, 2017; Danilevsky, 2005; Fennell, 1983; Gorsky, 1996; Okhotnikova, 1987; Kuchkin, 1990). According to the ideas recognized in the scientific literature, the "Vita" in its original edition appeared in the 1280s in Vladimir (on Klyazma). There is also a point of view that it dates back to an earlier period and was written shortly after the death of the prince in 1263. Other historians consider the time of its composition to be the middle of the 14th century, and in the final version even the second half of the 15th century (Ostrowski, 2013). Regardless of the specific historical circumstances of the composition of the Vita, it is important for us that its author (or authors) in the hagiographical part strictly adhered to the already established tradition of resorting to Old Testament analogies and comparisons, identifying their hero with the biblical leaders, and in the Russian land, indirectly through the personality of the prince, with ancient Israel. The author compares Alexander's face to the face of Joseph, and his strength to the strength of Samson, pointing out that "God gave him the wisdom of Solomon". That is why, according to the Vita, "one of the most important men of the Western land, one of those who call themselves servants of God, came, wanting to see the maturity of his strength, just as the Queen of Sheba came to Solomon in ancient

times". The main military victories of the prince — the Battle of the Neva in 1240 and the Battle of Lake Peipus in 1242 — are fully described using Old Testament analogies. The first is compared to the miracle "under Hezekiah the king. When Sennacherib, king of Assyria, came to Jerusalem, wanting to conquer the holy city of Jerusalem, an angel of the Lord suddenly appeared and killed one hundred and eighty-five thousand Assyrian soldiers, and when morning came, only dead bodies were found."

Before the Battle on the Ice, Alexander turns to God, calling out to Him: "Help me, Lord, as you did with Moses in the victory over Amalek in ancient times," and after the Crusaders were defeated, "God glorified Alexander before all the regiments, like Joshua at Jericho." Then, after the victory, Alexander himself, turned to the once-betrayed inhabitants of Pskov, and, threatening them, demanded gratitude for their deliverance from enemies: "If you forget this before Alexander's great-grandchildren, then you will become like the Jews, whom the Lord fed in the desert with manna from heaven and baked quails, but you forgot all this they and their God, who delivered them from the captivity of Egypt." The reaction of the foreigners to the approach of such a formidable warrior is characterized by the words: "And the women of Moab began to frighten their children, saying: 'Alexander is coming!'" Such a filling of the hagiographical part of the "Vita" with Old Testament images shows that the Old Russian author did not need and did not have any other comparisons in order to explain to the reader the essence and scale of the prince's actions in an accessible language. The reader, in turn, formed a stable conceptual series, the center of which was the identification of the analogy of the Russian land with ancient Israel, mediated by the personality of the prince and the events that happened to him.

The political and personal fate of Alexander Nevsky represents the dramatic experience of serving as a statesman in the era of the most dangerous foreign policy crisis in Russian history. For several years (1237–1242), the Russian land found itself in the position of having to deal with an enemy that seemed invincible and incomparable in power to anyone before it, plunging the country into a state of, if not physical, then moral devastation. It was a time of terrible national disaster, countless casualties and national mourning. Simultaneously, it was a time of great heroism, perseverance and self-sacrifice (Kargalov, 1968: 94).

Foreign invasions, of course, occupy an important place in Russian history and have repeatedly become an occasion for demonstrating the unparalleled courage and resilience of our people. However, all of them invariably ended in the defeat of the aggressors and did not influence the development of Russian statehood in a way that could be compared to internal turmoil. In the middle of the 13th century, the Russians suffered their first military defeat on such catastrophic proportions that their very existence was threatened. Most importantly, they could not win it back over the course of several generations; they were not slaves or subjects of the Horde's khans, but tributaries, regularly defeated by them on the battlefield. The appearance of an enemy who turned out to be invincible became a great source of trauma and national humiliation, which for several generations proved physically impossible to heal with one's own victory.

In this regard, the question of the interaction between two phenomena of Russian historiography may be of significant interest: the identification of Rus' with Israel through Old Testament analogies and parallels, which had reached its full form by the time of the Tatar-Mongol invasion, and the subsequently established characteristics of relations between Rus' and the Horde as "slavery", "captivity", etc. Here we come close to assessing the nature of such a phenomenon as the relationship between the Russian lands and the Horde over a fairly long period of time, which in itself is one of the most important issues of domestic historical science and public consciousness (Krivosheev, 2015: 190 — 197). It is so important that not only do historians argue about it, but lively public debates rage around it, and politicians at the highest levels regularly refer to it. Here the historical science is confronted with several fundamental contradictions, whose presence provokes the emergence of exotic versions that tell about the nature of relations between the Russian land and the Horde. Perhaps it is possible to come a little closer to understanding these contradictions if we look at the problem through the prism of the interpretation of the events that interest us in Russian literature within the framework of the ideology of God's chosenness and the concept of "Rus' — the New Israel". One of the central paradoxes of Russian history would thus be resolved: the established historiographical idea of the Tatar-Mongol "yoke" in the absence of one from the point of view of the documented practice of relations between Rus' and the Horde, especially in comparison with other countries that were subjected to Mongol conquests and invasions in the 13th century.

The interaction of concept and history begins with an assessment of the immediate physical effects of the invasion of Russian lands. First of all, this concerns the traditional approach to assessing the Tatar invasion in 1237–1241, as an exaggeration of the tragedy of the Russian people (Krivosheev, 2015: 140– 150). There is no doubt that the destruction that befell the Russian lands was monstrous. Nevertheless, during the spring and summer of 1238, almost everywhere there was a return to the "structures of everyday life". Many Russian cities did not defend themselves and were not destroyed at all; the Tatar troops simply did not reach many of them. The number of Russian princes killed in battles with the Tatars was less than 1/3 of their total number (Krivosheev, 2015: 148-149; Rudakov, 2023: 9).

However, the events that followed from the beginning of the 1250s cannot put the relations between Rus' and the Mongol Empire, and then the Golden Horde, on the same level as the situation of other countries that were subjected to Mongol campaigns of conquest in the first half and middle of the 13th century — Khwarazm in Central Asia, the Chinese states or Iran. We are not talking about the minor conquered peoples of the Volga region, the Urals or Siberia, where the power of the Mongol feudal lords was absolute. Compared to them, if we go back to the definition given by Lev Gumilyov. Rus' was "neither subordinated nor conquered": there was no loss of sovereignty for the Russian princes to make decisions on major issues of domestic and foreign policy. As a result, the Golden Horde, as B. Shpuler rightly notes, did not have a significant impact on the Russians and did not change their nature (Shpuler, 2021: 8). The Russian lands are the

only part of the "Juchi ulus" where not even a temporary Mongol administration arose, and "the essence of tributary relations inevitably entails the conclusion that the Mongols preserved in Rus' the social system that took shape in the middle of the 12th century and continued at the beginning of the 13th century." (Krivosheev, 2015: 226). The main reason for the comparative military dominance of the Tatars in the second half of the 13th century was the agony of the system of grand-ducal power in Rus' (Fennell, 1983). As soon as the power structure of the Russian lands was stabilized around several large centers, among which Moscow soon began to play a leading role, the Tatars became a formidable, but external enemy of the Russians. The Horde troops participated in inter-princely affairs, including military engagements, but never during the entire period of the so-called "yoke" were they in the position of rulers surrounded by silent slaves. The military victories of Alexander Nevsky's sons Dmitry (1285) and Daniil (1300) over large Tatar forces and the victory of Mikhail Tverskoy over Muscovites and Tatars in 1317 were combined with trips to the Horde. The Moscow princes, often seen as the conduits of Sarai's influence, actually disobeyed the Tatar khans appropriating the titles without regard to any yarlighs (Gorsky, 1999). As the military-diplomatic interaction with the Horde progressed, the Russian rulers, already in the first decades of these relations, "were completely freed from Tatar influence on their internal regulations" (Solovyev, 1988: 477). The granting of yarlighs to the Russian princes in the Horde was a diplomatic act of subordination, but recorded the absence of Tatar interference in the administration of Russian territories.

However, when analyzing the relations with the Horde and their role in the fate of the Russian people, the scribes turned to examples and comparisons, which by that time, over many generations, had become the central part of the entire system of meaning, with the help of which the content and meaning of certain events were conveyed to the reader. Such characteristics of relations with the Tatars as "captivity" or "slavery" could arise precisely within the framework of the deeply rooted concept of God's chosenness of the Russian land, expressed in the idea that "Rus' is the New Israel." As in many other cases, the authors of Russian chronicles and hagiographic works simply had no other way to convey the message. The movement initiated by the Orthodox Church to understand the causes of the Tatar conquests and thus develop approaches to the ideology of victory over the enemy, had to be supported all the more by the most severe assessments of the situation in the Russian lands.

In other words, the assessment of the reasons for the invasion and the nature of relations with the Horde in Russian chronicles and other documents of the period cannot be considered in isolation from the existing religious and political tradition. That is why the term "yoke," first mentioned in the works of the Polish historian Jan Dlugosz in the second half of the 15th century, was so easily adopted from foreign historiography. Subsequently, the "Old Testament" definitions turned out to be the most attractive for Russian, as well as foreign, historiography due to their brightness, which Karamzin was already striving for, and their political persuasiveness that was the case for a significant number of other authors.

As a result, they were the ones who laid the foundation for the general assessment of the relations between Rus' and the Horde by historians, with the exception of S. Solovyov, L. Gumilyov, B. Shpuler, and at the present stage — Yu. Krivosheev, A. Gorsky and a number of other Russian historians. In reality, such an interpretation of the nature of relations between Rus' and the Horde may be nothing more than a product of the tradition of conveying meanings inherent in Russian medieval literature. The way in which the Russian scribes conveyed the message to us thus became a message in itself, and so convincing that it has taken a central place in the entire historiographical tradition of assessing the nature of the Horde's rule over the Russian lands in the 13th — 15th centuries.

Moreover, the use of Old Testament comparisons to influence the people of "New Israel" developed gradually from the 1270s. The Church Council of 1274, convened by Metropolitan Kirill, became one of the most important events in the history of Russian Orthodoxy and, at the same time, a turning point in understanding the foreign policy situation in which the Russian land found itself after the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the subsequent establishment of tributary dependence on the Horde. In addition to resolving a number of issues related to church life, the Council is considered by historians to be the starting point for understanding the causes of the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the tributary dependence of the Russian lands, going beyond determining the immediate causes of these events (Rudakov, 2017: 90). It was at this moment that a movement began within the Russian Orthodox Church, which, according to Vasiliy Klyuchevsky, later made it possible that "the people, accustomed to tremble at the mere name of a Tatar, finally gathered their courage, stood up to the enslavers and not only found courage to stand up, but also went in search of the Tatar hordes in the open stepp. and there it fell on the enemies like an indestructible wall, burying them under many thousands of bones" (Klyuchevsky, 1969: 54). It was no longer only the causes of disaster and "slavery" that occupied Russian literature, but also the ways to correct them, which were conceptualized in the Old Testament categories familiar to it. The central document of the epoch is the "Teachings" ("Words") of Serapion of Vladimir, whose appointment to the see of the capital of the Russian land took place at the Council of 1274. The main content of this work is the exposure of human vices and the instruction of the true path, which lies in the sphere of repentance, purification from sins and spiritual self-perfection (Kuchkin, 1990; Rudakov, 2017). It is not surprising that in order to pose a problem, whose solution can open the way to freedom from the humiliating dependence on the Horde, Serapion turns to the most understandable and familiar way of conveying the message: a direct analogy to the fate of Old Testament Israel. A researcher of the Mongol-Tatars' representation in Russian literature points out that in the second teaching Serapion indicates the specific historical period from the invasion of the Tatars to the appearance of the sermon: "This is already approaching 40 years of languor and torment, and it is given that this heavy burden will not cease for us, our belly is iron and pestilent, and we cannot eat our bread for sweetness, and our sighing and sorrow dry our bones" (PLDR. 13th century: 444). It can be assumed that such a precise indication of the time during which the Russian land will be subjected to God's punishment is connected not only with the attempt of the author

of the "Teaching" to give an exact chronology, but also with his desire to give his own interpretation of the events. Vladimir Rudakov points out a clear parallel with the forty-year period of Israel's wanderings in the desert, which suggests Serapion's intention to raise the question of the reasons for the continuation of God's punishment of His Chosen People after the expiration of the "control" period of disgrace (Rudakov, 2017: 91). Since the Bishop obviously expects that his passionate call for the correction of spiritual life and morals will receive a response, he resorts to the most understandable and, from the point of view of Russian national consciousness, most appropriate analogy with the fate of Ancient Israel. Serapion not only equates the disasters that befell the Russian land with those that befell Ancient Israel, but also sees in them signs of the same attitude of God towards His Chosen People. This latter allows him to persistently demand truly sincere repentance and correction.

"The ecclesiastical and spiritual unity of the Great Rus' around Moscow preceded the political unity" (Prokhorov, 2000: 41) and already from the beginning of the 14th century, the motive of the connection between the spiritual basis of the self-awareness of the Russian lands and their struggle with foreign adversaries gradually came to the fore. The Great Principality of Moscow, whose rulers since the time of Ivan Danilovich (Kalita), enjoyed the special favor of the church hierarchy, gradually found itself at the head of this struggle, In the midst of changing circumstances, the idea of the exceptional closeness of the Russian people to God is present in the first chronicler: Dmitry Donskoy before the Battle of Kulikovo says in prayer, "For You are Our God and we are Your people", and Metropolitan Photius, in one of his teachings to Grand Duke Vasily Dmitrievich, calls his subjects "the chosen flock" of God (Efimov, 1912: 35). Then, at the final stage of the emancipation of the Russian land from the consequences of the military catastrophe that befell it in the middle of the 13th century, the assessment of the situation of the Russian land, based on the idea that "Rus' is the New Israel", takes the form of a political manifesto, containing an indication of a possible program of foreign policy action. Under the influence of the method of its transmission, the message takes the form of a political manifesto written by the Bishop of Rostov Vassian Rylo, at the moment of the most decisive confrontation between the Russian land and the failing Horde.

First of all, it is necessary to examine the nature of the document of interests to us, in which the concept of "Rus' — the New Israel" takes on a completed form. The ideological content of the "Message to the Ugra" is analyzed in the works of V. Rudakov, Yu. Seleznev and I. Kudryavtsev, as well as the ideas expressed in the review work of A. Konotop (Kudryavtsev, 1951; Konotop, 2011; Rudakov, 2017, Seleznev, 2019: 36). Vladimir Rudakov notes that "the main task of the "Message" was to create a coherent system of evidence in favor of the legitimacy of the fight against the Horde" (Rudakov, 2017: 167). Thus, in the "Message" the author uses the Old Testament meanings, in order to point out the falsity of the order of things and the possibility of its correction. I. Kudryavtsev, in turn, characterizes the "Message" as follows: "In it the dogmatic stream merged with the social stream in a uniform patriotic direction, and perhaps most of the genre features of this type of Old Russian literature have reached their perfection" (Kudryavtsev, 1951: 166).

This characteristic of the "Message", it seems to us, most reliably defines the nature of this document: the combination of the results of a moral search and a political process. On this basis, through the power of refined Old Testament images, the meaning and significance of the foreign policy actions of the Russian state in this specific historical period are given resonance.

The political circumstances of the appearance of the "Message" are well known; their details, unlike the content of the document, are the subject of extensive historiography and discussion (Lurie, 2021: 223–261). Summarizing the conclusions of historians, we can say that the "Message", written in early October 1480, pursues several goals. All of them are determined by specific circumstances and seem to the author to be legal (fair) within the framework of the identification of the Russian land with God's chosen Kingdom. Starting with an analysis of the nature of the Horde state and its supreme power, Bishop Vassian points to the reasons for the Russian lands falling into dependence on the Horde as having been an "execution by God".

Another aspect of the "Message" is the justification of the fight against the Horde and the need for the prince to act decisively, which is based on an analysis of the Tatar ethno-social system that reflects the nature of the power wielded by Ahmed Khan. Questions of the domestic political development of the Russian land provide an assessment of the power of the Grand Duke also in Old Testament categories and indicate the mode of behavior necessary for him in certain circumstances. This method of action stems from the results of what happened in the second half of the 15th and early 16th centuries: "The understanding of the Russian sovereign as the only righteous one, the identification of the Moscow sovereigns with the biblical kings indicates their universal mission as the only righteous rulers for the last Chosen People in this world, the New Israel" (Perevezentsev, 2019: 177). Finally, the "Message" contains a description of the inevitable consequences of the triumph of "Rus' — the New Israel" over its principal enemy within the framework of providentialism. The combination of these three storylines not only sums up the results of many years of understanding of the nature of relations between the Rus' and the Horde, but also indicates the further correct path for the "New Israel" after its final liberation from "captivity."

The specific content of the "Message" and its internal chains of argumentation have been analyzed in detail in the works of Russian historians and we will not go into them here detail (Kudryavtsev, 1951: 169–178; Rudakov, 2017: 164–173; Seleznev, 2019: 32-39; Nazarov, 1980: 116; Lurie, 2021: 223 — 261; Alekseev Yu., 1989: 128–132; Nazarov, 1980). In his text we see that the entire system of argumentation is grounded in the basic tenets of the concept of God's choice of the Russian Land that had been formed by that time. For the author, the "New Israel" is in the "captivity" of the "Pharaoh", whose role is played in specific historical circumstances by Ahmet Khan. According to Vassian, Ivan's proper conduct in the conflict with Ahmet stems from the fact that he is a political and spiritual ruler, placed by God "at the head of the people chosen by him (God), the people — New Israel", who must fulfill the will of this Chosen People "to complete liberation from foreign and heterodox enslavement" (Kudryavtsev, 1951: 171). If we place the "Message" in

the context of the use of Old Testament analogies by Russian literary scholars, which is analyzed in N. Efimov's monograph and a number of other works, we can assume that Bishop Vassian uses a concept that was already at that time a central element of the self-understanding of the audience of this document.

Therefore, "Message to the Ugra" does not simply continue the tradition of viewing the major historical experiences of the Russian people in categories based on a literal analogy with Ancient Israel. In accordance with the demands of the time, it summarizes the heritage created during the 500 years since the adoption of Christianity in relation to the problem, on the solution of which depends the fate of Russian statehood. It is no coincidence that Bishop Vassian sums up his reasoning about the political relations between the Russian land and the Horde with a direct reference to the fate of the enemies of Ancient Israel, whom the "merciful Lord enslaves" to the Chosen People (PLDR, 1982: 532). This prediction, based on an Old Testament analogy, concludes the history of relations between Rus' and the Horde at the level of their religious and philosophical understanding. During the "Horde captivity", Russian society, as God's Chosen People, went down the path of repentance and spiritual purification that was intended for it, and is entering a new stage in its history, just as it happened after the liberation from Pharaoh's captivity with its ancient counterpart. The method of conveying the message, accepted in Russian books, eventually becomes the message itself, and the Russian land becomes, on the level of political doctrine, the "New Israel," chosen by God and subordinate, along with its Grand Duke, directly to God.

Epilogue

The basic political task of preserving and strengthening the national statehood was solved by the Russian land in the last episode of relations with the Great (Golden) Horde during the reign of Ivan the Third. Subsequent appeals to the concept of God's Chosenness in the formulation "Rus' — the New Israel" are observed in the description of the Nikonian Chronicle of Ivan the Fourth's campaign against Kazan in 1551, in the "State Book", in the message of Andrei Kurbsky to Tsar Ivan the Terrible, in some documents from the Time of Troubles, as well as in a number of works of Russian architecture and fine art (Konotop, 2011: 44-47; Rowland, 1996: 604, 609-612).

However, they no longer occupy such an important place in understanding foreign policy tasks and challenges facing the Russian land. The emerging unitary Russian state had its own political and legal ideology, at the center of which, as V. Tomsinov defines it, was "the idea of intrinsic value" (Tomsinov, 2003: 74). Russian religious political philosophy, which grew through centuries of intellectual culture into national identity, formed the basis of this self-esteem, and thus the internal legitimacy necessary for the further development of the state.

This internal legitimacy had two sources. First, the Russian religious and political consciousness, based on the idea of one's chosenness by God from the moment of the adoption of Christianity and, especially, against the backdrop of the external threats that

intensified from the middle of the 11th century. Second, the colossal volume of material accumulated in the process of understanding the nature of relations between the Russian land and its foreign policy adversaries since the second half of the 13th century. In both cases, the influence of the method of transmitting the message — Old Testament analogies tending to directly identify the Russian land with ancient Israel — was not direct, but indirect. The medium was Russian religious literature — "one of the oldest and most diverse in post-classical Europe" (Petrov, 2008). The religious and philosophical idea of "Rus' — the New Israel", which took shape under the decisive influence of special international conditions, became for the Russian state the spiritual and intellectual core of its "consciousness of independence and special interests" (Presnyakov, 1918: 2).

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Русь — Новый Израиль: medium и message средневековой русской политической философии

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Статья посвящена вопросу влияния религиозно-политической концепции «Русь — Новый Израиль» на общественное сознание России и ее внешнеполитическую культуру. Эта концепция на протяжении нескольких веков русской истории играла ведущую роль в осмыслении и концептуализации основных политических событий в русских летописях и религиозной литературе. Таким образом, имело место влияние отождествления Русской земли с древним Израилем на образ мышления, восприятие и интерпретацию этих событий, формирование национальной внешнеполитической культуры. Влияние концепции «Русь — Новый Израиль» является доминирующим как способ передачи сообщения (medium) и, таким образом, становится сообщением (message) как таковым. Это позволяет предположить, что именно этот религиозно-политический конструкт стал на ранних этапах развития российского государства важнейшим способом его самоидентификации в окружающем мире.

Ключевые слова: политическая культура, самосознание, средневековая история России, богоизбранность, Русская земля, Новый Израиль, русские земли.

International Justice in Social Doctrines of the Orthodox Church

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The article considers international justice as a political issue in social doctrines of the Orthodox Church. The author focuses on the social doctrines of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Russian Orthodox Church and on the social-political provisions of the documents adopted by the Council of Crete (2016). Social doctrines of the Orthodox Church mention some issues that can be attributed to the discursive field of political theology. Thus, international justice is a part of the Orthodox Church concept of contemporary international relations and global human challenges. Such social doctrines state the impossibility of achieving international justice due to the sinful depravity of human nature. This human sinfulness determines all types of global discrimination not only against individuals or social groups (religious, racial, national, gender, etc.), but also against peoples and states. In social doctrines, war is defined as an unacceptable way to solve world problems. Orthodox churches call for fair international relations based on Christian values, thereby criticizing the existing world order based on the ideology of liberal globalism and secularism. Documents of the Council of Crete directly state that true peace (international justice) is possible only after the universal triumph of Christian principles. In conclusion, the author summarizes the features of the Orthodox Church approach to international justice and political theology.

Keywords: Orthodox Church, social doctrine, political theology, Council of Crete, Patriarchate of Constantinople, Russian Orthodox Church, international justice

Introduction

'The return of religion' to social-political sciences (Shtyokl, 2011) has revived the research interest in political theology in the contemporary academic discourse. However, Alexander Filippov rightly defines the term 'political theology' as conventional and requiring clarification for further scientific institutionalization (Filippov, 2019: 70). In this article, political theology is understood as a theological discipline (a part of the Orthodox Church theology) explicating the religious interpretation of the 'political' in its broadest sense[1]. Today religious studies admit the problematic nature of any universal definition of religion and prefer to discuss the diversity of world religious traditions with their unique worldviews, thereby emphasizing the confessional specificity of political ideology, which determines the task of clarifying the subject area of political theology (in its confessional diversity) for its further scientific research (Assman, 2022: 53–54).

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1. The features of the contemporary Orthodox Church political theology are perfectly described in the works of P. Kalaitzidēs (2012), V. Makrides (2021), A. Papanikolaou (2012) and K. Shtyokl (2021).

The study of social doctrines of the Orthodox Church allows to identify those political issues that are of interest to researchers of the confessional political-theological discourse. I support the Russian religious-studies distinction between 'social teaching' and 'social doctrine': the former "consists of both church provisions and works of numerous church and parachurch authors who are not always united in their views"; while the latter is "a set of the church official documents" (Ovsienko, 2001: 3). Thus, the article considers the official position of Orthodox churches on such an important concept as 'international justice'.

According to the Protestant theologian Paul Tillich, 'justice', like 'love' and 'power', is a basic concept for philosophy and theology. These concepts "are pertinent for every doctrine of man, they appear in decisive places of psychological and sociological treatises, they are central in ethics and jurisprudence, and they cannot be avoided even in mental and bodily medicine" (Tillich, 2015: 9). Moreover, international justice remains a relevant scientific issue due to the current international activities of states: the universal law of justice embodies the highest interests of a particular state rather than of the entire international community (Maritain, 2000: 177). Thus, the importance of the religious interpretation of global problems of our time, especially under 'the globalization of religion'[2], determines the necessity to consider issues of international justice as a part of confessional social doctrines or political theologies.

In the Orthodox Church, two autocephalous churches have social doctrines — the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Russian Orthodox Church. In addition, there are social documents adopted by the Council of Crete in 2016. As canonical territories of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, of the Russian Orthodox Church and of some autocephalous churches that took part in the Council of Crete do not coincide with state borders[3], I insist on the importance of the Orthodox Church understanding of international justice not only for research but also for practice.

International justice in the documents of the Council of Crete

The Council of Crete, i.e., officially "the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church", was held on June 16–27, 2016 on the Island of Crete (Greece). 10 out of 14 mutually recognized Orthodox churches (Patriarchate of Constantinople, Patriarchate of Alexandria, Patriarchate of Jerusalem, Serbian, Romanian, Cypriot, Hellenic, Albanian and Polish Orthodox Churches, Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia) sent their representative to the Council, while the Patriarchate of Antioch and the Russian, Georgian

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2. See, e.g., P. Beyer (1994), H. Casanova (1994), R. Robertson (2000), whose works present sociological concepts of 'the globalization of religions'.

3. For instance, according to the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church (2017), its jurisdiction "covers all Orthodox Christians on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church: Russian Federation, Ukraine, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Azerbaijan Republic, Republic of Kazakhstan, People's Republic of China, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvian Republic, Lithuanian Republic, Mongolia, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Republic of Uzbekistan, Estonian Republic, Japan, and all those Orthodox Christians who voluntarily join the Russian Orthodox Church in other countries" (Moskow Patriarchate, 2017).

and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches refused to participate. The official documents of the Council of Crete not only consider various issues of the intra-church life but also present the Orthodox churches' position on current problems affecting human life in the contemporary world. According to the Encyclical Letter of the Council, "the Church does not involve herself with politics in the narrow sense of the term; her witness, however, is essentially political insofar as it expresses concern for man and his spiritual freedom" (Council of Crete, 2018b: 23), which determines both intra-church and social significance of the Council's documents.

The issues of international justice are mentioned in the following documents of the Council of Crete: the Message of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (Council of Crete, 2018b), the Encyclical of Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (Council of Crete, 2018c), the Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today's World (Council of Crete, 2018a). These documents state that the contemporary world is full of injustice, and its clear expression is various types of discrimination. The Orthodox Church "today finds herself confronted by extreme or even provocative expressions of the ideology of secularization, inherent in political, cultural and social developments." (Council of Crete, 2018b: 17). Moreover, today's world is characterized by the spread of the "contemporary ideology of globalization" (Council of Crete, 2018b: 22), which is the main cause of upheavals and leads to social injustice on a global scale. The ideology of consumerism and secular globalization contributes to the loss of peoples' spiritual roots. It is especially noted that the contemporary media often become conductors of the ideology of liberal globalism and are used not to unite but to manipulate peoples.

Secularization and globalization determine a false connection between human progress and the task of raising living standards (economic development to the detriment of spiritual values). Orthodox churches call to "to promote a new constructive synergy with the secular state and its rule of law within the new framework of international relations" (Council of Crete, 2018b: 24). This new framework should be based on the preservation of human dignity and rights, which would guarantee social justice on the national and global levels. However, human rights should not be reduced to the arrogant deification of individual rights or ignore the social aspect of freedom; it is especially emphasized that one of the basic human rights is religious freedom. Concerning the contemporary international injustice, the Council of Crete mentions such its manifestations as violence and armed conflicts, persecution, expulsion and murder of religious minorities, human trafficking, violation of the rights and freedoms of individuals and peoples, forced change of religion. The situation in the Middle East, Africa and Ukraine was stressed: the Council's participants expressed hope that peace and justice would prevail in these regions.

'The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today's World' states that the Church strives for peace, justice, freedom, brotherhood and love between peoples and for the elimination of racial and other types of discrimination (Council of Crete, 2018a: 84). The Church is to ensure not only a critical understanding of contemporary injustice, but also the recognition that real peace and justice are possible only if the Gospel principles are fol-

lowed in international relations. Orthodox churches argue that peace and justice must play a central role in the life of peoples. According to the Council of Crete, "the peace of Christ is the ripe fruit of the restoration of all things in Him, the revelation of the human person's dignity and majesty as an image of God, the manifestation of the organic unity in Christ between humanity and the world, the universality of the principles of peace, freedom, and social justice, and ultimately the blossoming of Christian love among people and nations of the world. The reign of all these Christian principles on earth gives rise to authentic peace" (Council of Crete, 2018a: 90).

The Mission defines peace and justice as synonyms and emphasizes that both are possible only if people make efforts to fulfill the commandments of Christ. Therefore, injustice, including international, is considered a result of human sin, spiritual illness. One of the extreme manifestations of injustice is war and various conflicts; the Orthodox Church welcomes cooperation of peoples and states for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In addition, the Mission notes that the contemporary environmental crisis is a consequence of economic injustice which is determined by the consumer perception of nature. The Council of Crete suggests an alternative — an Orthodox-Christian model of the international unity of mankind, which can put an end to the existing global injustice, i.e., the Ecumenical Orthodox Church based on the equal honor of its constituent parts — autocephalous local churches (Council of Crete, 2018b: 23).

International justice in the social doctrine of the Patriarchate of Constantinople

The basis of the social doctrine of the Patriarchate of Constantinople is 'For the Life of the World. Towards a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church', which was written by the special theological commission created in 2017 on the initiative of Bartholomew, Patriarch of Constantinople (Archdiocese of America, 2020). One of its authors is Aristotle Papanikolaou — an American theologian, who developed an original concept of the Orthodox political theology, including the issue of justice (Papanikolaou, 2012). 'For the Life of the World' presents not only the understanding of the social-political problems of our time by the Patriarchate of Constantinople but also an example of the further explication of the provisions of the Council of Crete. Moreover, authors of the document and the hierarchy of the Patriarchate of Constantinople hope for its pan-Orthodox recognition as a guide to social activities of Orthodox Christians all over the world.

The document does not have a special section on international justice, but relevant issues are considered in the sections 'The Church in the Public Sphere', 'Poverty, Wealth, and Civil Justice', 'War, Peace, and Violence', 'Orthodoxy and Human Rights' (Archdiocese of America, 2020). Foreword states that the Church is ill-prepared for facing the challenges of pluralism and globalization, individualism and secularization; therefore, the document aims at providing guidelines for Christians in the contemporary world. Introduction emphasizes that "the world we inhabit is a fallen order, broken and darkened, enslaved to death and sin, tormented by violence and injustice" (Archdiocese of

America, 2020), and one of the tasks of the Orthodox Christian is the fight against evil and injustice.

Part II 'The Church in the Public Sphere' defines today's racial and national injustice in the framework of international justice and reasons for its violation. This part combines issues of justice and legal order: according to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, today's laws do not correspond to God's plan; however, Christians must support the existing legal system as ensuring certain basic agreements, which contribute to the elimination of injustices. The Patriarchate of Constantinople believes that the language of law is necessary to preserve and develop social justice and argues that the contemporary democratic system tends to follow the principles of the common good and justice; therefore, the Church can use the Orthodox concept 'symphony' to promote these principles in society and the state.

Part III 'The Course of Human Life' focuses on various forms of discrimination in the contemporary world as manifestations of international injustice. This part pays special attention to sexual discrimination emphasizing that the Orthodox Church must resist all forms of discrimination against one's neighbors regardless of their sexual orientation.

Part IV 'Poverty, Wealth, and Civil Justice' describes forms of social injustice and civil inequality on a global scale, including in developed countries, such as poverty, lack of access to education, medicine or legal protection, etc. According to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, such social injustices are often the result of racial or class discrimination.

Part V 'War, Peace, and Violence' states that all peoples live by the law of aggression — either hidden or open. The contemporary world is dominated by violence, which means that injustice permeates the system of international relations too. The Patriarchate of Constantinople clearly opposes all forms of violence and welcomes peace but not as a truce imposed by brute force. Peace implies restoration of the created world in its true form. The Church admits that some situations justify the use of violence, but the duty of any legitimate authority is to promote peace between people and nations. The Patriarchate of Constantinople does not accept the just war theory of the Catholic theology (Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria, etc.) arguing that war is always a manifestation of evil. Nevertheless, this does not mean a pacifist attitude towards war or the Orthodox Church's ban on Christians' service in the police or army.

Part VII 'Orthodoxy and Human Rights' states that the contemporary concept of human rights was once a part of the Christian tradition and today can be used, among other things, for ensuring international justice. Human rights are primary and inviolable compared to the rights of classes, governments or power institutions. Orthodox Christians should exercise human rights in their countries of residence and use the concept of human rights to establish peace between countries and peoples. The Patriarchate of Constantinople supports the global practice of protecting and promoting human rights for ensuring universal justice.

Conclusion emphasizes that in the contemporary world, there is a common idea of the neutral and universal public sphere without any religious content, i.e., religion is considered a private matter not to be mentioned in discussions about the common good and

justice. The Patriarchate of Constantinople considers this idea incorrect and unacceptable: contemporary secularism turns into a new ideology with its own concept of goodness and justice. However, contemporary international injustice proves the impossibility of eliminating all forms of discrimination with the secular approach alone. Religious faith determines all aspects of our life, including social and political views; therefore, the position of the Orthodox Church on various social-political issues of our time should be taken into account in specific solutions to eliminate international injustice. Moreover, the position of the Patriarchate of Constantinople on international justice echoes the position of Bartholomew, Patriarch of Constantinople, on many issues of the social doctrine (Bartholomew, Ecumenical Patriarch, 2008: 248–356).

International justice and social doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church

The social doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church was introduced in 2000, when the Bishops' Council of the Moscow Patriarchate adopted 'The Basis of the Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church' (Moscow Patriarchate, 2000). This doctrine's further development can be traced in such documents as 'The Russian Orthodox Church's Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights', 'The Position of the Russian Orthodox Church on the Current Environmental Problems', 'The Russian Orthodox Church's Position on the Reform of the Family Law and Problems of Juvenile Justice", etc.

The key document for understanding international justice in this political theology is 'The Basis of the Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church', in particular its sections 'War and Peace' (Moscow Patriarchate, 2000: 46–51), 'Christian Ethics and Secular Law' (Moscow Patriarchate, 2000: 26–32), 'International Relation. Problems of Globalization and Secularism' (Moscow Patriarchate, 2000: 97–105). The Basis states that the Christian's main goal is salvation, but this does not imply a passive position in the social-political life. Therefore, the Orthodox soteriology pays special attention to good deeds for fulfilling Christ's commandment to love one's neighbor (John 3:23).

Concerning international justice, the Moscow Patriarchate emphasizes that its basis is the golden rule: "*So* in *everything*, *do* to *others* what *you would* have *them do* to *you*, for this sums up the *Law* and the *Prophets*" (Matthew 7:12). The idea of moral truth in international relations presupposes the possibility of using force against other states and peoples to restore justice. The Moscow Patriarchate recognizes the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity as the basis of international relations but argues that all human regulations are relative before God: history proves the fragility of state borders and the contradiction between the principle of state's territorial integrity and the people's desire for state independence. Thus, the Russian Orthodox Church welcomes voluntary unification of countries and peoples into a single organism and regrets destruction of multi-ethnic states. The Basis notes that the collapse of some Eurasian states led to attempts to create mono-nation states, which were the cause of bloody conflicts in Eastern Europe.

The Russian Orthodox Church states that "war is evil; just as the evil in man in general, war is caused by the sinful abuse of the God-given freedom" (Moscow Patriarchate,

2000: 46), but allows participation in war for protecting neighbors and restoring violated justice — when war is an undesirable but necessary means. The Russian Orthodox Church believes that today it is impossible to distinguish an aggressive war from a defensive one; therefore, the question of supporting or condemning military actions needs to be considered carefully in each specific conflict.

According to the Moscow Patriarchate, contemporary political-legal globalization has not eliminated international injustice. The Russian Orthodox Church emphasizes imperfection of the contemporary law compared to the perfect divine regulations. Therefore, if human law rejects a divine norm and replaces it with the opposite, this law ceases to be law and becomes iniquity. In the contemporary world, due to secularization, human rights are defined as individual rights without any connection with God; however, law is to help man to fulfill one's main calling — to become like God and to fulfill one's duties to people, family, state, nation and other human communities.

The existing global injustice is supported by the contemporary system of international relations, in which international organizations play a huge role. They were designed to ensure the interaction of peoples and states on principles of universal justice bit often "become instruments for the unfair domination of strong over weak countries, rich over poor, the technologically and informationally developed over the rest. They also may practice double standards by applying international law in the interests of more influential states" (Moscow Patriarchate, 2000: 101). The Church stands for real equality of states and their full-fledged participation in resolving conflicts, i.e., decisions without the state's consent can be made only under aggression or massacre in the country.

The contemporary system of international relations is based on the priority of secular values over religious ones. The Moscow Patriarchate considers this a cause of the existing international injustice; thereby, the social doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church "seeks to assert Christian values in the process of decision-making on the most important public issues on both national and international levels. She strives for the recognition of the legality of religious worldview as a basis for socially significant action (including those taken by the state) and as an essential factor which should influence the development (amendment) of international law and the work of international organizations" (Moscow Patriarchate, 2000: 104–105). The existing injustice on the national and international levels makes the Moscow Patriarchate interact with states, various public organizations and individuals, even if they do not consider themselves a part of the Christian tradition, — to achieve peace, harmony and prosperity.

Concluding remarks

The results of the analysis of the issues of international justice in social doctrines of the Orthodox Church can be summarized as follows. First, they all present a theocentric understanding of justice: God is absolute justice in terms of cataphatic theology; thereby, His laws should be the basis of fair international relations. Only God is the "omnipotent lawgiver" (Schmitt, 2016: 34), His regulations are universal and binding, and the politi-

cal-theological discourse receives legitimacy only from God. Therefore, the contemporary international and national legislation is declared imperfect due to being unable to ensure international justice.

Second, the main cause of injustice is human freedom, i.e., the ability to choose between good and evil. All social doctrines emphasize the impossibility of international justice due to the sinful depravity of human nature. Thus, international injustice is an ethical-anthropological problem rather than a problem of institutional or legal imperfections, and its solution is the key to eliminating injustice on a global scale. Sin is the cause of all types of global discrimination of individuals and groups, peoples and states; and war is an unacceptable way to solve world problems.

Third, justice is a part of the church's soteriological mission: social doctrines of two Patriarchates (Constantinople and Moscow) state the possibility of resistance to evil (injustice), i.e., justify the right to civil disobedience: "the Church remains loyal to the state, but God's commandment to fulfil the task of salvation in any situation and under any circumstances is above this loyalty. If the authority forces Orthodox believers to apostatize from Christ and His Church and to commit sinful and spiritually harmful actions, the Church should refuse to obey the state" (Moscow Patriarchate, 2000: 20).

Fourth, social doctrines identify several levels of international injustice — individuals, social groups (national, religious, gender, etc.), political institutions/states (international relations). The multi-level nature of injustice does not negate the universal (Christian) ethics as a necessary condition for overcoming it, primarily from the position of the egalitarian norm (in the Christian sense).

Fifth, social doctrines of the Orthodox Church with their specific political discourses raise the question of institutionalizing the political-theological imaginary, the question about specific mechanisms for implementing doctrinal provisions, and even the broader question of including the Orthodox political theology in the contemporary political space. For instance, the Council of Crete states that the system of international relations should follow the organization model of the Orthodox Church as a community of autocephalous churches. However, history provides numerous examples of conflicts between different Orthodox churches (the latest one is the breakdown of communication between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate of Constantinople after the latter granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine), which indicates the controversial nature of the proposed model for establishing justice on a global scale. Moreover, Orthodox churches call for fair international relations based on Christian values, thereby criticizing the world order based on the ideology of liberal globalism and secularism. The documents of the Council of Crete directly state that true peace (international justice) is possible only after the universal triumph of Christian principles, i.e., after overcoming the spiritual crisis of the humanity.

Thus, the Orthodox Church understanding of international justice is based exclusively on its soteriological mission, which eliminates the state-legal meaning of international justice. The Orthodox political theology is conceptually different from the 'legal'

political theology of Carl Schmitt (Kondurov, 2019: 56–62), which questions the heuristic potential and theoretical-methodological boundaries of political theology (as academic discipline) in the contemporary scientific discourse.

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Проблема международной справедливости в социальных доктринах православного христианства

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В статье рассматривается проблема международной справедливости в контексте политической проблематики социальных доктрин православного христианства. Основное содержание исследования составляет анализ социальных доктрин Константинопольского патриархата и Русской православной церкви, а также социально-политических положений документов, принятых на Критском соборе (2016). В социальных доктринах православного христианства затрагиваются вопросы, которые можно отнести к дискурсивному полю политической теологии. В их число входит и проблема международной справедливости,

которая рассматривается в рамках православного понимания современных международных отношений и глобальных проблем, стоящих перед современным человеком. Общим для всех социальных документов является постулирование невозможности достижения международной справедливости ввиду греховной испорченности человеческой природы. Следствием греха является глобальная дискриминация не только человека или социальных групп на основании какого-либо принципа (религиозного, расового, национального, языкового, гендерного и др.), но и целых народов и государств. Война рассматривается как недопустимый способ решения мировых проблем. Вместе с тем православные церкви призывают к построению справедливых международных отношений на основе христианских ценностей, критикуя, тем самым, существующий миропорядок, основанный на идеологии либерального глобализма и секуляризма. В документах Критского собора прямо говорится о том, что подлинный мир (понимаемый в рамках международной справедливости) возможен только после вселенского торжества христианских принципов. В заключении конкретизируется проблемное поле православного подхода к проблеме международной справедливости и формулируется вывод о специфике православной политической теологии.

Ключевые слова: православное христианство, социальная доктрина, политическая теология, Критский собор, Константинопольский патриархат, Русская православная церковь, международная справедливость

Eschatological Conspiracy Theories: Models and Ways for Identifying Apocalyptic Semantics and Syntax*

BOOK REVIEW: SHNIRELMAN V. A. (2022). *KATECHON. FROM APOCALYPSE TO CONSPIRACY THEORIES*, MOSCOW; SAINT PETERSBURG: NESTOR–HISTORY, 424 P.

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> *Conspiracy against Russia*
> *Not in the protocols of Zion,*
> *Not in foreign omnipotence,*
> *Not in hostile obstacles.*
> *Conspiracy against Russia —*
> *In the heart that despises God,*
> *When sins defeat*
> *Sacrifice, sincerity, faith...*
> Archpriest A. Zaitsev (2011). Conspiracy against Russia

> *...The frock coat was innocent,*
> *beautifully tailored, well sewn...*
> *its owner was an anti-Semite*
> *and shouted about Zion;*
> *tugged at the skirts of his frock coat,*
> *which was sewn long ago by the old laws*
> *and by the Jewish tailor — old Solomon,*
> *and now the owner was a member of the Central Com-*
> *mittee, which seemed like forever,*
> *but only for the frock coat...*
> V. Normann (1992). The Ballad about the Frock Coat

According to the abstract, the book is intended "for a wide range of scientists... and everyone interested in ethnography, ethnology, social and cultural anthropology, history, sociology and other branches of humanities" (p. 2). The sociologist (it is difficult for me to think about other 'type' of reading) too concerned about disciplinary boundaries may be 'hurt' by the definition of sociology as a 'branch of humanities', but the book is not intended for a 'disciplinary purist'. It is an excellent example of interdisciplinary analysis, in which approaches and elements of different sciences are used to reconstruct the core

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of a hybrid-eclectic "conspiracy theory that combines geopolitics, Christian eschatology and esotericism with Soviet legacy", and this core is "the Orthodox-church apocalyptic ideas about the last times and Russia' role as a katechon" (p. 2). The book is full of factual data, reflects the author's attitude (sometimes ironic and even sarcastic) and reminds of a fascinating non-fiction investigation into the activities of conspiracy theorists (the text can be perceived in other ways, but it is certainly interesting even for the "uninitiated").

At first sight, the structure of the book may seem unbalanced: three chapters — "Conspiracy Concepts: From Apocalypse to World Conspiracy", "Nesta Webster and the 'Masonic Conspiracy'" and "Western Conspiracy in Russia" — consist of 80 pages, while the remaining 300 pages make the fourth chapter "Russian Conspiracy Theories" divided into 15 paragraphs. However, this imbalance is seeming: there is no Introduction (only Conclusion[1] and Index, References are presented as 2000 footnotes[2]), and the first three chapters serve as an extended preface/introduction to the main part. At second sight, it may seem that the author presents a set of illustrative cases in the framework of eschatological conspiracy theories, such as the magazine *Young Guard*, murder of the royal family, neo-pagans[3], A. G. Dugin, and so on. However, the book provides numerous an-

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1. Conclusion summarizes the ideas of all sections, so it is enough to understand the argumentation and further directions of the author's research if the reader for some reasons cannot read the whole book, although I would highly recommend it.

2. The reader may catch himself thinking that the huge number of footnotes shows not only the author's enormous work (in another book, *Limits of Tolerance: Ideology and Practice of the New Racism*, Notes and References consist of about 200 pages each) but also that everything said about political theology/ideology/eschatology is the result of working with sources rather than of 'harmful and dangerous' fantasies.

3. See: *Neopaganism throughout Eurasia* (2001). Comp. by V. Shnirelman, Moscow: Biblical Theological Institute of Saint Andrew the Apostle. Neopaganism is a "new Russian ideology", but "Russian neopagans are not a purely religious movement; they raise social, environmental and ethical issues, as was typical for many sects in the 19th — 20th centuries... Russian neo-paganism should be defined as movements that aim at constructing a 'true Russian religion' that would fully satisfy contemporary needs of the Russian society and the Russian state. Russian neo-paganism seems to be a national religion artificially created by urban intelligentsia from fragments of ancient, pre-Christian, local beliefs and rituals to 'revive national spirituality'. This means not so much the revival of religion as constructing an ideological basis for a new social-political community under modernization. At the same time, religion is often understood as ideology: it is assumed that the more united the national community the more it is based on the national ideology that appeals to the behests of ancestors and to 'uniqueness'… And such a 'Russian religion' should be free from any foreign influences. A certain role in the development of neo-paganism is played by the rejection of the modern industrial civilization with its barbaric attitude to nature and its social inequality. But neopagans are even more concerned about preserving the traditional cultural environment threatened by the leveling tendencies of globalization... Such an attitude determines the desire for a radical revision of the Russian history and even of the concept of 'Russianness'... Since in the last millennium the development of the Russian people has been connected with Orthodoxy, which neo-pagans resolutely reject as a foreign and even harmful element, they see nothing positive in the Russian history of this era. They argue that the most glorious pages of the past belong to earlier antiquity, and this puts them in a rather difficult position. First, specialists do not know about the Russian people in the early Middle Ages, not to mention previous centuries and millennia. Second, historical sources about the Slavs in the pre-Kievan period, including their religious beliefs, are extremely scarce and fragmentary" (pp. 8–10). The history of Russian neo-paganism from its origins to the present, including the features of neo-pagan approaches in the political and religious spheres, formation of neo-pagan communities and their unions in the last twenty years and other issues (except of neo-pagan myths, beliefs, rituals, community life and gender relations), are presented in the book: Shnirelman V. A. (2012). *Russian*

alytical typologies 'within' the contemporary, apocalyptically focused conspiracy theories — consistently (often in chronological order), following the rules of the scientific method in its social-humanitarian version, with carefully selected and examined examples[4].

In the first, introductory part, the author clarifies the terms and subject field of the book: "Christian eschatology, developed by theologians for centuries, created a colorful[5] picture of social decay and general decline on the eve of the end of the world, which was impossible to prevent as everything was destined by divine providence... But no one knew the timing. Therefore, there have always been people trying to discover visible and invisible signs of the approach of the Apocalypse... to decode the complex symbols of Holy Scripture... who exactly was meant, how and when these forces were to act and how they could be resisted. In the religious atmosphere of the Middle Ages, there was little choice — only the enemies of Christianity, and all suspicions fell on the Jews[6]... At the turn of the Modern Age... religion lost its former authority... Revolutions, decline of the traditional patriarchal way of life, nationalism, transition to mass politics... new synthetic religions... and all sorts of secular organizations... created the impression of chaos that was impossible to understand... The era of globalization multiplied these fears, exacerbating the feeling of helplessness in the face of possible total control of some invisible powerful forces... Stereotypes that had developed for years [and even centuries] came to rescue and today are examined for the presence of a certain archetype... The traditional narrative about the 'end of the world' and the coming of the Antichrist fit perfectly with the concept of a conspiracy" (pp. 4–5).

As in all other sections, the author refers to similar observations of researchers who noted "the blurred line between folk eschatology and reactionary, secular conspiracy theories"[7], "the similarity of conspiracy theories with belief in witchcraft"[8] (p. 6), etc. The second distinctive feature of the book is the rejection of 'causal' interpretation of the

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Native Faith. Neopaganism and Nationalism in contemporary Russia, Moscow: Biblical Theological Institute of Saint Andrew the Apostle.

4. The author examines Russian eschatological conspiracy theories no less carefully than, for instance, cattle breeding. See: Shnirelman (2020). *Origins of Cattle Breeding: A Cultural-Historical Phenomenon*, Moscow: Publishing House "Librocom".

5. Apparently, colorfulness of Bosch's "The Last Judgment" type.

6. And not only on the Jews, judging by the number of crusades and their justification by church hierarchs, but those enemies were more obvious and distant.

7. Here and further, the authors and works are not mentioned — the reader can see the selection of 'experts' and the interpretation of their positions in the book. The review aims at identifying the 'tools' for creating this *Compendium on Contemporary Russian Eschatological Conspiracy Theories* (based on the author's previous works) in the spirit of the *Compendium on General Sociology* by V. Pareto (Ed. by G. Farina. University of Minnesota Press, 1980) and its 'glossary', some 'articles' of which the reader would prefer to be expanded.

8. The author refers to the work by L. G. Ionin (2005). New Magical Age (*Logos*, no. 5, pp. 23–40), "a part of which is globalization that causes a conservative reaction of local cultures, similar to primitive magic" (p. 6). In another book, Ionin notes such "a result of the postmodern obsession with identity" as the emergence of totalitarian sects, or 'psychosects': people become members of such sects not by birth but by choice. See: Ionin L. G. (2013). *Revolt of Minorities*. Moscow; Saint Petersburg: University Book, p. 168.

rapid development of conspiracy theories — due to the apostasy-apocalyptic sentiments in the early 20th century: "apocalyptic sentiments do not always produce conspiracy theories — additional incentives are needed… A powerful impetus for conspiracy theories was given by the consequences of the World War I which led to the collapse of thousand-year-old empires and to the Bolshevik Revolution… Conspiracy theories tend to rethink the image of the enemy according to the era and to combine various phobias despite a striking constancy of the enemy's characteristics… this is a change in ideology without a change in the way of thinking… only the names of conspirators change, while the main content of the conspiracy myth remains the same" (p. 7).

The third feature of the book is that it evokes associations in the reader's subject field. Thus, if conspiracy theories are similar to mythology not in content but in functions, the reader may remember the idea of V.Ya. Propp[9] about the functionally same set of characters in fairy tales of different peoples, the works of T. van Dijk about discursive strategies[10], the critical discourse analysis developed by N. Fairclough[11] (interpretation of the center of the world conspiracy and its name depends on the dominant conspiracy concepts and objective social-economic and (geo)political realities), and general models for constructing the image of the enemy, including in the field of international relations.

After defining conspiracy theories as "a secular version of the Apocalypse, which preserves many ideas about it, developing for centuries within the Christian worldview" (p. 8), the author systematizes the substantive and functional characteristics of conspiracy theories, referring to numerous fundamental and applied, scientific and non-scientific works:

- this is a special discourse that always focuses on a community (racial, national, political, economic, etc.), only explanations of its danger differ;
- this discourse is based on pseudoscientific marginal ideas, aggressively criticizes academic science (as if hiding some invaluable knowledge from people), undermines trust in official institutions and their representatives as manipulators, and relies only on previous conspiracy works;
- this discourse is not a prerogative of authoritarian or democratic regimes — both use it to create an image of the enemy in a situation of social disappointment or growing social pathologies (a gap between formal legal equality and real power, an increase in the number of well-educated people that cannot find a worthy place in society, etc.), but regimes' tools differ (the growth of the secularized, rationalistic component to the detriment of the esoteric and eschatological, a shift to the field of mass culture, etc.).

To flourish conspiracy theories need: "archaized population with consciousness deeply rooted in religious images, which is not ready to perceive a contradictory picture of reality and necessarily complex explanations; political elites that want to preserve such con-

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9. See: Propp V. (2022). *Morphology of the Folktale. The Historical Roots of Fairy Tales*, Moscow: CoLibri.
10. See e.g.: Van Dijk T. A. (2008). *Discourse and Power,* Palgrave.
11. See e.g.: Fairclough N. (1995). *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, London; New York: Longman.

sciousness and are paranoid about losing power due to a 'conspiracy', which makes elites live in the mode of conspiracy theories and 'special operations'; finally, mass psychosis and frustrations which facilitate the consumption of explanations produced by conspiracy theories" (p. 13). The fourth feature of the book is that even if the author does not provide examples, they come to the reader's mind without prompting. Thus, in this case, one may think of the contemporary Chechen society with the legitimate[12] archaic norms of Sharia, tribe social structure and 'culture of apology' (including 'special operations' to return fugitive sons/daughters of the Chechen people to the family by the republic's law enforcement agencies from any Russian regions) for wrongdoings the 'delinquency' of which is explained by the 'departure from traditions'. As for mass psychosis and frustration, the coronavirus pandemic gave rise to an infodemic (described in the last section of the book) that shook the already undermined faith in science and in social orientation of governments, and then military conflicts strengthened the conviction of people (not fully recovered from the pandemic and the social-economic decline) in a conspiracy of political elites against the common man (both subjects of this confrontation have specific distinctive features in different countries and communities).

In the perception of conspiracy theories, the author identifies several fundamentally different approaches (pp. 13–15):

- "some authors develop such theories with passion, finding more and more 'secret conspiracies', and such works sometimes seem scientific or are published as adventure novels[13];

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12. Here are just two recent events that were widely covered by the Russian media and are difficult to imagine happening in any other Russian region. First, the apology of Russia's Minister of Education S. Kravtsov to the head of Chechnya R. Kadyrov for the "rude descriptions of nations that suffered Stalin's repressions" in the history textbook: Kravtsov visited Chechnya to report to Kadyrov on the changes made in the textbook. See e.g.: Khudyakova P., Ivanov F. Russia's Minister of Education Personally Showed the New History Textbook to the Head of Chechnya. 11.11.202. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/11/11/1005341-ministr-prosvescheniya. Second, Kadyrov's indignation that the children of his regional officials do not speak Chechen: the generation "that does not speak or think in Chechen has no future", so Kadyrov threatened such officials with dismissal from 'his team'. 08.11.2023. URL: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/08/11/2023/654b90179a794736ad220124. And these are relatively neutral events of recent weeks, during which Kadyrov's son took an interregional tour to collect high regional awards after his beating N. Zhuravel for burning the Koran.

13. The reader may remember movies based on the books of the same name by D. Brown: *The Da Vinci Code* presents a conspiracy of the Catholic Church against women (interpretations of the church conspiracy against the true teaching of Christ can be even more general, such as the concealment of the Gospel of Jesus in the movie "Stigmata" (1999), but Brown mentions the Gospel of Mary Magdalene); *Angels and Demons* presents a crime in the name of saving the traditional Catholic Church under the guise of an Illuminati conspiracy; *Inferno* — a conspiracy to preserve humanity by radically reducing population with a pandemic of a new virus. The author considers the first movie's "fantasies about the connection of the Merovingians with Jesus Christ" the basis of the theory about "the conspiracy of the Roman Catholic Church that did not want to recognize the descendants of Jesus and deliberately belittled the role of his wife Mary Magdalene from the position of gender discrimination". Proponents of this theory, "based on the apocrypha, new readings of the Gospel and the Qumran manuscripts, called for the restoration of justice — reconstruction of the true Christian teaching and of its true history, which were completely distorted by the church" (p. 79).

- other authors try to conduct a serious scientific analysis of conspiracy theories but assess this phenomenon differently" (irrational paranoid thinking, marginal phenomenon, collective myths or rational political strategies);
- the third group considers "conspiracies as a kind of a game of imagination, which is regarded with irony"[14] (especially the utopian desire of conspiracy theories to eliminate contradictions and conflicts by discovering some hidden truth);
- the fourth group "justifies conspiracy theories as a special philosophical technique determined by a skeptical perception of the generally accepted paradigm of causality set by the Enlightenment, and calls on researchers to focus on clarifying reasons for the popularity of conspiracy thinking and on the social function of conspiracy theories... that make us think seriously about the sources of our knowledge and beliefs" (in this interpretation conspiracy theories are of interest to sociology of knowledge);
- the fifth group "tries to formally distance from conspiracy theories and allows its criticism... but blindly repeats all main arguments of conspiracy theorists".

Before 'classifying' conspiracy theorists, the author identifies their features[15] — positive in terms of intentions but negative in terms of their realization:

- "all conspiracy theorists consider themselves patriots and develop their concepts based on their understanding of the interests of their states and peoples; therefore, such concepts have a pronounced national character" (p. 15);
- "conspiracy theorists appeal not to reason but to emotions and faith[16]; therefore, they are illegible in facts and do not disdain fakes" (pp. 15–16), creating "a kind of bricolage in which heterogeneous and sometimes incompatible elements (religious, esoteric, political, pseudoscientific, etc.) are taken out of context and presented in a variety of combinations" (p. 16), or "dubious/illegal parallels are drawn with the present time" (p. 44);
- conspiracy theorists publish lengthy lists of 'secret organizations' and their members "to make their ideas credible and persuasive"; "they use facts or interpretations that cannot be verified, and if scientists try to prove their dubiousness, these scientists are accused of being a part of a conspiracy" (p. 26);
- conspiracy theorists make guesses based "not on strict documentary evidence but on the taken out of context individual ideas of people of different competences, which does not lead to an unambiguous interpretation" (p. 47);

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14. It seems to be an irony in the spirit of the last three novels by V. Pelevin — *Journey to Eleusis* (2023), *TRANSHUMANISM INC.* (2022) and *KGBT+* (2021) — about the visually traditional Slavic but technologically controlled through implants (Russian) civilization.

15. In the spirit of G. Simmel's formal sociology, constructing a type of 'conspiracy theorist' (adherent/follower/apologist of conspiracy theories).

16. In M. Weber's terms, this would be a value-rational action that may shift rather to a traditional (reference to ancestors) or affective (mass protests) one than to a rational purposeful action (since conspiracy theories' ways for achieving political goals are emotionally charged).

- conspiracy theorists prefer "an openly metaphysical approach — believe in the immutability of social structure and in the constancy of 'national character'" (p. 44);
- conspiracy theorists describe the "essence of conspiracy" with such terms as 'obviously' or 'probably'[17] (p. 51);
- conspiracy theorists alarmistically "scare us with the plans of the world elite... to establish a dictatorship under the abolition of national states and the creation of a global empire" by "reducing the world population by an artificially created famine and by provoking civil wars and genocides" (pp. 67–68);
- conspiracy theorists combine different techniques of 'information wars' — replace direct names with euphemisms, hyperbolize and spread fakes based on horror stories, and so on (p. 379);
- conspiracy theorists refer to apocalypticism (scenarios of victory over evil) but "find the source of evil outside, as some alien external forces ('global cabal', 'invisible hand'[18] and other versions of the 'enemy', whose archetype is revealed in the myth of the Antichrist) which often turn out to be minorities, 'strangers'. At the same time, minorities and marginalized racial groups use conspiracy theories as 'weapons of the weak' to resist discrimination and to stand for their rights" (p. 20).

Thus, conspiracy theories "artificially simplify the complex and dynamic nature of historical process" (nothing is accidental — everything goes according to a plan, everything is not what it seems), "exaggerate the connection between intentions and results of action", "strive to find a cause-and-effect connection even if there is none" (pp. 20–21), interpret the lack of evidence "in favor of a conspiracy, because people believe that 'conspirators' can skillfully 'hide ends in the water'" (p. 27). Today the set of conspiracy theorists' tools has expanded: technical means and the Internet provide them with platforms for disseminating their views on unprecedented scale and with incredible speed. While academic critics of conspiracy theories lost their former 'expert status'[19], since "younger generations brought up in the conditions of 'clip thinking' do not need any lengthy evidence[20]". Not only the youth does not believe professional historians and supports methods of 'alternative history', trusting 'revisionist historians' who as if "look for true causes of historical events by studying sources hidden from the general public" (p. 51) and successfully 'find' such sources (like in a Masonic conspiracy). Contemporary states

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17. For instance, the Russian media as if reveals a 'Western conspiracy' by noting the frequent use of 'highly likely' in the anti-Russian discourse.

18. The reader may wish to add 'market' — "the invisible hand of the market"; however, conspiracy theories emphasize not an unintentional self-regulation but that all market processes are determined by the interests of the owners of transnational corporations.

19. Which is certain, see e.g.: Nichols T. (2017). *The Death of Expertise: The Campaign Against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters*, New York: Oxford University Press; Heffernan M. (2021). *Uncharted: How Uncertainty Can Power Change*, London: Simon & Schuster; O'Neill C. (2016). *Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy*, New York: Crown Publishers, etc.

20. Which is doubtful: the youth is very heterogeneous, including in relation to conspiracy theories.

(especially authoritarian ones) support the popularity of conspiracy theories by "expanding the boundaries of secret information" (p. 16) and preserving the previous models for creating and disseminating conspiracy ideas — 'from above' (elites) and 'from below' (folk), although these models have national-historical and political specifics.

In the book, numerous classifications of various components of conspiracy theories serve as a context for the analysis of "the conspiracy theory that deals not with individual conspiracies but with a truly global conspiracy designed to introduce a 'new world order' and establish a 'powerful world government'... by fraudulently bringing and supporting religious dogmas, albeit in a modified form, in the 'age of reason'... which means... introduction of a single universal religion and abolition of Christianity together with traditional cultures and national states" (pp. 18–19). Today apocalyptic ideas take the form of allusions and implicit references, since these ideas acquire new discursive forms according to historical realities and political situation (for example, Jewish conspiracy — Masonic threat — conspiracy of international bankers). At the end of the first chapter, the author notes that he is interested in the versions of the super-conspiracy "popular in wider public circles of post-Soviet Russia, with an emphasis on the presence of anti-Semitism" (p. 29).

In fact, the further narrative is a thorough and predominantly chronological reconstruction (in different 'locations') of this super-conspiracy in its social, educational, scientific, political-ideological and practical contexts. Descriptions of the apocalyptic-conspiracy thinking reveal the fifth feature of the book — the author's desire to follow Weber's principle of value reference[21], although it is difficult not to notice the author's skeptical-tragic perception of the social and intellectual consequences of the dominance of eschatological conspiracy theories in the Russian public and media discourses. Sometimes the author fails to adhere to dispassionate statements[22] and emotionally expresses his perception of conspiracy theorists' works on the verge of scientific sarcasm:

- "used dubious sources, resorted to unfounded speculation and spread unreliable information"; "when he got to the essence of the 'conspiracy', his speech became sluggish and unsure" (p. 51);
- "claimed without necessary evidence" (p. 59);
- "described real facts but distorted them at his will and gave them a fantastic explanation so that they fit into his concept" (p. 60);
- "tried to present himself as an impartial historian but at times could not contain his emotions and branded the revolution with shame" (p. 62);
- "until his death was engaged in anti-Jewish and anti-Masonic journalism" (p. 64) [one cannot help wondering what people deliberately spend their lives on];

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21. See e.g.: Weber M. (1946). Science as a Vocation. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Eds. by H. H. Gerth, C. W. Mills), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 129–156; Goddard D. (1973). Max Weber and the Objectivity of Social Science. *History and Theory*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1–22.

22. For instance, in such a way: "books [about the occult powers/hobbies of A. Hitler and his connections with Satan] are full of contradictions and blatant misinterpretations of historical facts, which indicates either the frivolity/ignorance of authors or their deliberate misleading of readers" (p. 70).

- "tabloid works [about the Nazi cult with references to Gnosticism and Satanism] were based on rumors and speculation" (p. 68);
- "turned a literary fantasy into a proof of the sinister plans of some external forces preparing a terrible fate for Russians" (p. 116);
- "tried to attribute to the Jews all criminal acts that have ever happened in history — from the burning of late ancient Rome to the outbreak of the civil war in Russia" (p. 127);
- "declared as the main enemy of the contemporary society a strange mixture of Freemasons, occultists, Kabbalists, bankers and revolutionaries, acting together to destroy national states and establish the power of a world government"; "he repeated tales about Freemasons as god-fighters and Satanists preparing the coming of the Antichrist… for greater persuasiveness comparing the building of the European Parliament with the Tower of Babel" (p. 141);
- "at first he limited himself to the statement about the influence of the Jews and Zionists on Hitler, but then his imagination ran wild to the point that he declared… many leaders of the Third Reich … 'Jews by origin', presented Hitler as a 'Jewish messiah'… Nazism — as 'the heresy of Judaizers', anti-Semitism — as a result of the 'Jewish self-hatred'… and exposed the 'myth of the Holocaust'" (p. 148);
- his "book, full of errors and speculations, published by the well-known chauvinist publishing house", was based on the "centuries-old Judeophobic interpretation of the Gospel" (p. 301);
- "the author remains silent until the very last pages of his book, on which through gritted teeth he admits that China is a land empire… however, the reader gets a comprehensive idea of English intrigues, even of those that did not exist" (pp. 302–303);
- "the book received the blessing of the Orthodox elders and an afterword written by one of them; obviously out of modesty, these elders decided to remain anonymous" (p. 153);
- "in the early 2000s, national patriots became concerned about mass migrations[23] and imagined the death of Russia flooded by 'foreign invaders'" (p. 206);
- "it is difficult to understand who bothered whom — either minorities bothered indigenous peoples, or vice versa; however, it was clearly stated that things in the West were going very badly, and Russians had nothing to do there" (p. 207);

23. See: Shnirelman V. A. (2011). *Limits of Tolerance: Ideology and Practice of the New Racism*, Moscow: New Literary Observer, vols. I–II. The author considers the forms of new racism in the Russian society through the anti-immigrant discourse compared to conspiracy theories, migration realities and migrantphobic sentiments revealed by sociological surveys. The author identifies the following forms of new racism: essentialist cultural racism; self-preserving biological racism of the 'white man/race'; scientific racism of researchers "convinced of the existence of strictly defined, objective, unusually stable 'racial types' supposedly characterized by different 'mentalities'"; doctrinal racism "developed and popularized by writers, journalists and scientists that provide rational arguments for popular irrational stereotypes" (vol. II, p. 465); "doctrinal racism is typical for a part of the educated elite, and emotional unreflective racism is more typical for everyday thinking and is expressed in derogatory terms" (vol. II, p. 470).

- "sometimes he forgot about the Jews to declare that all power in the contemporary world belonged to Freemasons, but then he came to his senses and blamed at once 'Zionists, Illuminati and Freemasons' as if not knowing whom to prefer" (p. 313);
- "this 'political scientist' is known for very strange ideas about history and for an image of the present time, which is far from reality" (p. 379), and so on.

In the second chapter, the author reconstructs the general argumentation of conspiracy theorists based on the work of the "founder of the contemporary Western conspiracy theories" N. Webster. She explains the "evil activities of the Jews" as follows (pp. 30–32): they strive for world power and for destruction of Christianity; for this purpose, they develop and implement socialist ideas (in the 1920s), hiding behind them attempts to enslave all humanity ('goyim') which they hate; any supporter of socialist ideas and/or revolution is an Illuminati, and all international socialist organizations are anti-patriotic, i.e., serve the enemy.

Here and further, the author provides examples of the type-forming features of the conspiracy theorist: attempts to discover (in fact to invent) parallels when there are none (between revolutionary programs and the views of the Bavarian Illuminati); voluntaristic labeling (some German kings of the 19th century were declared Illuminati, and legal, well-known organizations were named secret societies); denial of the obvious social, political and economic causes of revolutions, their explanation by the intrigues of secret occult forces (even concerning the Bolsheviks and Social Democrats, which they would be surprised at). However, in all conspiracy theories the author tries to find a rational grain, for instance, noting that Webster recognized the cruel oppression of nobility (monarchy) and the high level of corruption and selfishness of politicians (democracy), but still saw the main reason for people's uprisings in the activities of secret societies with the intervention of 'dark forces'. Moreover, many conspiracy theories' accusations turn out to be 'empty' if we refer to the historical research which, for instance, show that 'Freemasons' were very differentiated (participated in both revolutionary and pacifist movements, in the opposing military coalitions) and very patriotic (p. 32).

In the third chapter, the author summarizes the ways and results of the penetration of Western conspiracy theories into the Russin society "at the end of the Soviet period" (p. 38) in the form of three sets of ideas: attempts to rationally explain activities of secret societies as closely related to the economy and policies of the modern era (conspiracies of politicians, financiers, intelligence agencies, etc.); emphasis on the esoteric foundations of conspiracies (developed in the Middle Ages, which explains references to the end of times and the Antichrist); justification of the secret penetration of aliens from outer space into the human civilization (interest not so much in secrets of unearthly civilizations as in attempts of evil reptilians to enslave humanity[24]). Irrational and rational components of these three 'branches' of conspiracy ideas can be combined: for instance, 'Kremlin wives' were declared both Jews and 'Martians', Jewish revolutionaries — 'homosexuals',

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24. Apparently, in the spirit of L. R. Hubbard's ideas presented in the movie "Battlefield Earth" (2000).

'mentally ill degenerates' and 'legionnaires' (p. 41); Hitler — a Nazi occultist, Satanist, bearer of the 'collective unconscious' associated with the 'memory of the Aryan blood', an avatar of Hindu gods (p. 73); 'Russian civilization' — a state in which identity is determined not by ethnicity but by 'soul', culture and morality, therefore, A. S. Pushkin is 'the wisest magus', his works "contain the encoded ancient knowledge about the world and its evolution" (p. 273); coronavirus — an "ethnic weapon artificially created by Americans" and a "global sabotage of the world government" (p. 160), so vaccination is a "disastrous chipization" aimed at "creating a digital Babylon".

To 'construct' an irrationally motivated "bad Jew" (communist, Zionist, etc.), conspiracy theorists use the following rational discursive strategies (pp. 43–45; 47–48):

- turning upside down (interpretation of the Egyptian captivity described in the Bible as a 'Sinai expedition' which aimed at destroying local population and religion, i.e., the Jews pretended to be captives);
- understatement (the centuries-old persecution of the Jews in medieval Europe is not mentioned at all or Jewish casualties are considered "monstrously exaggerated by Zionists");
- denial (first, of the Jewish origin of Jesus Christ, today of the Holocaust[25]);
- zeroing (the Nuremberg trials were declared "the revenge of Talmudists");
- stigmatization by labeling (the Jewish god is "the god of racism, hatred and revenge");
- immunity to cognitive dissonance (ignorance of contradictions of one's assumptions to the available data, to one's reasoning and to one's previous beliefs);
- constant repetitions of the same ideas, like mantras.

Repetition is a kind of refrain in the book. On the one hand, the author emphasizes that conspiracy theories are published by the same publishing houses, written by the same authors, refer to the same ideas and works, etc. On the other hand, the reader also gets the impression of 'wish-wash': the triviality of the same initial postulates, endlessly discussed by conspiracy theorists (just in other words and contexts), makes the author repeat himself, commenting on reincarnations of previous conspiracy ideas in new political and ideological forms. The author stresses the "distortions of history" by conspiracy theorists that "have a poor understanding of history... select only those facts that are beneficial to their a priori concepts and often give facts their own interpretation which makes professional historians smile" (p. 45). Certainly, such forbearance can be justified if we consider historical science in line with its philosophical understanding as a struggle of narratives[26]. However, today, when the statist discourse explains (geo)political and economic decisions with a set of ideas from conspiracy theories and introduces sanctions with 'empty' nominations (discreditation, propaganda, treason, protection of the Russian

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25. Despite numerous documentary evidence, many countries do not officially recognize the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide in Turkey.

26. See e.g.: Ankersmit F. (1983). *Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian's Language,* Springer; Ankersmit F. R. (1994). *History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor,* University of California Press.

world/interests, etc.), conspiracy theories would not make even the common man smile, given their spread and media popularity. Moreover, the techniques used by conspiracy theorists to "create an impression of authenticity and specificity for the naive reader" (p. 59) sometimes do not work as expected due to the naivety of everyday thinking that fails to accept a too complex and unstable system of enemy nominations, which changes according to the political situation[27] (as it was common to say in the Soviet period, "fluctuates according to the party line").

The author concludes the third chapter and, accordingly, the introductory part of the book by identifying two types of the "Western conspiracy theories translated into Russian" (p. 82). The first type comes mainly "from the right-wing camp with racist and anti-Semitic views"; the second — "from the liberal camp frightened by the dictatorial regime as arising from the uncontrolled power of transnational corporations". In Russia, "an intricate mixture of eschatology, messianism and conspiracy theories emerged in the Orthodox fundamentalist circles already in the 1970s — 1980s... In general, conspiracy theories developed in Russia in an esoteric direction. At the beginning of the 21st century, such ideas were taken by the authorities as a powerful instrument of national unity [and social solidarity in the Durkheimian sense] to contain globalization and 'color revolutions' in neighboring countries. The latter were attributed to secret machinations of the 'Washington Regional Committee' [or the 'London Central Committee'], behind which stood the global forces of evil or the new world order" (p. 83).

The last and the longest chapter of the book considers Russian conspiracy theories based on the historical, journalistic (review of the formation of various types of conspiracy discourse in the Russian media[28]), political (theoretical and practical interest of

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27. The radical change in the "policy of the party and government" can be easily traced by the mentions/ignorance of media 'heroes' in political talk shows on the Russian television. For instance, this happened in the programs of V. V. Solovyov with S. V. Surovikin: when he was appointed a commander of the joint group of troops (forces) in the area of the special military operation, he was mentioned almost daily, including as 'General Armageddon', but then disappeared from the media agenda instantly and without a trace.

28. For instance, the permanent Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper *Tomorrow* A. Prokhanov continues to publish in it and to present on television shows his theory of the Zionist conspiracy of malicious Jewish intellectuals, who "want to turn Russia into a 'new Khazaria'" (p. 134) "led by the Antichrist". Here are some proving quotes from the *Tomorrow*, which I wrote down for my study project in 1999: "Not a single bastard will evade responsibility... We will forgive our enemies [Jewish Freemasons and Western henchmen of Yeltsinism] only when we hear a mortal howl of remorse, anguish and pain from their filthy mouths. Satan acted through them, and it is not easy to cleanse human vessels from his stinking presence. Bodies must suffer. No one will escape the punishment". "A special, indescribable feeling of the reality of the bright, sunny principle of supreme beauty and harmony present in the world, giving Russians the right to some kind of eschatological hope 'at the end of times'", was preserved "in the traditional Russian toy, bearing the imprint of millennia and the message of the ancient faith". The description of the Western culture is completely opposite: "Today, the 'Barbie empire' becomes the vanguard of the Western 'magical aggression', destroying the archetypal models for perceiving reality, which were inherited from their ancestors by Russian children... The little man receives his first experience of cultural colonization, feeling that toys are 'not ours' and painfully submitting to a foreign toy pantheon. This is the first social-cultural trauma in the child's life, which subsequently forms a severe complex of cultural inferiority... there is a foreign yoke over Russia, and to fight it we need not only military, technical, economic mobilization but also resources of a different kind, which in a certain sense can be called 'magical'. Thus, even a small clay toy can become a magical shield against the leveling mass-cultural pressure that destroys the deepest foundations of our ancient culture".

officials and political scientists in conspiracy theories) and sociological (a small section of the book focuses on the reflection of various elements of conspiracy theories in the Russian public opinion under the "cultivation of conspiratorial sentiments"[29]) data and examples which are pointless to try to fit into one review, so further only the specifically Russian features of the eschatological[30] conspiracy theories are mentioned.

"Russia had its own long tradition of conspiracy theories, which did not die even in the Soviet period" (p. 83). Initially in the 1820s — early 1830s, this tradition had an anti-reform eschatological character and opposed the "anti-Christian conspiracy" (with the participation of the Jews). The next surge of conspiracy theories followed the defeat in the Crimean War and the Polish rebellion of 1864. At the beginning of the 20th century, the ultra-conservative conspiracy version of human history "tirelessly searched for the origins and motives of the activities of secret societies in the Jewish tradition" (p. 84), and the wave of spy mania and chauvinism led to "the culmination of anti-Semitism and Germanophobia during the World War I" (p. 85). With the exception of specific wordings and objective historical factors, these conspiracy ideology and rhetoric did not differ much from Western 'analogues' and foundations: anti-Masonic and anti-Jewish campaigns; reliance on fabrications of foreign authors without reliable data; threatening the common man with the far-fetched eradication of Christianity and abolition of national states by the evil Freemasons; hints and direct references to the eschatological myth (satanic plans to bring the Antichrist to power) (p. 85); apocalyptic terms in conspiracy narratives and posters (Trotsky — 'a monster committing ritual murders'; Bolsheviks — 'antichrists', 'children of the devil' and 'forerunners of the last Antichrist'; revolution — 'Jewish'; Russia –'raped girl', etc.) (pp. 94–96). "The myth of the 'Jewish Freemasons', which was not popular among the elites of Tsarist Russia, found a new life during the Revolution and the Civil War, when even some former liberals moved towards the Black Hundreds" under the influence of the "myth of the Jewish-Bolshevik power" (pp. 93–94). This myth remains today in the form of the belief that the Revolution was the result of some secret conspiracy.

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29. See also: Gudkov L., Zorkaya N., Kochergina E., Lezina E. (2016). Anti-Semitism in the Structure of Russia's Mass Xenophobia: Negative Identity and Mobilization Potential. *Bulletin of Public Opinion*, no. 1–2, pp. 140–198; Gudkov L., Pipia K. (2018). Parameters of Xenophobia, Racism and Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Russia. *Bulletin of Public Opinion*, no. 3–4, pp. 33–64; Gudkov L., Zorkaya N., Kochergina E., Lezina E. (2018). Anti-Semitism in Russia: Opinions of the Jewish Population. *Bulletin of Public Opinion*, no. 3–4, pp. 65–109, etc. See: Shnirelman V. A. (2011). *Limits of Tolerance: Ideology and Practice of the New Racism*, Moscow: New Literary Observer, vol. II (the section on sociological surveys consists of 8 chapters).

30. In 2023, a book was published in Russian, which can provide the interested reader with a detailed review of Western eschatology (theological and philosophical): Taubes J. (2009). *Occidental Eschatology.* Transl. with a Preface by D. Ratmoko, Stanford University Press. According to Taubes, apocalyptic prophecy comes from the future, and yet it is completely in the present; in the apocalyptic beginning, two forces unite — the one that destroys all forms and images, and the one that creates new forms; depending on the situation and task, one comes to the fore, but this does not mean that the other is absent. Thus, in Apocalyptics, history does not appear as only an event chronology: based on the past and present, history tries to comprehend the future as broadly described and permeated with one decisive question — when the end will come. Therefore, the structure of Apocalyptics and gnosis is significantly affected by the eschatological moment, even when 'mythological' apocalypse turns into 'philosophical' systems.

In the Russian emigration, these eschatological sentiments persisted, while in the USSR "conspiracy theories developed in a different direction: Stalin's terror campaigns gave a powerful impetus to conspiracy sentiments... when the whole country feared numerous 'conspiracies'... of pan-Turkists, pan-Iranists, pan-Islamists, Pan-Finns, cosmopolitans and... agents of all kinds of foreign intelligence services" due to Stalin's campaigns aimed at identifying and eliminating 'enemies of the people' (p. 98). During this period, Russian conspiracy theories acquired their main features: "an explosive mixture of unsatisfied complexes of national priority and images of secret and obvious adversaries"; "a mixture of archaic religious fears with populist Judeophobia of the fascist type, and of capitalist rhetoric with chauvinistic propaganda"; "'bashful anti-Semitism' hiding behind various euphemisms and metaphors, which failed to hide the visible features of the 'Black Hundred internationalism'"; "distortion and falsification of the position and motivation of enemies, i.e., of the West" — Western high ideals and values were declared a cover for "the desire for vulgar profit" (pp. 98–99). The author rightly notes that many conspiracy ideas were borrowed by the post-Soviet era — both spontaneously (by writers and historians) and purposefully by the state ideology (Judeo-Masonic/Jewish conspiracy and anti-Zionism opposed to the 'Aryan world'[31]). Today these ideas are a part of the political and media rhetoric, which determined a "return to Stalinist ressentiment" (p. 99) in the form of a combination of "uncompromising anti-Westernism" with "rehabilitation of Stalinism".

Thus, conspiracy theories of the post-Soviet period acquired the following new features:

- romanticization of the ancient Slavic past and discovery in it of "the worst enemies of the Slavs, who did everything to conquer, enslave and, ultimately, destroy them... which marked the beginning of the Khazar myth[32]... then the flowering of

31. See: Shnirelman V. A. (2015). *Aryan Myth in Contemporary World*, Moscow: New Literary Observer, vols. 1–2. The author considers "the process of constructing the Aryan identity and the existence of the Aryan myth in both temporal and political-geographical dimensions". The author mentions an appeal to the Aryan myth by "amateur writers in search of a commercial success", by "radical politicians trying to impose the Aryan myth on society to implement their political programs", by "esotericists and neo-pagans creating new religious cults and rituals", and by "power structures wishing to create an attractive national ideology... therefore, today there is no longer a single Aryan myth but its various modifications with different goals" (vol. I, p. 5). "The Aryan myth is considered as a discourse that combines ideas about ancestors with a project for the future reorganization of society". The author suggests the following complex interdisciplinary analysis for both the Aryan myth and eschatological conspiracy theories: a combination of diachronic and synchronic approaches, historical research (analysis of the emergence and dynamics of the Aryan myth), comparative studies (to identify features of the Aryan myth in different ethnic-cultural frames), discursive analysis of 'Aryan ideas'; qualitative analysis of the media, etc. (vol. I, p. 10).

32. See: Shnirelman (2012). *Khazar Myth. Russia's Ideology of Political Radicalism and Its Origins*, Moscow; Jerusalem: Bridges of Culture, Gesharim. The Khazar myth is briefly described in another book: "At first I was interested in the Khazar myth created mainly on the Russian soil and giving a specific flavor to the local anti-Semitic propaganda. The Khazar myth is especially interesting because it shows, first, how basic ideas easily change their meaning, adapting to the interests of certain social or religious groups; second, how these ideas transform according to political changes; third, how easily these ideas juggle images of historical events and heroes". Shnirelman V. (2017). *Tribe of Dan: Eschatology and Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Russia*, Moscow: Publishing House of the Biblical Theological Institute of Saint Andrew the Apostle (p. xi).

the Slavic-Aryan myth, and both emphasized a secret terrible conspiracy based on Nazi models[33]" (p. 106);

- conspiracy rhetoric's inclination to religious conservatism and "an eschatological version of the conspiracy that explain the eternal Western hatred for Russia by the fact that Russia remained faithful to Orthodoxy and is the 'center of world spirituality'" (p. 124);

- the search for the origins of a secret conspiracy in such hoary antiquity that "Merovingians are described as Slavs, who turn out to be almost the founders of the European civilization[34]... but 'stained' their genealogy with the blood of the 'tribe of Dan'[35]" (p. 147);

- the tendency of Orthodox fundamentalism towards "securitization that dooms its supporters to a tireless search for enemies, both external and internal" (p.162);

- such a large-scale and free penetration of conspiracy theories into mass culture and intellectual circles that conspiracy ideas turn into collective/social representations identified by sociological surveys;

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33. This makes the image of the Russian singer Shaman more clear: his songs appeal to the Russian identity/history, while his image evokes associations with the Nazi aesthetics among such a wide audience that the Blogs and Communities section on the *Tomorrow* online portal published an article in defense of Shaman: "The fugitive conquerors of Upper Lars and the pseudo-leftists saw... Nazi aesthetics… and hints at the slogans of the Third Reich: "God is with us!" (Gott mit uns!) and even "The banner is up!", supposedly taken from the party anthem "Horst Wessel" with the phrase "Die Fahne hoch!" — "Banners up!". "God is with us" is a common phrase used since the beginning of Christianity, and the notorious badges with "Gott mit uns" were invented not by the SS officers but long before them in Royal Prussia, and even the later Romans shouted "Nobiscum Deus!". As for "Die Fahne hoch!", they can find fault even in the Soviet painting by G. Korzhev "Raising the Banner". However, those who left Russia on the "philosophical electric scooter" are illiterate and affective... They are also not pleased with the appearance of Shaman and make vivid comparisons: "a typical Hitler Youth"; "reminds of the young Nazi from Bob Fosse's movie "Cabaret". How? With his blonde hair? Should we ban blondes? Since when did the leather jacket become a 'fascist uniform'? On the contrary, it was a workwear of commissars... In Germany, leaders of the Rot Front wore leather jackets — like Russian communists. The general style of Shaman is informal… leather jackets became bikers' clothes all over the world... The uniform of the Hitler Youth consisted of a brown shirt and black shorts similar to the scout uniform". See: Ivankina G. They saw fascism even here. Who and why did not like Shaman's new video. URL: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/oni_i_tut_uvideli_fashizm.

34. Such quasi-historical constructions remind of the ideas of the satirist M. Zadornov about Russian as the proto-language of all peoples, but he did not claim to be a historian/public intellectual.

35. See: Shnirelman V. (2017). *Tribe of Dan: Eschatology and Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Russia*, Moscow: Publishing House of the Biblical Theological Institute of Saint Andrew the Apostle. The author identifies "in the general mass of anti-Semitic theories several popular issues that define the general negativism towards the Jews... these are three main mythological constructions represented by the myth of the Antichrist, the Aryan myth, and the Khazar myth. They have different roots, are based on different ideas and arguments, address different audiences. Which proves the ambiguous and highly contradictory essence of the contemporary anti-Semitic views which, on the one hand, oppose each other with fierce polemics, but, on the other hand, reflect some common basic emotions expressed in different images" (pp. x-xi). The book focuses on the eschatological myth "that caused a surge of mass interest at the turn of the 20th — 21st centuries not only in Russia but also in Western countries, especially in the USA", and "like two other myths provides rich material for conspiracy theories… being popular in the West, such ideas largely got rid of former anti-Semitism, but in Russia they still feed on its juices" (p. xii).

- a paradoxical combination of religious, mystical and conservative variations of conspiracy theories with devotion to socialism or communism;
- expansion of conspiracy theories 'upwards' — from the "conservative and national-patriotic part of the intellectual spectrum", searching "for the secret force that destroyed the USSR", to civil officials and law enforcement officers who "blame in all Russia's troubles 'machinations of the West'... the US intelligence services... 'fifth column' or 'agents of influence' [today they got the official status of foreign agents]" (p. 117).

The maximum concentration of eschatological images and corresponding terms is typical for the statements of Orthodox priests, theologians and parachurch thinkers who attributed the function of 'katechon' to Orthodoxy and Russia as endlessly repelling the attacks of all evil forces "that dream of destroying the 'last Christian state'" (p. 126). However, the results of Russia's victory over the "global forces of evil" are described in different ways: a tragic scenario of the death of Russia, leading to the death of the whole world; a more neutral end of the old world that will be replaced by a new world led by a revived Russia; an optimistic "return to the original state of communal-religious patriotism"[36]. Many historical events acquired a conspiratorial interpretation with eschatological details precisely as battles in this endless fight[37]: for instance, the "ritual murder" of the Romanov royal family ("sacrifice to Satan"; "genocide against the Romanov dynasty"; "cutting off heads of the members of the royal family" as a part of the "satanic ritual"; denial of the scientific examination of the royal family as "machinations of liberals"); organization of the February and October Revolutions by 'Russophobes', "by the order of the worst enemies of Russia", etc.

The essence of the eschatological component of the Russian conspiracy theories is simple as narrative but complicated as scientific argumentation. The simplicity of narrative is determined by its traditional nature and biblical logic of the plot: Russia is katechon, not allowing the Antichrist into the world; this determines Russia's confrontation with the West that wants to destroy the "Russian God-bearing people" and open the way for the Antichrist; weapons of the West are secret societies and occult organizations, groups of "satanic invasion" and "quiet Freemasons" (p. 138); world history is the struggle between civilizations of good (Orthodox/Christianity) and evil ('Judeo-Masonic'/'misanthropic Judeo-Talmudic ideology', "usurious doctrine of buying up the world", "Zion-Nazi dictatorship", "Zion-Nazi aggression" of the "technocratic Euro-American civilization», "genocide of the Russian people"). The corresponding interpretation of real historical events is based on "a symbolic language, its terms are polysemic, and their true meaning is understood only by experts ("initiated")": for example, "the discussion about the regicide and the authenticity of the royal family remains revived the anti-Semitic discourse" (p. 268).

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36. Descriptions of such an original state, for example, in the dystopian novel by T. N. Tolstoya *Kys* or in the dystopian works by P. G. Sorokin's *Day of the Oprichnik* and *Sugar Kremlin* do not evoke much optimism.

37. It is described in the novel by M.Yu. Elizarov *The Librarian*, which was recently filmed as a TV series.

The undoubted advantages of the book were mentioned above, but there are several more. First, this is one of the author's last fundamental studies, so he refers to his previous works that reveal certain aspects of the issues discussed in detail. Second, the book is easy and interesting to read despite its overload (in the positive sense) with factual and historical material, which can be explained by the author's style — this is not a boring pretentious presentation but a story of the interested researcher that provides scientific but sometimes emotional arguments, sometimes with metaphors more typical for fiction: "golden age of conspiracy theories"; "patriarch of French anti-Semitism"; "his books were full of chauvinism, militarism and anti-Americanism… then with alarmism"; "he completely changed the eschatological scheme, replacing the 'Holy Scripture' with the 'Program of the CPSU'", etc.

Third, the book raises many questions for social sciences and humanities. For instance, the question of the demarcation line between science and ideology, which was becoming thinner throughout the 20th century but locally, while after the coronavirus pandemic and on the eve of either the World War III or a nuclear war this line has almost disappeared, and in some issues (interpretation of military and geopolitical decisions), disciplines (history) and social institutions (education and upbringing) is even denied by the state authorities. A particular manifestation of this trend is that "an image of the enemy with an accompanying escalation of fears may lead to a real war; it is clear that such logic is acceptable for security officials and military strategists but absolutely unacceptable for historians, from whom scientific ethics requires unconditional reliance on authentic historical documents" (p. 117).

Another question is to what extent explanatory metaphors of social cognition in an ideological-politicized context and in the world of post-truth lose the function of metaphor and turn into empty 'invectives'. This is again the problem of distinction between ideology and science: both rely on explanatory models, but if science begins to fit facts into them ("fitting the history of the Jews into an a priori scheme") it loses its difference from ideology, and "the reasoning of pseudo-scientists 'causes enormous harm to society, generating and spreading myths and phobias and leading to a social split" (p. 262). Thus, the biological-organicist metaphor of the early sociological thought helped to adjust its 'optics', albeit with distortions of social Darwinism and single-factor theories, while conspiracy theories "turned to biology in incorrect ways[38]... to develop a metaphorical language for showing the enemy as an absolute stranger" (p. 196), i.e., "for distorting reality" and "creating a reactionary obscurantist ideology" (p. 202). It is incredibly sad to read about a sociologist who "quite rightly believes that sociologists should not ignore the issue of secret societies but considers it not as political myth making or a kind of folklore

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[38]. Apparently, the author means racism in which distinguishes ideology and practice: "the ideological construction is not always embodied in practice and the practice of racism is not always based on a developed ideology… It is useful to consider racist practices as follows: a) everyday racism that does not require a developed ideology; b) political racism based on a party ideology; c) institutional racism inherent in some social institutions (school, medical care, housing, social assistance, religious organizations, etc.); d) state racism manifested in legislation and practices sanctioned by the state". See: Shnirelman V. A. (2011). *Limits of Tolerance: Ideology and Practice of the New Racism*, Moscow: New Literary Observer, vol. II, p. 465.

but as a harsh reality... believes in magical practices, collective sacrifices and even celestial aliens [not in the anthropological or astronomical sense]" (p. 342).

The provided generalized description of the "convinced conspiracy theorist" may help: "every now and then he distorts historical facts for the sale of his favorite idea", "his favorite expressions are 'there is no doubt' and 'there is no reason to doubt', and he constantly uses them as evidence of his dubious statements" (p. 208); "he persistently tries to reveal connections albeit there are none" (p. 327); his works are not original, his arguments are trivial and based on compilations of well-known ideas (p. 213) and works of other conspiracy theorists, i.e., this is 'secondary literature' (p. 294). "He uses a variety of facts to arbitrarily interpret them and believes that 'the world is always against us'... he does not believe scientific data" (p. 304). His texts "amaze with the abundance of the most diverse materials, and the only thing they miss is serious analysis. They are full of emotional assessments, pseudo-erudition, unjustified jumps from one era to another, implausible comparisons and connections, tendentious interpretation of the ideas and activities of some famous authors, and obvious mistakes in presenting historical facts" (p. 149). Unfortunately, as a rule, not an academic historian but "a convinced conspiracy theorist, who believes that the main factor of history is not economy but mysticism... enjoys a certain popularity, gives public lectures and interviews" (p. 304). While an academic historian or philosopher may "recognize conspiracy theories as a legitimate scientific direction that reveals the secrets of those in power", "reproaches scientists for 'servility', i.e., for serving moneybags who are the least willing to allow a truthful coverage of their activities", and calls "opponents skeptical of conspiracy theories 'useful idiots' who play into the hands of conspirators" (p. 319).

Perhaps, the most interesting illustration of the "conspiracy theorist" is A. G. Dugin: "in different years he declared himself... an esotericist, an Old Believer, a Eurasianist, a political scientist, a sociologist... Considering the 'world conspiracy', he proceeds from esoterica, conspiracy or geopolitical theories... The surprised reader does not understand which to follow. But this does not bother Dugin, because he places emotions above reason and values the irrational approach immeasurably higher than the rational" (pp. 164–165). However, the author recognizes Dugin's "complete rightness" in some positions: his interpretation of conspiracy theories as "a continuation of medieval myths about 'dark forces' and 'machinations of the devil', which are now used outside the strict religious context"; his warning that "excessive and uncritical enthusiasm for conspiracy theories" can lead to "intellectual degradation" (pp. 165–166). Here the author seems to reach the limit of his emotional neutrality[39] and wonders why Dugin does not follow "his own wise advice" but formulates ideas "on the verge of schizophrenic delirium": "being under the indelible impression of dual constructions, Dugin sees the key to any ideas and movements in dividing them into oppositions and calls these verbal games an 'analysis'" (p. 168). Dugin's

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39. The author describes A. Prokhanov even more emotionally: "poetizes crimes", "his language is full of delirium and insanity, colored with resentment", "as his language he chooses delirium and vulgarity, leading the Russian mass literature into the jungle of anti-intellectualism that pleases the current political system" (p. 176).

views change "almost with every new book he reads", but he "loves his ideas so much that does not give up a single thought… and manages to offer the surprised reader several contrasting ideas about the Jews, which he suggested in different years" (p. 166)[40]. The author explains numerous and obvious contradictions in Dugin's concept by the fact that he "is not a scientist, he is an ideologist that sees his main task in evoking emotions that would direct people to the desired goal, and for this all means are good" (p. 173).

Although the review implies critical remarks, I hardly have the right to make such, but complex and ambiguous issues of the book cannot but raise questions from the reader. A reader with a sociologically biased perception may have some doubts about "the high mass demand for conspiracy theories" (the question is not in scale but in demand as such) or about conspiracy theories "meeting the needs of the rising populist wave" (the question is not so much in the wave as in the interpretation of populism[41] and in criteria of the rise). It would probably make sense to supplement the book with a glossary of basic terms, because the author uses some as synonyms, for instance, noting that "conspiracy sentiments… can become an incentive for real destructive actions — escalation of conflicts and violence, wars and genocide", explaining that "when these myths [conspiracy ideas?] are used as a tool of the propaganda struggle, they have a strong political impact" (pp. 27–28). Undoubtedly, this is a perfect description of contemporary realities, but when reading the book, the reader gets the feeling that conspiracy theories, propaganda, eschatology and utopia are too strongly intertwined in the semantic space of this narrative.

The reader may have doubts about the interpretation of the main subject of the global conspiracy — "international bankers" — as an euphemistic nomination for the Jews (today "rich people" are hated rather as a class in the Marxist sense) and about the strengthening of the anti-Semitic rhetoric in the Russian conspiracy texts (the image of the enemy is more variable, and, judging by the television rhetoric, certain "Anglo-Saxons" are the leading "enemies of Russia" today[42]). Some readers may consider the relationship

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40. In another book, the author notes that "Dugin can hardly be accused of ideological obstinacy. He creatively changes his views, subtly sensing the changing political situation… His constant fluctuations in assessing Israel and the Jews are determined by the momentary political situation and indicate the subjectivity of his approach which is very far from scientific". See: Shnirelman V. A. (2011). *Limits of Tolerance: Ideology and Practice of the New Racism*, Moscow: New Literary Observer, vol. II, pp. 224–225.

41. The author notes that "conspiracy theories can be attributed to the field of populism, in which the place of the rejected meta-narrative is immediately taken by a new meta-narrative promoted by conspiracy theorists" (p. 26). This is a too broad interpretation of populism, which clarifies little in its essence in general and in its relationship with conspiracy theories in particular. Even more confusing is the author's clarification that "post-truth generated by conspiracy theories leads to post-democracy, and this is precisely what has been observed in recent years in the form of the rising populist wave… because conspiracy theories give birth not to dissidents but to a zombified public" (p. 28). See, e.g.: Nikulin A., Trotsuk I. (2022). Political and Apolitical Dimensions of Russian Rural Development: Populism "from above" and Narodnik Small Deeds "from below". *Politics and Policies of Rural Authenticity*. Ed. by P. Pospěch, E. M. Fuglestad, E. Figueiredo, Routledge, pp. 77–93; Nikulin A. M., Trotsuk I. V. (2022). Humanitarian Populism. *Russian Sociological Review*, vol. 21, no 4, pp. 136–149; Ely C. (2022). *Russian Populism: A History*, Bloomsbury Publishing.

42. In the book *Tribe of Dan: Eschatology and Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Russia*, the author clarifies that "today anti-Semitism is the most well-known type of phobia", but "its extraordinary stability and ability to

between the rational and the irrational in conspiracy theories insufficiently articulated in the everyday context: as a rule, there are two groups of the everyday 'conspiracy theorists' — those who do not believe in a secret conspiracy of dark forces but purposefully use this horror story (politicians — to gain power, bloggers — for enrichment, journalists — for career, etc.); sincere believers and those frantically preaching the future dark/godless times, who ensure the successful life strategies of 'non-believers' from the first group. Probably, this conventional scale with two 'poles' needs other, intermediate positions (irrationally motivated politicians and ordinary people that rationally intimidate others), but I would like to live in a society lacking this scale. Apparently, this is a utopia which loses to conspiracy theories, but everyday life gives reasons to doubt their correctness, which means, according to the behest of V. I. Lenin, that conspiracy theories are not omnipotent. Every day our plans so invariably collapse or change that we simply cannot believe in total control of some 'evil empire' over everything that happens around — "hunger, civil wars, genocide..., oil prices, WTO policies, devaluation of national currencies, GMOs, etc.". Otherwise, we would have to admit that the "global cabal" does not cope[43] with its primary (in the Leninist sense) tasks.

Эсхатологическая конспирология: теория и практика опознавания апокалиптической семантики и синтаксиса

Рецензия на книгу: *Шнирельман В. А.* (2022). Удерживающий. От Апокалипсиса к конспирологии. М.; СПб.: Нестор-История. 424 с.

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survive entire eras, changing forms and adapting to new situations, continues to raise questions. In particular, the emphasis on racial, political and social-economic forms of anti-Semitism pushed its religious forms into the background... The contemporary religious renaissance leads to the revival of religious forms of anti-Semitism... the Jews are described as the vanguard of the Antichrist, which makes believers interpret their high activity as a sure sign of the approaching end of the world", while there is still "anti-Semitism without the Jews" (p. 4).

43. In the spirit of the similar assessment of government decisions and reforms by J. Scott (1999). *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, Yale University Press.

The Concept of the Political: Between Existential Philosophy and Counter-Revolution

Book Review: Bashkov V. *Repeticija politicheskogo. Seren K'erkegor i Karl Shmitt* [The Rehearsal of the Political: Søren Kierkegaard and Carl Schmitt], Saint-Petersburg: Vladimir Dal'.

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The review of Vladimir Bashkov's book "The Rehearsal of the Political: Søren Kierkegaard and Carl Schmitt '' will begin with a personal quotation from the author, explicitly pointing out the freedom of interpretation granted to the reviewer: "This study is an invitation to shared reflection. We leave it to the reader to decide for himself what conclusions are to be drawn and whether they are necessary with regard to these types of questions" (p. 16). This is an important point because the book claims to be reinterpretive, which means that we have to judge whether the proposed interpretation allows us to understand Carl Schmitt better. To do so, let us turn to the epigraph that precedes Bashkov's study, in which Kierkegaard claims, objecting to his readers, that he is primarily interested in the beginning itself. It is fair to say that what matters for existential philosophy is the pathos of the beginning, how and why one decides to begin at all. But can we continue this claim by saying that the pathos of the beginning is important only for existential philosophy, or that existential philosophy would be the best name to define the pathos underlying the beginning of human action? These are the questions from which we propose to proceed, analyzing both Bashkov's book and Schmitt's writings.

The basis of Bashkov's interpretation is that Schmitt, despite some distortions, introduces Kierkegaard's thought into political philosophy, the most important part of which rests on the delineation of different existential spheres: the Aesthetic, the Ethical and the Religious. Being at these different stages, a person acts in very different ways, and the ground of their action or inaction changes. The author guides us through Schmitt's work, using these stages as an interpretive canvas. It is easy to see in Schmitt's critique of political romanticism a demand that correlates with the ethical stage, where self-determination occurs through the making of a judgment and the acceptance of the obligations associated with that judgment. Unlike the real politician, even the romantic one, the political romantic always tries to avoid establishing anything definite. Their political thought is contradictory, eclectic, and not at all demanding in relation to real politics, in which it is always important to stand firm, to make a decision. The political romantic avoids making a choice, because in doing so he deprives himself of an infinite number of possibilities. It is worth remembering that Schmitt uses the example of Adam Müller

to show how the political romantic can easily contradict himself, adapt to the "winds of change", and see the guarantee of their creative freedom even in Metternich's police state. Not only that, but it is the reactionary regimes that freeze all activity that are most attractive to the political romantic, because the outward absence of conflict and the increased value of abstraction and loyalty support their reluctance to make a decision. Reality is merely an occasion where only a romantic subjectivity has any real value. As Bashkov convincingly shows, what counts for Schmitt in "Political Romanticism" is historical concreteness, a norm that exists independently of the romantic subject's creative energy. But it is not only political romanticism that asserts the primacy of the possible over the actual, the intrusion of one into the other.

The author's next step is to move from political romanticism to a sovereign dictatorship. Unlike the commissary dictatorship, the sovereign dictatorship is not rooted in the existing political order, and does not owe anything to the present, since it completely abolishes the current order of things. It unleashes the enormous energy of political activity, which is necessary not so much for the affirmation of its agent, as for the complete transformation of the object of activity. Accordingly, despite its resemblance to political romanticism, a sovereign dictatorship takes both reality and its own decisions seriously. Bashkov, following Schmitt and Kierkegaard, describes seriousness in terms of tension, energy and existentiality. Thus sovereign dictatorship, which in the texts of 'Political Theology' and 'The Concept of the Political' is simply transformed into sovereign power, constitutes an action at the ethical level. Bashkov characterizes the ethical position of the political by acknowledging its final distinction (p. 94). The ethical self makes distinctions not between good and evil, but rather between their recognition and non-recognition.

This process of distinction is also present in politics. Here it draws the line between friend and enemy. The author goes on to reveal similarities. Bashkov's parallel reading and translation of one concept into the other helps him to identify the structure of the influence of despair on the political. The political contours of despair are already evident in one of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, namely Anti-Climacus, who appeared at the moment when Kierkegaard had become an outcast and failed to become a Protestant pastor. Anti-Climacus saw despair everywhere, expressed in the expulsion of sin from the spiritual life of the self. Sinlessness appears to be guaranteed by history and progress. The sinless Self knows neither sin nor redemption any longer. This order is maintained by a public that is united as never before and that assumes the impossibility of individual judgment. To overcome despair, it is necessary to bring sin back into the realm of politics, into the very heart of political life. This requires, first of all, the return of the singular, the one who is brought to judgment. Bashkov notes (p. 106) that, according to Anti-Climacus, despair will not vanish, so it must be taken seriously as an intrinsic human trait. Ultimately, sin is a generic human feature, but man must identify himself as separate from the generic, as a singularity, in order to discover his own sinful nature. And this is where Schmitt comes in! Bashkov discovers that for Schmitt, despair takes on approximately the same features as for Anti-Climacus, but in Schmitt's era the scale of this attitude toward the world and the self had grown to even more catastrophic proportions. In 'The Concept of the Po-

litical' and 'Theory of the Partisan', we find a critique of pacifism, which denies the evil ("dangerous") nature of human beings, thereby arguing that with the progress of society, violence is no longer necessary, and that institutions, which exist only to restrain the dangers of mankind, actually do nothing but oppress human nature, which is essentially good. Seen through this lens, the political identification of enemies becomes absolute evil, a total rejection of humanity. "War against war" assumes the characteristics of a humanitarian massacre against "non-humans." In contrast, Schmitt suggests that human beings are seen as inherently dangerous and prone to sin, and that the recognition of political hostilities actually reveals the intrinsic truth of humanity. And here we do not contradict the Christian commandment, because it speaks of private, not public hostilities.

At this point we should note that Bashkov's further study becomes somewhat value-oriented. There are passages in the text that express open solidarity with the evaluations made by Schmitt and Kierkegaard. Towards the end of the book this becomes quite clear, but at this point we cannot proceed to the author's conclusions. First of all, we need to look at how he interprets Schmitt's reading of Hobbes. The key point is as follows: for Bashkov, Kierkegaard is also similar to Schmitt in that the latter tries to save the singularity from the dictates of the public or any other part pretending to be the whole (e.g. a political party). The political union created by the collective, decision-based identification of friends and enemies has homogeneous and individualistic character at the same time. In the homogeneity of the state of emergency, the individual would be able to get rid of the circumstantial bodies that claim total power in the technocratic state. These bodies are not responsible for political power, but claim total dictatorship over private life. Thus, a situation of civil war arises when the sovereign, long lost in the routine of technocracy, lets power slip out of his hands. The leap to the intense experience of sin, and thus to the identification of the Other as potentially dangerous, is juxtaposed with the critique of Descartes and the subsequent mechanistic philosophy of the human and the state. The connection between the critique of Leviathan and the freedom of the singular seems obvious. It is easily found not only in 'The Concept of the Political', but also in 'The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes'. If Descartes presented man as a mechanism, Thomas Hobbes did the same thing, but with a political union. The further development of Leviathan led to this cold and regular machine becoming less and less in need of an explicitly sovereign judgment. This is expressed in the perception of legal law as similar to the law of natural science. The purpose of this mechanism was to prevent religious wars, for its remarkable feature was the concentration of all the power of the people in the hands of the sovereign, who thus gained power over their religion. The authority of the Pope or of the independent congregations of Protestant sects crumbled before the combined power of the One who alone had the right to determine the rules of collective worship. Thomas Hobbes, however, leaves the subject the right to retain inward freedom of belief, and only outward respect for an official religion only insofar as it serves the stability of the political order. This raises two questions. In the first place, the state of nature is not the historical existence of peoples at a certain stage of their development, but a theoretical description of relations between abstract solitary individuals already devoid

of any particular corporate or patrimonial ties. Why did they suddenly become solitary, when from a historical perspective it is difficult to detect the state of nature of this type? They realized that they might lose what they needed to survive as a result of a possible conflict with others like themselves (and human beings are equal because they are of the same nature). Second, the state of nature is a constant threat that is always present in the idea of sovereignty, from which the sovereign builds himself up. When the gap between the inside and the outside became apparent, it was the primacy of the inside that began to be emphasized.

Vladimir Bashkov devoted an entire chapter to the interpretation of Hobbes, its connection to Schmitt, and how, in the project of political theology, the rereading and conceptual interaction between the interpretations of Hobbes and Kierkegaard gives us the opportunity to bring the sinful nature of man in general, and original sin in particular, back into the realm of the political. In this interpretation, the failure of the Leviathan project is an opportunity to rethink religion as a profound personal experience, rooted in existentiality and in the recognition of one's own sinfulness. If Hobbes is a profoundly Christian thinker who never forgot the confessional formula "Jesus is the Christ," this means that the state of nature can only be abolished by the singular subjects accepting a covenant based on fear, which is already present everywhere.

Here we can finally move from a modest and general statement of how we see the author's argument to how we see the problem he raises and how relevant his conclusions are.

Bashkov's study is undoubtedly of great value, if only for the fact that it brings to light in great detail a problem that has only been briefly sketched in Russian literature. The author not only interprets Schmitt through Kierkegaard's texts, but also draws on biographical material that shows Schmitt's preoccupation with Kierkegaard at those moments in his life when he needed salvation and affirmation of his individual spiritual experience (divorce, excommunication, imprisonment). This is especially true of the section entitled "Instead of Imprisonment," which shows that Schmitt quite often twisted the meaning of Kierkegaard's texts in order to apply them to the present, a reality that was always his primary concern. Kierkegaard's influence on Schmitt is particularly evident in his diaries.

Reading this study, however, leaves one in doubt. It can be expressed in the following question: is it precisely Kierkegaard who should be the seminal figure in the interpretation of the political theology project? Bashkov writes (p. 20) that we can observe the undeniable influence of the Danish theologian on the text of 'Political Romanticism', yet Kierkegaard is mentioned there only once. This is surprising, especially given that the counterrevolutionary writers Joseph de Mestre, Louis de Bonald, and Juan Donoso Cortés, are cited much more frequently by both Schmitt and Bashkov. By way of contrast, it is worth noting that in "Political Romanticism" Schmitt strikingly contrasted the political fortunes of the romantic Adam Müller and the traditionalist Louis de Bonald. Bashkov states that the references to Catholic counterrevolutionaries conceal "specifically understood Kierkegaard", although he discovers only part of the argument in the Catholic reactionaries. This is a remarkable step, which is not done in the book. The same page

does not refer to any research on this issue, and the author does not return to it afterwards. This gap gives rise to the idea that the interpretation of Schmitt on the basis of Kierkegaard is not so compelling, and that Schmitt could have conceived of the beginning of the political not only and not so much on the basis of existential philosophy (which is certainly present in his texts), but also with regard to Catholic counter-revolutionaries. The similarities are easy to see. For example, Donoso Cortés, in his 'Speech on Dictatorship', uses very Schmittian apologetics of dictatorship and the emergency solution. The speech opens by calling for dictatorship in the name of public safety, for the good of a society that is above all else. Laws are not made for their own sake. Legality is inappropriate here and generally serves as a gamble on the part of the opposite, liberal camp. Why is legality inappropriate in these circumstances? Since society demands to be saved, legality is not enough (in other circumstances, more peaceful ones, there is no problem with it). What is needed is a dictatorship, which is, of course, a terrible word, but "revolution", according to Cortés, is much worse, the most terrible of all. It is the revolution that becomes this terrible circumstance that requires extraordinary governmental measures. In taking on this burden, they are not unreasonable or illegitimate because, as Cortés argues, social life, just like that of human beings, consists of action and reaction, that is, of forces of invasion and forces of resistance. This analogy is not accidental, Donoso Cortés asserts that in society, invading forces (which for humans would be diseases) have two states: one where they "spill over throughout society and are represented by individuals"[1], and another where things have gone completely wrong, a social disease has taken root, and the invading forces are transformed into political groups. Of course, in the first situation, a legalistic effort is sufficient if the forces of resistance are also distributed throughout society and exert their life-giving effect at all levels. If, on the other hand, we observe a situation which, in the language of Hobbes and Schmitt, can be called a civil war, then "the forces of resistance with all the necessity that nothing can or has the right to hinder are gathered in one hand"[2]. It is not difficult to see that the dictatorship here has a character similar to that of the sovereign in 'Political Theology', who suspends the law for the sake of the law itself. Society must be preserved, its foundations must not to be shaken, and all destructive forces must be expelled either by law or by sovereign action. Next comes the historical justification for the dictatorship, but this is not very useful for our topic, so let us go straight to the theological argument. According to Cortes, God has left mankind to worldly affairs, and rules the universe through the laws he has established. However, he has repeatedly intervened in this established order to change it. To translate this into the language of worldly affairs, one could argue that God has acted as a dictator. But that is not the end of the story. In the same speech, Donoso Cortés shows us the relationship between secular power and religious authority. Repression is of two kinds: internal and external, or in other words, religious and political. It was the Christian community in its best days, when Christ was alive, that formed a society completely free of external

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1. Donoso Kortes.H. (2023) *Rech' o Diktature* [Speech on Dictatorship], Sankt-Peterburg: Vladimir Dal', p.17
2. *Ibid*. p. 18

repression. On the contrary, the whole history of the West before the Revolution is the history of the growth of secular power, and the Revolution merely continues this disastrous trend. As the power of religion declined, secular power consolidated. It is as if only the moment of existential experience of faith is missing from this description, but there is already the historical-theological reasoning that if there were a religious reaction[3], all the previous consolidation of secular power would come to a halt and then be reversed. But if the opposite happens... And then Donoso Cortes goes on to sound as apocalyptic as possible, predicting the most formidable tyranny we can imagine.

Despite the obvious similarities in formulation, there is a gap between Schmitt and Cortés. To define it, it is worth recalling that for Schmitt, democracy is the totality and identity of the governed and the governing. Out of this identity arises homogeneity that is not peculiar to the society of the old order. This homogeneity could also be the moment of liberation of the individual from the fetters of kinship, estate, class, and other things, opening the way to the existential experience of hostility and sin. In other words, the Leviathan that failed opened the way to a total political union that no longer hides its foundation from itself, no longer distinguishes between the internal and the external. In the short article entitled "Politics" Schmitt writes that if the political world was previously manifested only in the form of the state, now the only adequate description of politics is everything that concerns the people in its integrity, because it is the people, not the state, comprises the regular concept of political unity.

Here we have to take the next step. Schmitt inherits from Kierkegaard the anthropology of sin as a justification for the singularity and possibility of the religious. If this is true, then the return of subjectivity is only possible through (to use Cortes' terminology) a return to religious repression. A rejection of social unity, which cannot tolerate such existential tensions between humans, is produced by the radical opposition of the self to sin. There is no more liberal neutrality. In this case, Kierkegaard, creatively interpreted by Schmitt, is the gap between him and the counterrevolution, which still had something to fight for. To recognize one's own despair, then, and to go all the way into it, is to insist on the authenticity of the anthropology of sin hypocritically concealed by the technocratic state. Ultimately, by insisting on sin, we insist on the state of nature transcended by liberalism.

The political is a state of nature, as Leo Strauss had already observed in his "Notes on Carl Schmitt". In his interpretation, Schmitt overcame Hobbes by going back to the beginning, thus attempting to overcome liberalism. Strauss did not find this attempt to be successful, but what is important for us is not this, but the place that existential motives occupied in this endeavor. If our interpretation is correct, then Kierkegaard's influence on Schmitt only reinforced the counterrevolutionary resolution of the "political theology" project.

This makes Bashkov's conclusions understandable. They have the scent of what one might cautiously call "the politics of despair". The lessons of Kierkegaard and Schmitt are

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3. *Ibid.* p. 50

read as existential, which means that the space of freedom is conceived through overcoming and insisting on singular subjectivity, which only seems brighter in a state of emergency and dictatorship. Beyond the partisan struggle there is a time of normalization. The important thing is to live up to seeing it.

But are we obliged to continue the conservative line, after having been forced to turn to existential philosophy? Or is politics perhaps also a question of what is just? After all, in "Political Romanticism," Schmitt still allows for such definitions. Could it be that freedom is not only something that is realized exclusively in genuine action, but also the possibility of political participation, which is restricted in all kinds of dictatorships? To clarify these questions would require a study that bridges, within Schmitt's work, a counterrevolution and Kierkegaard.

Понятие политического: между экзистенциальной философией и контрреволюцией

Рецензия на книгу: *Башков В.* (2022). Репетиция политического. Серен Кьеркегор и Карл Шмитт. Спб.: Владимир Даль.

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